Dumo v Espinas

Facts:

Spouses Dumo are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy beach resort in Bauang, La Union.  Severa J. Espinas filed a "Quieting of Title and/or Ownership and Possession against spouses Sandy and Presnida Saldana, subject matter of the case being the same resort.

Although a decision has been rendered against the defendants in the case against spouses Saldana, the the same was not enforced.

Disgruntled with the refusal of the sheriff to put them in possession over the questioned real property, and in open defiance with the official action taken by the sheriff, all defendants acting for the interest of Espinas took it upon themselves, employing force, intimidation, and threat, to enter the property.

Despite protests made by Spouses Dumo, who were there then present and visibly outnumbered by defendants and their agents who were armed with sticks, bolos, hammers, and other deadly weapons, successfully drove out plaintiffs, and took over the premises

It was alleged that the defendants were boasting aloud that they were under instructions by the "judge" to do just that – to forcibly enter and take over the premises. While inside the premises, they demolished and totally tore down all the improvements.

Spouses Dumo prayed for the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages. The MTC rendered judgment holding that petitioners were able to prove their right of possession over the subject property.

Respondents appealed the case to the RTC of Bauang, La Union. The RTC reversed and set aside the Decision of the MTC. It also ruled that as regards damages, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property.

Spouses Dumo filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA held that the MTC correctly found that the petitioners were in possession of the subject land and agreed with the ruling of the RTC that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property concerned.

Issue:

Whether or not the the CA erred in holding that the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value for use of the property.

Held:

No. The CA is correct. There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.

The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.

Although the MTC’s order for the reimbursement to petitioners of their alleged lost earnings over beach resort could have been considered as compensation for their loss of the use and occupation of the property while it was in the possession of the respondents, records do not show any evidence to sustain the same. 

Quinagoran v CA

Facts:

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages against Victorino Quinagoran before the RTC Cagayan. They alleged that they are the co-owners of a  a parcel of land at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they inherited from the late Juan dela Cruz.   

Quinagoran started occupying a house on the north-west portion of the property, by tolerance of the heirs. The heirs asked petitioner to remove the house as they planned to construct a commercial building on the property but petitioner refused, claiming ownership over the lot.

The heirs prayed for the reconveyance and surrender of the disputed lot and to be paid the amount of P5,000.00 monthly until the property is vacated.

 Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)  to include all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00.  He argued that since the lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of P1,730, the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount. He likewise avers that it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should allege the assessed value of the property involved.

The heirs maintain that the contention of petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss before the RTC that the assessed value of the disputed lot is below P20,000.00 is based on the assessed value of an adjacent property and no documentary proof was shown to support the said allegation. It also contended that the tax declaration which petitioner presented, together with his Supplemental Reply before the CA, and on the basis of which he claims that the disputed property's assessed value is only P551.00, should also not be given credence as the said tax declaration reflects the amount of P56,100.or the entire property.

 The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action is accion publicciana and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of the value of the property.  The CA affirmed decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of the property involved?

Held:

NO. Jurisdiction lies in the MTC.

The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true.  As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.

         Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides:

 SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

 (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

            In Atuel v. Valdez,  the Court likewise expressly stated that:

            Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.  Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction “in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of real property.”  However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.

         In the case, Quinagoran maintains that there should be such an allegation of the assessed value of the real property to determine jurisdiction. However, nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned.  There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.

        Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss.  Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void. The CA also erred in affirming the RTC. 

Garces v CA

FACTS:

Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986.  She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.

Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office.  Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as the same is not vacant.

Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths.  It was addressed “Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte” which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.

Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces be cancelled.

Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.  Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.

 RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the “cases” or “matters” referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections.  

 CA affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?

HELD:

No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.

Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:

“Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution.  A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself.  Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC.  On the contrary, it was the COMELEC’s resolution that triggered this Controversy.  

The “case” or “matter” referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute.  The settled rule is that “decision, rulings, order” of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving “elective regional, provincial and city officials.”

In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC’s choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official.  Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  

To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over “all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.”

*Petition denied 

Limpin v IAC

Facts:
Four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino to Guillermo Ponce and his wife Adela (since deceased) as security for a loan of P2,200,000.00. The mortgages were registered. Two of the lots, those covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, were afterwards sold by the Aquinos to the Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title.

Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money judgment against Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in Court of First Instance of Davao. To satisfy the judgment, the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 were levied upon on and sold at public auction to Limpin as the highest bidder for the sum of P517,485.41.

On order of the trial court, the covering titles were cancelled and issued to Limpin. Limpin sold the two lots to Rogelio M. Sarmiento. By virtue of said sale, TCTs Nos. 285450 and 285451 were cancelled on November 4, 1983, and TCT’S were replaced in Sarmiento's name.

Ponce filed suit against the Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the Aquinos' four lots. Judgment was rendered in favor of Ponce. After the judgment became final, the Trial Court, directed the sale at public auction of the 4 mortgaged lots to satisfy the judgment.

The 4 lots, including those formerly covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, were sold to Ponce himself whose bid was the highest and exactly correspond to the judgment debt. On the same day, the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered.

Ponce then moved for the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of a writ of possession in his favor covering the four lots. But the Trial Court confirmed only the sale of the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 02839 and 92840, refusing to confirm the sale or issue a writ of possession in regard to the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 on the ground that those titles had already been cancelled and new ones issued to Gregorio F. Limpin.

Limpin refused to participate in the hearings contending that the Court had no jurisdiction over his person; but he did comment that the mortgage over the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 had been released by Ponce by virtue of a "Partial Release of Real Estate Mortgage". The Trial Court denied Ponce's motion for reconsideration, whereupon he sought corrective relief by filing a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus in the Intermediate Appellate Court, impleading Limpin and Sarmiento, as private respondents.

IAC set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and issue a writ of possession to Ponce with respect thereto, subject to Sarmiento's equity of redemption.

Issue:

Whether or not IAC erred in according superiority to the mortgage rights of Ponce over the levy and sale in favor of Limpin and the subsequent sale to Sarmiento.

Held:

NO. The superiority of the mortgagee's lien over that of a subsequent judgment creditor is now expressly provided in Rule 39, Section 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, which states with regard to the effect of levy on execution that it shall create a lien in favor of a judgment creditor over the right title and interest of the judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to the liens or encumbrances then existing.

Using jurisprudence in Santiago v Dionisio, the Court in that case held that:

... [T]he effect of the failure to implead a subordinate lienholder or subsequent purchaser or both is to render the foreclosure ineffective as against them, with the result that there remains in their favor the "unforeclosed equity of redemption." But the foreclosure is valid as between the parties to the suit.
Applied to this case, this means that the sale to Ponce, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the two lots in question should have been confirmed, subject to Limpin's (and now Sarmiento's equity to redemption. The registration of the lands, first in the name of Limpin and later of Sarmiento, was premature. At most what they were entitled to was the registration of their equity of redemption.

It is well settled that a recorded mortgage is a right in rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. The recordation of the mortgage in this case puts the whole world on constructive notice of its existence and warned everyone who thereafter dealt with the property on which it was constituted that he would have to reckon with that encumbrance. Hence, Limpin's subsequent purchase of the "interests and participation" of Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, as well as the sale of the same to Sarmiento were both subject to said mortgage.

--

Additional rulings not related to topic:

* The fact that at the time Ponce foreclosed the mortgage on October 21, 1983, the lots had already been bought by Limpin and subsequently sold to Sarmiento is of no consequence, since the settled doctrine is that the effects of the foreclosure sale retroact to the date of registration of the mortgage, i.e., March 1, 1973 in the present case.

* As regards the claim that Ponce executed a deed of partial release of his mortgage on July 20, 1977, the evidence discloses that Ponce and Jose Aquino, the mortgagor, thereafter executed separate affidavits dated December 1, 1983, stating that the said partial release was void, not only for want of consideration but also for lack of the signatures of Ponce's two sons who at the time of the execution of the document, were co-mortgagees as successors and heirs of Mrs. Adela Ponce. Moreover, the Deed of Partial Release was not registered but had simply been attached.

Galano v Roxas

Facts:

In the local elections of 1967, respondent Nemesio Roxas was elected mayor of the Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal. Shortly after he assumed office there were filed with his office 24 resignations signed by petitioners Chief of Police Jesus Galano and his twenty-three co-petitioners, all members of the police department of said town. These resignations were accepted by respondent mayor.

