Elayda v CA

Facts: The proceedings originated from a complaint of Amelia C. Elayda against the Spouses Pedro Roxas and Leonora T. Roxas. Elayda basically sought recovery of loans extended to the defendants in the aggregate sum of P90,000.00, with interest.

The loans were secured by post-dated checks issued by the spouses and receipts signed by them purporting to show that they had received jewelry to be sold on commission. The Roxases admitted having received said loans but claimed that the loans had been paid in full and that total payments exceeded the total obligation justly and actually due from them, and they had been required to pay usurious interests.

During trial, Elayda presented her testimonial and documentary proofs in due course, 

The Roxases adduced evidence which tended to show that they had received the loans aggregating P90,000.00 on two separate occasions. They alleged that they were required to give, and did give, a "kickback" of P10,000.00 and to pay interest at the rate of 4% a month. They also claim that the total payment made by them to Elayda amounted to P112,674.00.

To counteract this evidence, Elayda tried to submit a statement prepared by her accountant to the effect that the total loan given by her to the spouses amounted to P186,000.00, not P90,000.00. She also averred that the payments made by the spouses on account thereof came up to only P110,474.00 –– of which the sum of P14,223.81 was charged to interest at 14% per annum and P96,250.19, to principal –– thus leaving a balance due from them of P89,749.81. 

The trial court ruled for the Roxases. The preponderance of evidence being clearly in favor of defendants, the complaint is dismissed and the plaintiff is condemned to reimburse and return to defendants the sum of P22,674.00, with costs against plaintiff.

The Appellate Tribunal affirmed the Trial Court's judgment in its entirety, as "being in accordance with law and the evidence."

Issue:

 Whose version of the material occurrences has been established by a preponderance of the evidence?

Held: The Roxases contention.

Elayda wants the SC to go over the proofs presented by the parties, and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the Trial Court and the Appellate Court were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence and eventually, to the totality of the evidence of one party or the other. This, the Court cannot and will not do.

Of course, the matter of whether a particular item of proof was properly admitted or rejected in light of the rules of evidence, is an issue of law. Of this character is the issue raised by Elayda in respect of the Trial Court's rejection of her accountant's statement. This issue this Court can and does now pass upon.

The Court declares the rejection to be correct. Such rejection is entirely in accord with the "familiar doctrine" that "an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not . . ." 

That doctrine has been embodied in the revised Rules of Court, effective on January 1, 1964, Section 2, Rule 129. Nothing in the record shows that Elayda's admissions in her complaint were indeed "made through palpable mistake."

Besides, if it be true that the total loan liability of the Roxases was not P90,000.00 only, but P186,000.00 (or P187,600.00), it is quite surprising that Elayda's evidence-in-chief, as plaintiff, was directed to proving an obligation of only P90,000.00. Even more surprising is the fact that in her complaint Elayda only alleged the sum of P90,000.00 as the indebtedness of the Roxases to her. The evidence of an indebtedness in excess of P90,000.00 would therefore appear to be a mere afterthought, difficult to accept at face value.

Also correct was the Trial Court's ruling, sustained by the Appellate Court, that Elayda's failure to deny specifically and under oath the accusation of usury set out in the Roxases' Amended Answer constituted an admission of that accusation. The ruling is entirely in accord with Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which pertinently provides that "allegations of usury are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath." The admission is a judicial admission, albeit implied, and cannot be negated "unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake," a showing which Elayda has not made.

CA affirmed.

Benito v Pan American World Airways

Doctrine: Conditions in a plane ticket exempting the common carrier from liability for damages caused to its passenger due to its negligence are offensive to public policy and void.

Failure to notify passenger or non-availability of flight of which the carrier was aware before the passenger's departure is negligence.

Facts:

Benito and Carnain (moslems) wanted to go to an annual Pilgrimage in Mecca. They booked an air passage from Manila to Jeddah with Sharp Travel Agency thru the manager, Joaquin Gonzales. Air France accepted the booking.

Plaintiffs left Manila at 6 pm, reached Tehran and Beirut as scheduled. Unfortunately, they were informed that the flight for Jeddah left the previous day. Since it was useless for them to wait for the next flight because the ceremonies in the Holy City would have been over, they were forced to return to Manila. The plaintiffs sued Air France and Pan American for damages.

Issue: 

Whether or not Pan American is liable for damages.

Held:

Yes.

Conditions in a plane ticket exempting the common carrier from liability for damages caused to its passenger due to its negligence are offensive to public policy and void.

