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Miyerkules, Mayo 16, 2018

Travel n Tours v. Cruz et. al.

FACTS:

Edgar Hernandez owns an Isuzu Passenger Jitney which he was driving along Angeles-Magalang Road. A passenger bus (RCJ Bus Lines) owned by Travel & Tours was driven by Edgar Calaycay. The bus was travelling in the same direction as the jeepney. The bus bumped the rear portion of the jeepney causing it to ram into an acacia tree and resulted in the death of Alberto Cruz and serious physical injuries of Virginia Muñoz.

Hernandez, Muñoz and the father of Alberto Cruz filed a complaint for damages claiming that the Calaycay was negligent in driving the bus. Travel & Tours claimed the exercise of diligence of the good father of the family in hiring Calaycay and further claimed that it was Hernandez’ negligence that caused the accident when the jeep cut across the lane of the bus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Travel & Tours is liable for damages.

HELD:

YES. Travel & Tours is liable for damages.

As owner of the bus and employer of Calaycay, Travel & Tours is liable.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."

Article 2180 states:

"The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible x x x.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry x x x."

Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code provides that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it had exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care. In this case, the petitioner failed to do so.

Edgar Calaycay was duly authorized by the defendant company to drive the bus at the time of the incident. Petitioner’s claim that it has issued policies, rules and regulations to be followed, conduct seminars and see to it that their drivers and employees imbibe such policies, rules and regulations, have their drivers and conductors medically checked-up and undergo drug-testing, did not show that all these rudiments were applied to Edgar Calaycay. No iota of evidence was presented that Edgar Calaycay had undergone all these activities to ensure that he is a safe and capable driver. In fact, the defendant company did not put up a defense on the said driver. The defendant company did not even secure a counsel to defend the driver.

Travel & Tours did not even know the correct and true name of its drivers. In one of the pieces of evidence presented by Travel & Tours, the name of the driver was Calaycay Francisco. Hence, the liability of the employer for the tortuous acts or negligence of its employer is primary and solidary, direct and immediate, and not conditional upon the insolvency of prior recourse against the negligent employee.

However, both vehicles were not in their authorized routes at the time of the incident the jeepney was in violation of its allowed route as found by the RTC and the CA, hence, the owner and driver of the jeepney likewise, are guilty of negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil Code:

When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Since it has been established that the proximate cause of the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. is the negligence of Calaycay with the contributory negligence of Hernandez, the heirs of Alberto Cruz, Jr. shall recover damages of only 50% of the award from petitioner and its driver and the other 50% by Hernandez.

Malayan Insurance v. Alibudbud

Facts:

Diana Alibudbud,employed by Malayan Insurance as the Senior Vice President for its Sales Department was issued a Honda Civic sedan with the following conditions: (1) she must continuously stay and serve Malayan for at least three full years from the date of the availment of the Car Financing Plan; and (2) that in case of resignation, retirement or termination before the three-year period, she shall pay in full 100% share of Malayan and the outstanding balance of his/her share of the cost of the motor vehicle.

Alibudbud execute a Promissory Note and a Deed of Chattel Mortgage in the amount of P360,000.00. One of the stipulations in the Deed state that Alibudbud shall refund Malayan an amount equivalent to its 50% equity share in the motor vehicle, or P360,000.00 if she leaves Malayan within three years from the availment of the subject vehicle.

Alibudbud was dismissed from Malayan due to redundancy. Malayan demanded that she surrender possession of the car but Alibudbud refused to do so.

Malayan instituted a complaint for Replevin. Afterwards, Alibudbud filed an illegal dismissal case against Malayan. She also sought for the suspension of the proceedings on the action for Replevin on the grounds that the illegal dismissal case was a prejudicial question. The complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed.

The RTC granted the replevin and stated that: Alibudbud is under obligation to pay in full the acquisition cost of the car issued to her by Malayan; Alibudbud's ownership over the car is not yet absolute for it bears the notation "encumbered", thereby signifying her obligation to pay its value within the period set forth in the Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage; and that the replevin action was converted into a money claim in view of Alibudbud's vehement refusal to surrender the possession of the car.

The CA dismissed the action for replevin on the grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction on the action for replevin as there was an “employer-employee” relationship which was, in effect, a pre-condition before one can avail of the car financing plan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC properly took cognizance of the Replevin case; Whether or not the parties’ relationship to each other is that of an “employer-employee”

HELD:

YES, the RTC properly took cognizance of the Replevin case. The relationship of the parties is that of debtor and creditor. Malayan's demand for Alibudbud to pay the 50% company equity over the car or, to surrender its possession, is civil in nature. The trial court's ruling also aptly noted the Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage voluntarily signed by Alibudbud to secure her financial obligation to avail of the car being offered under Malayan's Car Financing Plan. The issue in the replevin action is separate and distinct from the illegal dismissal case.