As a result of the above resignations, 8 policemen of the town remained. With the police force thus badly depleted, two municipal councilors, Arriola and Valerio, had to perform traffic and patrol duties. Soon enough, respondent mayor appointed replacements to the positions vacated by petitioners.

Petitioners addressed separate letters to the Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission complaining that respondent mayor had threatened them into filing those "courtesy resignations" and praying that the same be declared null and void and the appointments of their respective replacements be accordingly disapproved.

The Civil Service Commission referred the matter for investigation to the Police Commission. Hearing Officer of the Police Commission who conducted the investigation submitted his report recommending that the resignations of petitioners be declared null and void and that they be reinstated to their former positions with corresponding payment of back salaries. This report was approved by the Police Commission en banc and forwarded to the Civil Service Commission, with the result that the latter made the indorsement to respondent mayor. Respondent then made the indorsement to the President (at this time, it was Marcos).

After respondent submitted copies of the transcript of the proceedings in the PolCom and other pertinent documents, as required, to the Office of the President, no further action has been taken by that office on respondent's indorsement. And as respondent would not comply with the orders of the Civil Service Commission, on November 20, 1969, the instant petition for mandamus (which is actually a quo warranto proceeding) was filed with this Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the quo warranto proceeding was properly filed.

Held:

NO. A petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within 1 year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position And this period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy. Accordingly, after said period has lapsed, the remedy of the aggrieved party, if any, lies exclusively with administrative authorities.

The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are pre-requisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period.

In the case at bar, the theory of petitioners themselves is that they were separated from the service thru the ruse of accepting their "courtesy resignations" between January 2 and 6, 1968 and the record shows that they were aware of the supposed illegality of their ouster as early as January 10, 1968, the date of their separate letters to the Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission impugning the action of respondent mayor. It is thus evident that in the premises, they are beyond the help of the courts, their time to resort thereto having lapsed.

*Petitioner to declare Galano in contempt of court, DENIED

Davao Light & Power Co. Inc. v CA (204 SCRA 343)

Facts:

Davao Light and Power Inc, Co. filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages against Queensland Hotel and Teodorico Adarna. The complaint contained an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment.

Judge Nartatez granted the writ and fixed the attachment bond at around P4Million.  The summons, copy of complaint, writ of attachment, copy of attachment bond were served upon Queensland and Adarna. Pursuant to the writ, the Sheriff seized the properties of the latter.

Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time the order of attachment was promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11,1989), the Trial Court  had not yet acquired jurisdiction over cause and person of defendants.

Trial Court denied the motion to discharge.

CA annulled the Trial Court’s Order. Davao seeks to reverse CA’s order.

Issue:

Whether or not preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant before acquiring jurisdiction over his person.

Held:

Yes. Rule 57 speaks of the grant of the remedy “at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter” What the rule is saying is that after an action is properly commenced (by filing of the complaint and payment of all requisite docket and other fees), the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment. This he may do so, before or after, the summons to the defendant.

The CA decision is reversed and the writ of attachment issued by Judge Nartatez is reinstated.

**

Preliminary Attachment – provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into custody of court as security for satisfaction of judgment to be recovered.

Nature of Attachment: a remedy which is purely statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict of construction of the provisions granting it. No principle, whether statutory or through jurisprudence, prohibits its issuance  by any court before the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person.

Versoza v CA (299 SCRA 100)

Facts:

Fe Uson is the owner of a parcel of land in Sual, Pangasinan. She mortgaged the land to Wilfredo Versoza.  For failing to pay her obligation, Versoza foreclosed the property. The Provincial Sheriff set the foreclosure sale. 

To prevent from proceeding with the foreclosure sale, Uson filed for annulment of mortgage with a prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint of Uson was dismissed on the ground that it was not personally verified by Uson. The court granted Uson’s Motion for Reconsideration and filed an amended complaint with the required verification.

In the meantime, Versoza asked the Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure. Uson requested that the sale be deferred since there was a pending action (annulment of mortgage) in court. However, the sale continued and the property was sold to Versoza.

After the redemption period, Sheriff issued the Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale. The lot is now under Versoza’s name. Sometime after, Versoza sold the lot to Pilar Martinez.

Uson filed her an application for preliminary injunction in her 2^nd amended complaint impleading Martinez and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan as defendants to the case.

Trial Court granted the injunction and ordered Martinez to cease and desist from performing acts of ownership over the lot.