The condition/stipulation in the ticket provided: “Carrier undertakes to use its best efforts to carry the passenger and baggage with reasonable dispatch, but no particular time is fixed for the commencement or completion of carriage. Subject thereto, carrier may without notice substitute alternate carriers or aircraft and may alter or omit the stopping place shown on the face of the ticket in case of necessity. Times shown in timetables or elsewhere are approximate and not guaranteed, and form no part of this contract. Schedules are subject to change without notice. Carrier assumes no responsibility for making connections

Failure of a common carrier to notify a passenger of the alteration or non-availability of a connecting flight to his place of destination, of which the carrier was aware before the passenger’s departure, is omission to act with diligence and to exercise the necessary precaution in connection with its contract of carriage with the passenger.

The court held that the condition in the tickets exempting a common carrier from liability for damages caused to its passengers due to its negligence, are offensive to public policy and thus void. Article 1760 of the Civil Code prohibits the elimination or limitation of pecuniary responsibility, even by common stipulation, as far as common carriers are concerned

Sandejas v Lina

Doctrine: . In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. 

Facts:

On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS. Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro as administrator. 

On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned were the records of the Court where Sandejas filed his petition. 

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A. Lina alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated to sell to Lina 4 parcels of land.

Eliodoro died sometime in November 1984 in Canada His counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the death of the administrator. He also alleged that the matter of the claim of Alex becomes a money claim to be filed in Eliodoro's estate. the lower court issued an order directing the other heirs of Sandejas to move for the appointment of a new administrator within 15 days from receipt of the order. 

On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has not received any motion for the appointment of an administrator in place of Eliodoro; that his appointment would be beneficial to the heirs; that he is willing to give away his being an administrator as long as the heirs has found one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as new administrator. They were reasoning out that it was only at a later date that Sixto accepted the appointment. The lower court substituted Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas as administrator.

On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale executed between Alex A. Lina and Elidioro and to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Alex. The lower court granted Alex's motion. 

Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court. 

Issue

What is the settlement court's jurisdiction?

Held:

Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. One can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only with the court's permission.

Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences have no bearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.

In the present case, the Motion was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to Alex; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.

* Re: Intervenor's Standing

Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and granting respondent's Motion for Approval.

There is no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides:

"SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. -- Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. "

This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically requiring only the executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2);or for authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other interested persons, although such authority is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4).

Section 8 mentions only an application to authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who should file the application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one .who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the avails of the suit.

BELEN C. FIGUERRES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF ASSESSORS OF MANDALUYONG, CITY TREASURER OF MANDALUYONG, and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MANDALUYONG

Doctrine:

After the proposed schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in a local government unit within Metro Manila, as prepared jointly by the local assessors of the district to which the city or municipality belongs, has been published or posted in accordance with §212 of R.A. No. 7160 and enacted into ordinances by the sanggunians of the municipalities and cities concerned, the ordinances containing the schedule of fair market values must themselves be published or posted in the manner provided by §188 of R.A. No. 7160

Facts: 

Belen C. Figuerres is the owner of a parcel of land located at Amarillo Street, Barangay Mauway, City of Mandaluyong.  In 1993, she received a notice of assessment from the municipal assessor of the Municipality of Mandaluyong..

The assessment was based on a number of ordinances issued by the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaluyong. Ordinance No. 119 contains a schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in the municipality. Ordinance No. 125 fixes the assessment levels applicable to such classes of real property. Finally, Ordinance No. 135 amended Ordinance No. 119, by providing that only one third (1/3) of the increase in the market values applicable to residential lands pursuant to the said ordinance shall be implemented in the years 1994, 1995, and 1996.

Figuerres brought a prohibition suit in the CA against the Assessor, the Treasurer, and the Sangguniang Bayan to stop them from enforcing the ordinances in question on the ground that the ordinances were invalid for having been adopted allegedly without public hearings and prior publication or posting and without complying with the implementing rules yet to be issued by the Department of Finance.

CA dismissed the petition stating that the approval and determination by the Department of Finance is not needed under the Local Government Code of 1991, since it is now the city council of Mandaluyong that is empowered to determine and approve the aforecited ordinances.  Furthermore, the Finance Local Assessment Regulation No. 1-92  provides for the rules relative to the conduct of general revisions of real property assessments pursuant to Sections 201 and 219 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Issue/s:.

1.Whether or not public hearings are required to be conducted prior to the enactment of an ordinance imposing real property taxes

2.Whether or not there is a need for the publication of fair market values.

Held:

1.Yes.  R.A. No. 7160, §186  provides that an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges “shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.”

