Facts:
Tomas Litimco filed a petition before the Public Service Commission (PSC) praying for authority to operate a TPU service on the line Manila-Malolos via Sta. Isabel with the use of 10 units. Several operators filed written oppositions.
Before PSC could render its decision, La Mallorca, another operator, moved to reopen the case stating that if the petition to operate the line proposed be granted it would work to its prejudice and so it requested a reopening in order that it may file its opposition. The motion was granted.
However, instead of presenting evidence in support of its opposition, La Mallorca moved for postponement, only to announce days later that instead of merely objecting to the petition, it decided to file an application under a separate number (Case No. 63120) requesting for authority to operate the same line applied for by petitioner by rerouting 4 of its 10 round trip units of the line Malolos-Manila via Guiguinto.
The PSC rendered decision denying petitioner’s application but granting that of respondent on the ground that the latter has a better right to render the service applied for.
Petitioner contends that the Public Service Commission erred because:
1. his application was filed much ahead than that of respondent and as such it is entitled to preference
2. in awarding the line to respondent it in effect gave recognition to the unfair attitude of respondent
3. to grant the service in favor of respondent will work to the prejudice of the riding public for it would be allowing respondent to abandon a portion of its service on its original line Manila-Malolos via Guiguinto, a service which was previously found to promote the need and convenience of the people in said territory.
Respondent reasoned out that its:
1. application for rerouting will not involve any increase of trips or units nor will involve the purchase of new trucks, while that of petitioner would call for the use of 10 new trucks, which means a further depletion of the already depleted dollar reserve of our government
2. application for re-routing will not involve the acquisition of an operating right over the national highway from Malolos railroad crossing up to Guiguinto, while, on the other hand, petitioner’s application will involve the acquisition of a new operating right
Issue:
Who has a better right to render the service?
Held:
Litimco. Since it is admitted that he is financially competent and able to operate the line proposed and is also an operator of a bus line from Manila to Malolos via Bulacan, we see no plausible reason why he should not be given preference to operate the service applied for considering that he is the first one to apply for such line.
This is in accord with the policy to stave off any act of discrimination or partiality against any application for operation of a new line. While there may be cases where an applicant, even if ahead in time, was not given the service, it is because it was proven that he was financially incompetent, or otherwise disqualified, to render the service, If an applicant is qualified financially, and is able to undertake the service, he should be given the preference as a matter of fairness and justice.
Priority in the filing of the application for a certificate of public convenience is, other conditions being equal, an important factor in determining the right of the public service companies.
The argument that the application of petitioner for the operation of the new line calls for the purchase of 10 new trucks is of no consequence, if the operation will redound to the benefit of the riding public. The operation of a new line as a general proposition always involves a new investment which may happen even with old operators. In the course of operation, and with the passing of time, new equipment and facilities may be found necessary to maintain an efficient service, which additional expenditure cannot certainly be considered as a cause for disruption of the service. This is a matter of finance which concerns exclusively the one who desires to operate the new line.
At any rate, the new line merely covers 7 kilometers of new territory which traverses three sparsely populated barrios, and considering that respondent did not deem it necessary to cover said territory except after the passing of many years, and only thought of giving the service when petitioner filed his application, fairness requires that preference be given to petitioner.
Biyernes, Marso 1, 2013
Republic v PLDT
Facts:
PLDT and RCA Communications Inc (which is not a party to this case but has contractual relations with e parties) entered into an agreement where telephone messages, coming from the US and received by RCA's domestic station could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT and vice versa.
The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) by renting the trunk lines of PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. One of the many rules prohibits the use of the service for his private use.
Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service where the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by the RCA's station to and from local residents.
PLDT complained that the Bureau was violating the conditions for using the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public. PLDT gave a notice that if violations were not stopped, PLDT would sever the connections -which PLDT did.
Republic sued PLDT commanding PLDT to execute a contract, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court finds it reasonable.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic can command PLDT to execute the contract.
Held:
No. The Bureau was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government offices to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of a free Gov't of the Phil.
When the Bureau subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature.
The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.
To uphold PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public.