Versoza and Martinez now claims that the status quo to be preserved refers to the point before the filing of the 2^nd complaint and before Martinez acquired the property. They also contend that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. The judge of the case clarified that the status quo being maintained in this case is the possession of Uson of the land and does not refer to Martinez being the registered owner of the lot.

Issue:

1.       Whether or not Uson is entitled to an injunctive writ.

2.       What is the status quo ante that the writ seeks to preserve?

3.       Wherher or not consummated acts can be restrained by injunction in this case?

Held:

1.       YES. The requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ are:

                The invasion of the right is material and substantial;

The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;

There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

The requisites are all present in the case. Uson had title to and possession of the property. She also claimed to have paid her obligation except for a nominal unpaid balance which she agrees to consign judicially. Hence, she has a clear and unmistakable right to protect her title and possession of the mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale.

2.       Status quo maintained is from Uson’s possession of the land. As defined, status quo is the last peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy. Its preservation is the function of the injunctive suit.  When the amended complaint does not introduce new issues or causes of action, the suit is deemed to commence on the date when the original complaint was filed.

3.       YES. While the general rule is that injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done, there is an exception – where the acts performed after an injunction suit is brought,  a defendant may not as a matter of right proceed to perform the acts sought to restrained and then be heard to assert in a suit that the injunction will not lie because he has already performed the acts before the final hearing. 

The court said that, a court should not (by means of preliminary injunction) transfer the property from the possession of a party to another where legal title is in dispute and the party having possession of the property asserts its ownership. One who does the act sought to be restrained, does so at his own peril.

In the case, when Uson filed the complaint, she had title to and was asserting ownership of the lot. An action was brought to enjoin Versoza from proceeding with the sale but he continued it. In doing so, Versoza was acting at his own peril.

Socorro Limos v Spouses Odones (G.R. No. 186979)

A request for admission is not intended merely to reproduce or reiterate the allegations but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request.

FACTS:

Spouses Odones filed a complaint for Annulment of Title against Limos before the RTC in Camiling, Tarlac. The complaint alleged that they were owners of a parcel of land by virtue of an extrajudicial succession.

It took a while before the respondents decided to register the conveyance and when they did, they found out that the land’s OCT was replaced by a TCT in the name of Socorro Limos.

Limos allegedly secured the TCT by virtue of a sale executed by Donata Lardizabal and husband, Francisco Razalan.

Respondents sought the cancellation of the TCT on the grounds that the signatures of Lardizabal and Razalan were forged. The petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses in their Answer to which the respondents gave a Reply maintaining that the sale was valid.

Thereafter, the petitioners served upon respondents a Request for Admission of the following matters:

1. That the husband of the deceased Donata Lardizabal is Francisco Razalan;

2. That the children of the deceased Sps. Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan are Mercedes Razalan, Tomasa Razalan and Tomas Razalan;

3. That this Tomasa Razalan died on April 27, 1997, and her heirs are (a) Melecio Partido surviving husband, and her surviving children are (b) Eduardo Partido, (c) Enrique Razalan Partido, (d) Eduardo Razalan Partido, (e) Sotera Razalan Partido and (f) Raymundo Razalan Partido.

4. That Amadeo Razalan is claiming also to be a grandchild and also claiming to be sole forced heir of Donata Lardizabal

5. That Amadeo Razalan is not among those who signed the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale;

6. That as per Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan which was submitted by the plaintiffs, the children of Tomasa Razalan are Sotera Razalan and 2 brothers/sisters. These children of Tomasa Razalan did not also sign the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale;

7. That there is/are no heirs of Clemente Razalan who appeared to have executed the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale;

Petitioners failed to respond to this Request for Admission, prompting the filing of a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing and arguing that the failure of Respondents to object to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission pursuant to Rule 26, Sec 2 of the RoC. As such a hearing on the affirmative defenses had become imperative because petitioners were no longer required to present evidence on the admitted facts.

Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending that the facts sought to be admitted were not material and relevant to the case.

RTC -> denied the Motion and held that items 1-4 were already earlier pleaded as an affirmative defense, hence, it would be redundant for Respondents to make another denial.

CA -> dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative defenses could be best proven by a hearing

So Petitioner’s seek for a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense is proper.