However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions,  Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question.  On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. 

In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of  evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment.  

Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner’s cause of action in the present case.  Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.

2. Yes.   R.A. No. 7160, §212 which in part states:

. . . . The schedule of fair market values shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, city, or municipality concerned, or in the absence thereof, shall be posted in the provincial capitol, city or municipal hall and in two other conspicuous public places therein.

Hence, after the proposed schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in a local government unit within Metro Manila, as prepared jointly by the local assessors of the district to which the city or municipality belongs, has been published or posted in accordance with §212 of R.A. No. 7160 and enacted into ordinances by the sanggunians of the municipalities and cities concerned, the ordinances containing the schedule of fair market values must themselves be published or posted in the manner provided by §188 of R.A. No. 7160.

Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that the subject ordinances were not disseminated in accordance with these provisions of R.A. No. 7160.  On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong  presented a certificatef of  Williard S. Wong, Sanggunian Secretary of the Municipality of Mandaluyong that “Ordinance No. 125, S-1993 . . . has been posted in accordance with §59(b) of R.A. No. 7160. Thus, considering the presumption of validity in favor of the ordinances and the failure of petitioner to rebut such presumption, we are constrained to dismiss the petition in this case.

 *CA affirmed.

CIR V CA (GR 107135)

Facts:

Petitioner Central Vegetable Oil Manufacturing Co., Inc. ( CENVOCO ) is a manufacturer of edible and coconut/coprameal cake and such other coconut related oil subject to the miller's tax of 3%.  Petitioner also manufactures lard, detergent and laundry soap subject to the sales tax of 10%.

In 1986, petitioner purchased a specified number of containers and packaging materials for its edible oil from its suppliers and paid the sales tax due thereon.

After an investigation conducted by respondent's Revenue Examiner, Assessment Notice was issued against petitioner for deficiency miller's tax in the total amount of P1,575,514.70 

 CENVOCO requesting for reconsideration of the above deficiency miller's tax assessments, contending that the final provision of Section 168 of the Tax Code does not apply to sales tax paid on containers and packaging materials, hence, the amount paid therefor should have been credited against the miller's tax assessed against it - that since packaging materials are not used in the milling process then, the sales taxes paid thereon should be allowed as a credit against the miller's tax due because they do not fall within the scope of the prohibition.  

 Respondent wrote CENVOCO regarding its position stating that since the law specifically does not allow taxes paid on the raw materials or supplies used in the milling process as a credit against the miller's tax due, with more reason should the sales taxes paid on materials not used in the milling process be allowed as a credit against the miller's tax due.  There is no provision of law which allows such a credit-to-be made.

CENVOCO filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals, which came out with a decision in favor of CENVOCO. Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed.

Issue:

1. Whether or not a reversal of the ruling is violative of the rule on non-retroactivity of rulings of tax officials?

2. Whether or not the sales tax paid by CENVOCO when it purchased containers for its milled products can be credited against the deficiency miller's tax.

Held: 

1. NO. According to petitioner, to hold, as what the Court of Appeals did, that a reversal of the aforesaid ruling would be violative of the rule on non-retroactivity of rulings of tax officials when prejudicial to the taxpayer (Section 278 of the old Tax Code) would, in effect, create a perpetual exemption in favor of CENVOCO although there may be subsequent changes in circumstances warranting a reversal. 

In the case, well-entrenched principle that the government is never estopped from collecting taxes because of mistakes or errors on the part of its agents, but this rule admits of exceptions in the interest of justice and fairplay. Moreso is there no error in allowing the sales taxes paid by CENVOCO on the containers and packages of its milled products, to be credited against the deficiency miller's tax due thereon, for a proper application of the law.

2. NO. The sales, miller's and excise taxes paid on all other materials (except on raw materials used in the milling process), such as the sales taxes paid on containers and packaging materials of the milled products under consideration, may be credited against the miller's tax due therefor. Containers and packaging materials are certainly not raw materials.  Cans and tetrapaks are not used in the manufacture of Cenvoco's finished products which are coconut, edible oil or coprameal cake.  Such finished products are packed in cans and tetrapaks.

*Decision of the CA affirmed.

Meralco Securities v Savellano

Facts:

 The late Juan G. Maniago (substituted in these proceedings by his wife and children) submitted to petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue confidential denunciation against the Meralco Securities Corporation for tax evasion for having paid income tax only on 25 % of the dividends it received from the Manila Electric Co, thereby allegedly shortchanging the government of income tax due from 75% of the said dividends.