Kuan and Ching v. Ho et. al.


FACTS:

Tan Siok Kuan and Pute Ching are owners of parcels of land in Quezon City. They have been leasing portions of the property to the defendants since 1972. On 07 February 2003, they notified defendants of their failure to pay rentals (from the period of September 1997 to December 2002). For failure to pay the rentals and vacating the premises, seven (7) unlawful detainer cases were filed by the petitioners against the defendants.

Defendants Bombita, Gagarin and Napolitano allege that the lease agreements they executed were void ab initio as the petitioners were Chinese nationals who are not entitled to own real property in the Philippines. They also claim possession since 1968, and that as a result, plaintiffs should have filed  an accion publiciana and not an action for unlawful detainer.

Defendants Ho, Returta, Salas and Malonzo claim that they have been in possession of the premises in 1966 (for 37 years) and that they have not paid rentals since their possession; that the photocopied Transfer Certificate of Titles presented by petitioners were mere photocopies; and that the cause of action should have been accion publiciana since no lease contract exists between the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a lessor-lessee relationship between the two parties.

HELD:

NONE.  There is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties.

Petitioners’ claims were bare allegations, showing no evidence of an express or implied lease. There was no mention of how and when the alleged contract of lease started, there was no proof of prior payment of rentals or any prior demand for such payment considering that the alleged failure to pay rentals was way back in 1997 and the case was only instituted in 2003.

* An implied admission of a lessor-lessee relationship falls under the exceptions to the principle of res inter alios acta.

Anecito Campos v. BPI (substituted by Houston Homedepot Inc.)

FACTS:

Anecito Campos mortgaged fourteen (14) lots in favour of Far East Bank and Trust Co. who merged with BPI(Bank) to secure a loan of P1 Million. On one of the vacant lots mortgaged, Campos constructed a 2-storey building with the knowledge and consent of the Bank. Campos defaulted and the Bank moved for the extra judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties.

As the Bank was the highest bidder during the public auction, the Bank was issued a Certificate of Sale. Campos failed to redeem the properties during the legal redemption period. Hence, the Bank filed a writ of possession before the Regional Trial Court. But before the Order for the Writ of Possession became final and executory, Campos filed a Motion for the Suspension of the Implementation of the Writ of Possession and/or to Allow Mortgagor to Present Evidence of Good Faith.

Campos claims that he was in good faith when the 2-storey building was constructed. He claims that he has the right to retain possession of the building and the lot until the Bank reimburses him for the value of the building.

The Bank opposed, claiming that the purchaser in a foreclosure sale has no obligation to reimburse the mortgagor for the value of the improvements. It also cited a stipulation in the Mortgage Contract which states that the mortgagor transfers the parcel of land “together with all the buildings and improvements now existing or which may hereafter be erected or constructed thereon…” Houston HomeDepot was impleaded in the case as it was the Bank’s transferee pendente lite.

RTC denied Campos’ motion for lack of merit. It also denied Campos’ motion for reconsideration, hence the Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:

a. Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied Campos’ motion to suspend the implementation of the writ of possession.

b. Whether or not Campos’ can claim that he is a builder in good faith and therefore entitled to reimbursement from the Bank.

HELD:


a. No. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Campos’ motion.

Section 7 of Act No. 3135 states that:

"In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in the form of an ex parte motion x x x and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately." (emphasis supplied)

This provision explicitly allows the purchaser of a foreclosed property to file an ex parte motion to acquire possession of the property. Since Campos never questioned the validity of the foreclosure sale, his remedy was to institute a separate value of the improvements This provision explicitly allows the purchaser of a foreclosed property to file an ex parte motion to acquire possession of the property. Since Campos never questioned the validity of the foreclosure sale, his remedy was to institute a separate civil action for the value of the improvements (i.e. the building).

Failure to redeem the foreclosed property extinguishes the mortgagor’s remaining interest in it. Following the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the purchaser’s name, the purchaser can demand possession at any time as a result of his absolute ownership. It becomes a ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession. The only exception to this is if the property is possessed by a third party whose possession is adverse to the mortgagor.

b. Campos cannot claim that he is a builder in good faith. Articles 448, 350 and 456 of the Civil Code do not apply in his situation. The articles contemplate situations when a person builds on the land of another. In Campos’ case, he built on his own property.

Also, following the principle of Autonomy of Contracts – that contractual obligations have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith – Campos’ voluntarily included the building when he entered into the mortgage contract with the Bank.