Halili v CIR (136 SCRA 112)

Facts:

The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than five hundred bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation initially commenced with the filing of a complaint for overtime with the CIR. The disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an Agreement where the Administratrix would transfer to the employees the title to a tract of land in Caloocan, Rizal. The parcel of land was eventually registered in the name of the Union.

The Union, through Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the property. Union President Amado Lopez, in a letter, informed J.C. Espinas and Associates that the general membership of the said Union had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm based on whatever amount would be awarded the Union.

Atty. Jose C. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897 workers' claim. When Atty. Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases, still an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the impression that he was the principal lawyer in these cases.

Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when these cases were pending resolution. He always held office in the firm's place at Puyat Building, except in 1966 to 1967 when he transferred to the Lakas ng Manggagawa Offices. During this one-year stint at the latter office, Atty. Pineda continued handling the case with the arrangement that he would report the developments to the Espinas firm. When he rejoined the law firm in 1968, he continued working on these cases and using the Puyat Building office as his address in the pleadings.

When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did not reveal to his partners (he was made the most senior partner) that he had a retainer's contract. He stayed with the law firm until 1974 and still did not divulge the 1967 retainer's contract. Only the officers of the Union knew of the contract.

The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union appears anomalous and even illegal as well as unethical considering that-

1. The contract was executed only between Atty. Pineda and the officers of the Union chosen by about 125 members only. It was not a contract with the general membership.

2. The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili Transit and the 45% fee for those who were no longer working worked to the prejudice of the latter group who should and were entitled to more benefits. Thus, too, when the alleged retainer's contract was executed in 1967, the Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila. By then, Atty. Pineda knew that all the workers would be out of work which would mean that the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.

3. The contract which retroactively took effect on January 1, 1966, was executed when Atty. Espinas was still handling the appeal of Halili Transit in the main case before the Supreme Court.

4. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorney's lien with Arbiter Valenzuela on February 8, 1983, he did not attach the retainer's contract.

5. The retainer's contract was not even notarized.

A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. objected in view of PD 1529 which requires no less than an order from a court of competent jurisdiction as authority to sell property in trust.

Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme Court but relying on the earlier authority given him by the Ministry of Labor, filed another urgent motion, praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot. The sale was finally consummated, resulting in the execution of an escrow agreement.

When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel for the Union) learned of the sale and apportionment of the proceeds from past Union president Amado Lopez, he requested Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela to allow him to look into the records of the case. The latter, however, told him that the records of the case were missing. Thereupon, Atty. Espinas requested Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to locate the records.

Issue:

a.Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held in contempt.

b. Whether or not Atty. Pineda should be disbarred.

Held:

a. YES. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.

In the Slade Perkins case, "the exercise of the power to punish contempt has a twofold aspect, namely (1) the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order; and (2) to compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses to perform. Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal.

A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein.

A criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.

b. YES. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.—A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corrupt or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence.

In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's motion for such authority to sell the property make the entire transaction dubious and irregular.

Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to sell was by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the authority to sell the property. He could not and did not even wait for valid authority but instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize.

The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members who were no longer working and the 30% lien on the benefits of those who were still working as provided for in the alleged retainer's contract are also very exorbitant and unconscionable.

*Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is sentenced to imprisonment and directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred.

Nunez v Ricafort (382 SCRA 381)

Facts:

An administrative complaint was by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct.

Sometime in October 1982, Soledad authorized Atty. Ricafort to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to the lawyer 10% of the price as commission. Atty. Ricafort succeeded in selling the lots, but despite Soledad’s repeated demands, he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale. This forced Soledad to file an action for a sum of money before the RTC, Quezon City.

The court rendered its decision ordering the Atty. to pay Soledad the sum of P16,000 as principal obligation, with at the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the action.

An appeal to the CA was made. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.

Soledad filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. But it appears that only a partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 unsatisfied. In payment for the latter, Atty. issued four postdated checks but was dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was closed.

Hence, Soledad was forced to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MTC, Quezon City.

In a joint affidavit, Atty. Ricafort admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor of Soledad. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already been encashed by Soledad, he subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.