HELD:

NO. Under Rule 26, Sec 1 and 2: A party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have impliedly admitted all matters contained therein. It must be emphasized that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the discretion of the court. A request for admission is not intended merely to reproduce or reiterate the allegations but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request.

Thus, if the trial court finds that the matters in the Request were already admitted then the requested party cannot be compelled to admit or deny them again. In turn the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response  to request or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Rule 26, Sec 2.

In the case, the redundant and unnecessary nature of the Petitioner’s Request  rendered it irrelevant so as to apply the implied admission rule. Since there is no implied admission attributable to the Respondent’s failure to respond, then the argument that a preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.

---

*As to validity of the sale, Court held that it shall be determined in a full-blown trial. A preliminary hearing will not sufficiently address these issues.

Gomez v Montalban (G.R. No. 174414)

When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.

Facts:

Lita Montalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez in the amount of P40,000 with a voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15% interest per month. Montalban failed to comply with her obligation so Gomez filed a complaint in the RTC for sum of money. Summons was served but despite her receipt, she still failed to file an Answer. She was declared in default and upon motion, Gomez was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Montalban to pay Gomez.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that there was no proper service of summons since there was no personal service. She alleged that one Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre was not authorized to receive summons and that her failure to file an Answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence (FAME). The Petition was set for hearing but counsel for respondent failed to appear before the court hence the dismissal of the Petition.

Montalban filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the Petition stating that counsel’s failure to appeal was unintentional to which the RTC granted. To this instance, Gomez filed a Petition for Reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the granting of Petition for Relief from Judgment by the RTC is proper.

Held:

NO. The RTC committed an error in doing so. A Petition for Relief under Rule 38 is only available against a final and executory judgment and the grounds include fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

Discussion on Grounds:

"Mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake," which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. This does not exist in the case at bar, because respondent has in no wise been prevented from interposing an appeal.

"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court,or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy. This is not present in the case at hand as respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to present her case.

Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. Under Section 1 Rule 38, the "negligence" must be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsel's conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court's ruling.

In Tuason v CA, the court explained the nature of a Petition for Relief from Judgment:
“A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.”

In the case, Montalban contended that judgment was entered against her through mistake or fraud because she was not duly served summons. However, under the discussion of the following grounds, the SC sees no merit in her petition.

*Petition for Relief from Judgment is set aside.

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v CA (334 SCRA 305)

Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial/quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and that there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. It seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction. Also certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy.

On the other hand, Rule 45 as a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment which include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings. All errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.

FACTS:

Banco Fil sold to Tala Realty 4 lots in Iloilo. Tala then leased the properties back to Banco Fil for a monthly rental of P21,000 for a period of 20 years. Tala demanded payment for rentals but Banco Fil failed to comply with their obligation so Tala filed numerous ejectment suits against Banco Fil. Incidentally, Banco Fil also filed 16 other complaints for recovery of real property to which Tala filed a Motion to Dismiss (MtD). The trial court granted the MtD and denied Banco Fil’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Banco Fil, instead of filing an appeal, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion because it did not comply with the constitutional mandate on the form for decisions. CA dismissed the certiorari stating that Rule 65 may be granted only when there’s no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.

Banco Fil received the copy of the CA’s decision and filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which the CA again denied. Banco Fil filed another petition for certiorari under Rule 65 this time with the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether appeal to SC under Rule 65 is proper.

HELD:

NO. SC immediately dismissed petition for the violation of the basic rules of Remedial Law. The proper remedy from the CA’s adverse resolutions to the SC is an ordinary appeal via petition for review under Rule 45.

Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial/quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and that there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. It seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction. Also certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy.

On the other hand, Rule 45 as a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment which include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings. All errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.

In the case, Banco Fil’s allegations that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion were only bare allegations since Banco Fil even admitted that the CA labored out a 33-page rationale on the decision of their case, thus, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.

Note that, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Hence, the availability to Banco Fil of the remedy under Rule 45 effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Also note that certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal. In the case, Banco Fil’s recourse under Rule 65 cannot be taken, because when it filed a petition for certiorari to the SC, the reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Rule 45 to the CA had already lapsed. 

Canlas v Tubil

Rule 40, Sec 8 CANNOT apply to a case where the MTC has original jurisdiction and where the case was already decided on its merits.

