Republic v Leonor (609 SCRA 75)

In a reversion proceeding, premised on the claim that the property is a foreshore land or that the patents were obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, the burden is on the one who claims it to be so.

Mere omission of nformation from the patent application, though essential, does not, per se, cause ipso facto cancellation of the patent.

FACTS:

DENR-Region IV (through the Solicitor General) filed complaints for Cancellation of Free Paten and OCT and Reversion against Ignacio Leonor and Catalino Razon. The complaints averred that Lot No. 10108-8617 and 10109 were part of the non-disposable foreshore land and did not appear in the cadastral map or records of the DENR. These defects allegedly constituted fraud w/c ,ipso facto cancelled the free patents and the corresponding OCTs.  An investigation of Lots 9368 and 9675 resulted in the discovery that although the lots appeared in the cadastral map, they were not cadastrally surveyed and that serious discrepancies existed among the technical descriptions in the certificates of title.

Respondents filed an answer stating that the free patents were issued in accordance with law, that the lots were surveyed by Alexander Jacob (Geodetic Eng’g) of the Bureau of Lands, and that the subject lots were not investigated by DENR.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents due to insufficiency of evidence. CA declared that 2 of the lands were foreshore lands.and sustained the RTC’s finding that there was no sufficient evidence on the rest of the subject lots.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed error when it sustained the validity of the 3 subject free patents.

HELD:

No. For Lot 8617, records show that the only piece of evidence alluding to this lot being foreshore land is the testimony of Atty. Apuhin from DENR.  His only finding was that the lots had already been developed as a beach resort (owned by Leonor) but the court examined the cadastral map and that there was nothing to indicate that it is a foreshore land. What is obvious is that the lot is close to the waters of Balayan Bay.  However, proximity alone does not necessarily make it a foreshore land. Also petitioner was not able to establish that there was clear and convincing evidence of fraud.

Petitioner also points out that in the free patent application, Leonor did not indicate the name of his predecessors – that this was in violation of the Public Land Act and will ipso facto cancel the free patent. SC said that mere omission of information , though essential, will not ipso facto cancel the patent. It must be shown that the info withheld  would have resulted in the disapproval of the free patent application had it been disclosed.

For Lot 9398, petitioner cited discrepancies in its description. SC stated that such discrepancies would not necessarily imply that respondents employed fraud. Again, there was no proof. Petitioner also argues that the predecessors of Leonor are fictitious persons. The SC does not agree by stating that the predecessors were respondents in a case for accion reivindicatoria and quieting of title.

Conclusion: DENR did not conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged irregularities imputed to respondents in obtaining the free patents. 

Heirs of Crispulo Ferrer and Engracia Puhawan v CA

Doctrine: A survey made in a cadastral proceeding is not a proof of ownership. It merely identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title, its purpose is to identify and delineate the extent of the land.

On prescription: Art 1137 of the Civil Code only applies to private lands, not to public lands even if they have been declared alienable and disposable. Open, continuous, exclusive, notorious (OCEN) must be conclusively established. CA141 is applicable in this case.

Facts of the Case:

Petitioners sought to enjoin NAPOCOR (Nat’l Power Corporation) from selling the Caliraya Hydroelectric Power Plant. They claim ownership over portions of the land where the power plant stood, specifically Lot 1873 and Lot 72.

NAPOCOR claimed that they acquired Lot 1873 through purchase from Oliva Ferrer. As for Lot 72, it claimed that its right to occupy and use of the lot stemmed from the Right of Way Agreement executed by the petitioners.

Petitioners opposed this claim by alleging that Ferrer was a co-heir who owned Lot 1873. As a heir, Ferrer only inherited some part of the lot and the sale to NAPOCOR in excess of this amount was w/o authority from the co-owners and therefore, void.

RTC dismissed the action for injunction and claim for damages. It ruled that the petitioners failed to present convincing proof of ownership of Lot 1873, other than the Bureau of Lands certificate claimed and surveyed for Crispulo Ferrer. As for Lot 72, the RTC ruled that it had already been acquired by Hilaria and Victoria Puhawan through extrajudicial partition. Hence, petitioners have no legal claim over Lot 72. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have a claim to ownership of Lots 1873 and Lot 72.

Held:

No. The reliance of the petitioners on the Bureau of Lands certificate to prove ownership to Lot 1873 is not sufficient. All that the certification proved was that Crispulo Ferrer was a survey claimant. Purpose of a survey plan is simply to identify and delineate the extent of the land. It is not a proof of ownership. In the case, the petitioners were not even able to present the actual survey plan. Also, the CA found that the portions of land covered by his Ferrer’s title were not those where NAPOCOR’s power plant stood.

Also, they could NOT have acquired it by prescription. Acquisition of ownership of public lands is governed by Commonwealth Act 141, not Art. 1137 of Civil Code. There was no conclusive proof that Lot 1873 was decreed to be alienable and disposable. There was also nothing to support the allegation that their predecessors occupied Lot 1873 since 1916 or June 12, 1945.  Assuming that they have held possession since the date, (when NAPOCOR occupied portions of the land and began construction of the power plant) their inaction for 61 years establishes the fact that they were never in OCEN. Their claim is barred by laches.

As for Lot 72, their claim is also barred by laches. The lot was occupied by NAPOCOR since 1937 and again their inaction was to the petitioner’s disadvantage.

Motion for reconsideration denied. 

Bachrach v La Protectora

Facts:

Nicolas Segundo, Antonio Adiarte, Ignacio Flores and Modesto Serrano (defendants) formed a civil partnership called “La Protectora” for the purpose of engaging in the business of transporting passengers and freight at Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Marcelo Barba, acting as manager, negotiated for the purchase of 2 automobile trucks from E. M. Bachrach for P16,500. Barba paid P3,000 in cash and for the balance executed promissory notes.

One of these promissory notes was signed in the following manner:

“P.P La Protectora, By Marcelo Barba Marcelo Barba”

The other 2 notes were signed in the same way but the word “by” was omitted. It was obvious that in signing the notes, Barba intended to bind both the partnership and himself.

The defendants executed a document in which they declared that they were members of La Protectora and that they had granted to its president full authority to contract for the purchase of the 2 automobiles.  The document was delivered by Barba to Bachrach at the time the vehicles were purchased.

Barba incurred a debt amounting to P2,617.57 and Bachrach foreclosed a chattel mortgage on the trucks but there was still balance. To recover the balance, action was instituted against the defendants. Judgment was rendered against the defendants.

Issue:

a.Whether or not the defendants are liable for the firm debts.

b.Whether or not Barba had authority to incur expenses for the partnership (relevant issue)

Held:

a.Yes. Promissory notes constitute the obligation exclusively of La Protectora and Barba. They do not constitute an obligation directly binding the defendants.  Their liability is based on the principles of partnership liability. A member is not liable in solidum with his fellows for the entire indebtedness but is liable with them or his aliquot part.

SC obiter:  the document was intended merely as an authority to enable Barba to bind the partnership and that the parties to the instrument did not intend to confer upon Barba an authority to bind them personally.

b. Yes. Under Art 1804, every partner may associate another person with him in his share. All partners  are considered agents of the partnership. Barba must be held  to have authority to incur these expenses. He is shown to have been in fact the president/manager, and there can be no doubt that he had actual authority to incur obligation.