The court required Atty. to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite the favorable action on his three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so compelled Soledad to file a motion to cite Atty. in contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit the comment “smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and a law dean.”

The IBP findings show that the Atty. had no intention to “honor” the money judgment against him. It recommended that Atty. be declared “guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant” and be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant.

Held:

YES.  There is a blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers. Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession.

His act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, he even had the temerity of making a mockery of the court’s generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the SC, Atty. openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders.

Atty. Ricafort then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility stating that:

Lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so.

The SC indefinitely suspended Atty. Ricafort from the practice of law and directed to pay Soledad P13,800.

Dumo v Espinas

Facts:

Spouses Dumo are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy beach resort in Bauang, La Union.  Severa J. Espinas filed a "Quieting of Title and/or Ownership and Possession against spouses Sandy and Presnida Saldana, subject matter of the case being the same resort.

Although a decision has been rendered against the defendants in the case against spouses Saldana, the the same was not enforced.

Disgruntled with the refusal of the sheriff to put them in possession over the questioned real property, and in open defiance with the official action taken by the sheriff, all defendants acting for the interest of Espinas took it upon themselves, employing force, intimidation, and threat, to enter the property.

Despite protests made by Spouses Dumo, who were there then present and visibly outnumbered by defendants and their agents who were armed with sticks, bolos, hammers, and other deadly weapons, successfully drove out plaintiffs, and took over the premises

It was alleged that the defendants were boasting aloud that they were under instructions by the "judge" to do just that – to forcibly enter and take over the premises. While inside the premises, they demolished and totally tore down all the improvements.

Spouses Dumo prayed for the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages. The MTC rendered judgment holding that petitioners were able to prove their right of possession over the subject property.

Respondents appealed the case to the RTC of Bauang, La Union. The RTC reversed and set aside the Decision of the MTC. It also ruled that as regards damages, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property.

Spouses Dumo filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA held that the MTC correctly found that the petitioners were in possession of the subject land and agreed with the ruling of the RTC that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property concerned.

Issue:

Whether or not the the CA erred in holding that the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value for use of the property.

Held:

No. The CA is correct. There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.

The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.

Although the MTC’s order for the reimbursement to petitioners of their alleged lost earnings over beach resort could have been considered as compensation for their loss of the use and occupation of the property while it was in the possession of the respondents, records do not show any evidence to sustain the same. 

Quinagoran v CA

Facts:

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages against Victorino Quinagoran before the RTC Cagayan. They alleged that they are the co-owners of a  a parcel of land at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they inherited from the late Juan dela Cruz.   

Quinagoran started occupying a house on the north-west portion of the property, by tolerance of the heirs. The heirs asked petitioner to remove the house as they planned to construct a commercial building on the property but petitioner refused, claiming ownership over the lot.

The heirs prayed for the reconveyance and surrender of the disputed lot and to be paid the amount of P5,000.00 monthly until the property is vacated.

 Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)  to include all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00.  He argued that since the lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of P1,730, the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount. He likewise avers that it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should allege the assessed value of the property involved.

The heirs maintain that the contention of petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss before the RTC that the assessed value of the disputed lot is below P20,000.00 is based on the assessed value of an adjacent property and no documentary proof was shown to support the said allegation. It also contended that the tax declaration which petitioner presented, together with his Supplemental Reply before the CA, and on the basis of which he claims that the disputed property's assessed value is only P551.00, should also not be given credence as the said tax declaration reflects the amount of P56,100.or the entire property.

 The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action is accion publicciana and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of the value of the property.  The CA affirmed decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of the property involved?

Held:

NO. Jurisdiction lies in the MTC.

The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true.  As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.

         Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides:

 SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

 (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

            In Atuel v. Valdez,  the Court likewise expressly stated that:

            Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.  Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction “in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of real property.”  However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.

         In the case, Quinagoran maintains that there should be such an allegation of the assessed value of the real property to determine jurisdiction. However, nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned.  There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.

        Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss.  Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void. The CA also erred in affirming the RTC.