FACTS:

Iluminada Tubil was the owner of a residential lot in Guagua, Pampanga. Rudy, Victoria and Felicidad Canlas erected a house on the aforementioned lot and occupied it as their residential house upon mere tolerance by the owner. Tubil now wanted to use the land fruitfully so demands were made to vacate the lot. Canlas refused so a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Tubil before the MTC. Canlas filed a motion to dismiss (MtD) on the grounds that the MTC was without jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the parties were not the real parties-in-interest.

MtD was denied. Canlas filed an answer stating that they were in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the land; that Tubil’s title over the land issued by a Free Patent was dubious; that the action was actually accion publiciana which is beyond MTC’s jurisdiction.

MTC dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer on the grounds that Tubil failed to show that there was mere tolerance. RTC affirmed. Respondent files a petition for review with the CA which reversed the MTC’s decision and ordered the RTC to decide on the merits of the case. Canlas now files a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari contending that the RTC does not have original jurisdiction over the subject matter, thus, it cannot validly decide on the merits pursuant to Rule 40, Section 8, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court (RoC).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rule 40, Section 8 is applicable in this case.

HELD:

NO.  Rule 40, Sec 8, par 2 states that “If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction BUT shall decide the case without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence…”

The SC held that the case was of unlawful detainer to which the MTC has original jurisdiction over the subject matter, not accion publiciana where the RTC has original jurisdiction.

Having ruled that the MTC acquired jurisdiction, it properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint for failure of the respondent to prove mere tolerance by sufficient evidence. Rule 40, Section 8 of the RoC has no application in this case.

*Decision of the MTC is reinstated.

** Property Review:

Unlawful Detainer - an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

-summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.

Accion Publiciana - action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper RTC when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.

If at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.

Mapa v CA

Facts:

High Peak Mining Exploration Corporation borrowed money from Land Bank, the latter acting as trustee. Loans are evidence by a Promissory Note (PN) but there was no further security attached for it. High peak failed to pay loans so LBP sent demand letters.  The PNs became the subject matter of a complaint for the recovery of sum of money where Deputy Sheriff Romulo Flores filed a return of service of summons stating that since Mapa (Chairman of High Peak) could not be found in the given business address( 2^nd flr, First Midland Condominium, Makati), he gave a substituted service to Susan dela Torre, an employee of the High Peak. Mapa filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the service of summons was highly defective because the sheriff’s return did not show that the sheriff exerted efforts to personally serve the summons, thus substituted summons was not warranted.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid substituted service of summons.

Held:

Yes. The absence in the sheriff’s return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. It must be emphasized that the absence in the sheriff’s return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. While the sheriff’s return carries with it the presumption of regularity of duties, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in relation to duty was not done simply because it was not disclosed.

In the case, Mapa did not deny the statements made by the sheriff – that Susan is authorized to receive processes of this nature. Until rebutted by competent evidence, returns would enjoy the presumption of regularity. Thus, Susan may be deemed as an agent of High Peak to whom a substituted service of summons can be made. 

Carpio v Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas (Batangas), Inc.

Facts:

Rodolfo Carpio and Remedios Orendain filed with the RTC Batangas a complaint against Rural Bank and Jaime Ozaeta, clerk of court and sheriff of the same court. Petitioner alleges that they are absolute owners of a parcel of land in Sto. Tomas, Batangas. They obtained a loan of P515,000 from the Bank and executed a real estate mortgage over the same property. Without prior demand or notice to petitioners, Bank filed for extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Ozaeta then conducted a public auction where the Bank was the only bidder.

Petitioners allege that the sale was conducted without proper publication because the sheriff’s notice of sale was not published in a newspaper of general circulation, and that they were not given the opportunity to redeem the property. Bank filed an Answer with Counterclaim alleging that oral and written demands were made to petitioners, that there was proper publication, and that petitioners were given 2 years to redeem the property but they failed.

Petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that the Bank’s counterclaim was not accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. Bank filed an opposition, contending that its counterclaim is compulsory, thereby needing no more certificate of forum shopping since it is not an initiatory pleading or complaint. RTC dismissed the motion to dismiss. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not counterclaim needs to be accompanied by a certificate of forum shopping.

