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Sabado, Setyembre 1, 2012

Pecson v Mediavillo (G.R. NO. 7890)



Facts:

The last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased. After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir (judge) found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the opposition .

 Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion averring:


  • That Rosario is and Joaquin  was the grandchild of the testator, Florencio Pecson 
  • That Rosario, was disinherited by Florencio, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo states:

I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, Rosario, because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.


  • That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which she now suffers in periodical attacks.

It also appears from the evidence that Teresa (daughter of Florencio, mother of Rosario) also died. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the death of the testator.

The lower court found out that the evidence shows that Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him. But since she was 14 years old, and shortly afterwards became insane, she was not responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather.

The court therefore decreed that  clause 3 of the will is contrary to law and is set aside for being of no force or value whatever.  

Issue:

Whether or not the courts, when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such disinheritance. 

Held:

 Yes. The Civil Code (Art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited.

In the case,  It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had received some attentions from a young man – that she had received a letter from him – and that her grandfather, Florencio, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said young man.  It was upon that occasion when the disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that after said event, she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the present time.

The lower court is correct in taking into consideration her tender years, that she was probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.



Republic v Enriquez (166 SCRA 608)


FACTS:
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue served a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property on the Maritime Company of the Philippines to satisfy various deficiency taxes of said company. The First Coast Guard District acknowledged receipt from the Commissioner of several barges , vehicles and 2 bodegas of spare parts belonging to taxpayer Maritime.

                Ramon Enriquez (Deputy Sheriff of Manila) levied on 2 barges of Maritime pursuant to a writ of execution issued in a Civil Case involving Maritime where the aforesaid company lost. Enriquez then scheduled a public auction sale including the aforementioned properties.

                The Commissioner wrote the sheriff informing him that the barges were no longer owned by Maritime as the said barges had been distrained and seized by the BIR in satisfaction of the deficiency taxes. This letter was filed on June 19, 1986 at the office of the sheriff.

                On June 23, 1986, the sheriff sold the 2 barges and issued certificates of sale to the highest bidder which was the levying creditor.

                On June 24, 1986, Commissioner filed a petition for prohibition praying that the respondent be ordered to desist and refrain from further proceedings in connection with the execution and that respondent’s notice of levy be null and void. The CA dismissed the petition holding that the sheriff did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the BIR Warrant of Distraint prevails over the writ of execution issued by an RTC.

HELD:
BIR Warrant of Distraint prevails. It is well settled that the claim of the government prevails on a tax lien superior to the claim of a private litigant predicated on a judgment. The tax lien attached not only from the service of warrant of distraint but from the time the tax became due and payable.

In the case, the Distraint was made by the Commissioner long before the writ of execution was issued by the RTC. There is no question that at the time of the writ of execution, the 2 barges were no longer properties of Maritime. The power of the court in execution of judgments extends only to properties unquestionable belonging to the judgment debtor. Execution sale affect the rights of the judgment debtor only, and the purchaser in an auction sale acquires only such right as the judgment debtor had at the time of sale.

There is no further need for petitioner to establish his rights over the 2 barges as evidence clearly proves that the barges are under distraint and in fact seized by the Commisssioner.

*Notice of Levy and Execution Sale annulled. Respondent is enjoined from further proceeding with the sale.