 Commissioner caused the investigation of the denunciation after which he found and held that no deficiency corporate income tax was due from the Meralco Securities Corporation since under the law then prevailing (in the case of dividends received by a domestic or foreign resident corporation liable to corporate income tax only 25% shall be returnable for the purposes of the tax. The Commissioner rejected Maniago's contention that the Meralco from whom the dividends were received is not a domestic corporation liable to tax.

In a letter, the Commissioner denied Maniago's claim for informer's reward on a non-existent deficiency. This action of the Commissioner was sustained by the Secretary of Finance. Maniago filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Commissioner to impose the alleged deficiency tax assessment on the Meralco Securities Corporation and to award to him the corresponding informer's reward under the provisions of R.A. 2338.

The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that since in matters of issuance and non-issuance of assessments, he is clothed under the National Internal Revenue Code and existing rules and regulations with discretionary power in evaluating the facts of a case and since mandamus win not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary power, he cannot be compelled to impose the alleged tax deficiency assessment. 

On the other hand, the Meralco Securities Corporation averred that since no taxes have actually been recovered and/or collected, Maniago has no right to recover the reward prayed for

The respondent judge rendered a decision granting the writ prayed for and ordering the Commissioner to assess and collect from the Meralco Securities Corporation the sum of P51,840,612.00 as deficiency corporate income tax plus interests and surcharges due thereon and to pay 25% to Maniago as informer's reward.

Issue: 

Whether or not mandamus is proper in this case

Held:

No. It is furthermore a well-recognized rule that mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others. Mandamus may not be resorted to so as to interfere with the manner in which the discretion shall be exercised or to influence or coerce a particular determination

Moreover, since the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is charged with the administration of revenue laws, which is the primary responsibility of the executive branch of the government, mandamus may not be against the Commissioner to compel him to impose a tax assessment not found by him to be due or proper for that would be tantamount to a usurpation of executive functions. 

In the case, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with the task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes had after a mature and thorough study rendered his decision or ruling that no tax is due or collectible, and his decision is sustained by the Secretary, such decision or ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the performance of official duty and cannot be controlled much less reversed by mandamus.

No deficiency taxes may therefore be assessed and collected against the said corporation. Since no taxes are to be collected, no informer's reward is due to private respondents as the informer's heirs. Since no assessment, much less any collection, has been made in the instant case, respondent judge's writ for the Commissioner to pay respondents 25% informer's reward is gross error and without factual nor legal basis.

*Respondent judge has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because the subject matter thereof clearly falls within the scope of cases now exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. 

*The determination of the correctness or incorrectness of a tax assessment to which the taxpayer is not agreeable, falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and not of the Court of First Instance.

Notes:

Informer's reward is contingent upon the payment and collection of unpaid or deficiency taxes. informer is entitled by way of reward only to a percentage of the taxes actually assessed and collected. 

Sps. Florentino Zaragosa v CA G.R. No. 106401

Facts:

Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. He died without a will and was survived by his four children.

On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. Alberta claims that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She further alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her father's lifetime.

Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent and the allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in their father's name, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for a valuable consideration. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey the cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do so because she became an American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime.

 

The Regional Trial Court of Iloilo promulgated its decision, adjudicating Lot 871 to Alberta as appertaining her share in his estate and ordering defendants to vacate its premises and deliver immediately the portion occupied by them to herein plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim against defendants over Lot 943 is dismissed as well as claims for damages interposed against each other.

The RTC found that Flavio partitioned his properties during his lifetime among his three children by deeds of sales; that the conveyance of Lot 943 to petitioners was part of his plan to distribute his properties among his children during his lifetime; and that he intended Lot 871 to be the share of private respondent.

 Court of Appeals reversed the decision appealed from, insofar as defendant-appellants, spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda E. Zaragoza, were adjudged owner of Lot 943. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. It noted the admission by petitioner in his letter, that their father had given them their inheritance. Further, public respondent found that the alleged sale of lot 943 in favor of petitioner Florentino was fictitious and void. The signature of Don Flavio in the said document was markedly different from his other signatures appearing in other documents. 

Issue:

 (1) whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties, which include Lots 871 and 943, is valid

 (2) whether the validity of the Deed of Sale and consequently, TCT over Lot 943 registered in the name of the petitioners, can be a valid subject matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share.

Held:

1. Yes. A partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this.The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation.

Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. 

In the case, both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private respondent. 

 

2.  No. The petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides:

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subjectto collateral attack. It can not be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.