Held:

No. Section 5,Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure distinctly provides that the required certification is intended to cover an initiatory pleading – meaning an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. Rationale of this provision is to curb the malpractice of forum shopping.

In the case, the Bank’s Answer with Counterclaim is a responsive pleading, filed to counter petitioner’s complaint that initiates the civil action. The provision does not contemplate a defendant’s claim for relief that is derived from the main action or complaint.

*Petition denied

** Forum Shopping – an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum.

Elpidio Uy v CA

Facts of the Case:

Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), Pool Formation Trust Agreement (PFTA), PNB  and Public Estates Authority (PEA) entered into an agreement to implement the Heritage Memorial Park.  BCDA was the Project Owner and tasked to sell Heritage Park Investment Certificates to buyers. As trustee, PNB is given the legal and beneficial title to hold the certificates. The certificate holders organized themselves into a non-stock, non-profit corporation, Heritage Park Management Corp. (HPMC).

            Now, PEA and Uy’s business (Edison Dev’t and Construction) executed a Landscaping and Construction Agreement whereby the business will do all the landscaping and the construction of a terrasoleum. Since there was delay in the construction, the Heritage Park Executive Committee terminated the construction contracts so HPMC assumed all the duties and responsibilities of PEA.

Uy filed a complaint against PEA before the Construction Industry Arbitrary Commission (CIAC) where it sought to recover payments for the construction already done in the project.  The CIAC awarded monetary claims to Uy and a Notice of Garnishment was served on HPMC.

HPMC then filed a petition for Injunction/Prohibition before the CA on the ground that the CIAC had no jurisdiction since HPMC was not impleaded as a party in the case before CIAC. HPMC contended it is an indispensable party since it holds the certificates, any claim against PEA is a claim against all parties who contributed funds to the project.  Uy’s contention is that HPMC is not a party-in-interest since it was only a mere trustee of the funds and would not be directly benefited or injured by the outcome of the case.

Issue:

            Whether or not HPMC is a real party-in-interest or an indispensable party.

Held:

            Indispensable party.  An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by court’s action in litigation and without whom there can be no final determination of the case. A party’s interest in the subject matter and in the relief sought are so intertwined that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity.

            According to the provisions of PFTA, PEA would turn over to HPMC all the contracts relating to Heritage Park. At the time of the filing of the CIAC case, PEA already assigned its interests to HPMC and therefore, no longer a party-in-interest. HPMC now stands to be benefited/injured in the suit. Since HPMC was not impleaded, there cannot be an effective, complete and equitable resolution of the dispute.

Notes on indispensable parties:

*Does CIAC have jurisdiction? YES. Both parties agree to submit the dispute for arbitration. However, CIAC should’ve dismissed the case on the grounds that HPMC was not impleaded. Indispensable parties must be joined as either plaintiffs or defendants. When they are not joined, it is the duty of the court to stop trial and order its inclusion.

*The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties lies on the plaintiff. Defendant has no tight to compel.

Philippine Veterans Bank v BCDA (G.R. No. 173085)

FACTS: 
BCDA filed several expropriation actions before the branches of the RTC of Angeles City for the acquisition of lands needed to construct the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX). The defendants in this case are the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Ten of these cases were raffled off to Branch 58 of the RTC of Angeles City.

Upon learning of the expropriation cases filed, PVB filed a motion to intervene and alleged that the properties actually belonged to Belmonte Agro-Industrial Development Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in 1976. PVB bought the land upon foreclosure but was not able to consolidate ownership in its name. PVB's motion was denied on the ground that the intervetion amounted to a third-party complaint that is not allowed in expropriation cases and that it will only serve to delay the proceedings. PVB's motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PVB is entitled to intervene in expropriation cases.

HELD:
No. Sec 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of  Civil Procedure empowers the court to order payment to itself of the proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to be settled. At the time PVB tried to intervene, its conflict with the farmer beneficiaries were already pending before another branch of RTC Angeles City. Branch 58 had no authority to pre-empt the other branch of its power to hear and adjudicate claims before it.



PVB's withdrawal of its actions in the other branch because it was found that jurisdiction lies with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) will still leave Branch 58 with no power to adjudicate the issues of ownership presented by PVB's intervention. PVB's remedy is to secure an order from Branch 58 to have the proceeds of the expropriation deposited with that branch, pending the adjudication of ownership by the DARAB.