PLDT and RCA Communications Inc (which is not a party to this case but has contractual relations with e parties) entered into an agreement where telephone messages, coming from the US and received by RCA's domestic station could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT and vice versa.
The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) by renting the trunk lines of PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. One of the many rules prohibits the use of the service for his private use.
Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service where the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by the RCA's station to and from local residents.
PLDT complained that the Bureau was violating the conditions for using the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public. PLDT gave a notice that if violations were not stopped, PLDT would sever the connections -which PLDT did.
Republic sued PLDT commanding PLDT to execute a contract, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court finds it reasonable.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic can command PLDT to execute the contract.
Held:
No. The Bureau was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government offices to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of a free Gov't of the Phil.
When the Bureau subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature.
The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.
To uphold PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public.
Mecenas v CA
Facts:
M/T Tacloban (barge-type oil tanker) collided with M/V Don Juan ( inter-island vessel carrying 750 passengers). When the collision occurred, the sea was calm, the weather fair and visibility good. As a result, M/V Don Juan sank and the passengers perished.
Petitioner was the parent of the passenger who died. They file an action for damages alleging the negligence of Capt. Santisteban (captain of Don Juan) and Negros Navigation (owner of Don Juan).
Issue:
1. Who was negligent?
2. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation was negligent.
Held:
1. M/V Tacloban was primarily and solely at fault. M/V Don Juan was also at fault.
Rule 18 of the International Rules of the Road which requires 2 power-driven vessels meeting end on or nearly end on each to alter her course to starboard so that each vessel may pass on the port side of each other.
In the case, M/V Tacloban, as held by the report of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard, failed to follow the Rules. Hence, she was deemed negligent.
However, route observance of the International Rules of the Road will not relieve a vessel from responsibility if the collision could have been avoided by proper skill on her part or even a departure from the rules.
M/V Don Juan having sighted M/V Tacloban when it was still a long way off was negligent in failing to take early preventive action and in allowing the 2 vessels to come into close quarters as to render the collision inevitable when there was no necessity for passing so near M/V Tacloban for Don Juan could choose its own distance. It is noteworthy that M/V Tacloban upon turning hard to port shortly before the moment of collision, signaled its intention to do so by giving 2 short blasts with its horn. Don Juan gave no answering horn blast to signal it's own intention and proceeded to turn hard to starboard.
2. Yes. The behavior of the captain -playing mahjong "before and up to the time of collision" constituted gross negligence. This behavior is unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the lives of at least 750 passengers were entrusted.
It does not matter that the Captain was off-duty or on-duty. Realistically speaking, there is no such thing as off-duty hours for the master of the vessel at sea that is a common carrier who is required extraordinary diligence. Hence, Negros Navigation in permitting or in failing to discover and correct such behavior is also grossly negligent.
Notes:
Starboard -right
Port -left
M/T Tacloban (barge-type oil tanker) collided with M/V Don Juan ( inter-island vessel carrying 750 passengers). When the collision occurred, the sea was calm, the weather fair and visibility good. As a result, M/V Don Juan sank and the passengers perished.
Petitioner was the parent of the passenger who died. They file an action for damages alleging the negligence of Capt. Santisteban (captain of Don Juan) and Negros Navigation (owner of Don Juan).
Issue:
1. Who was negligent?
2. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation was negligent.
Held:
1. M/V Tacloban was primarily and solely at fault. M/V Don Juan was also at fault.
Rule 18 of the International Rules of the Road which requires 2 power-driven vessels meeting end on or nearly end on each to alter her course to starboard so that each vessel may pass on the port side of each other.
In the case, M/V Tacloban, as held by the report of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard, failed to follow the Rules. Hence, she was deemed negligent.
However, route observance of the International Rules of the Road will not relieve a vessel from responsibility if the collision could have been avoided by proper skill on her part or even a departure from the rules.
M/V Don Juan having sighted M/V Tacloban when it was still a long way off was negligent in failing to take early preventive action and in allowing the 2 vessels to come into close quarters as to render the collision inevitable when there was no necessity for passing so near M/V Tacloban for Don Juan could choose its own distance. It is noteworthy that M/V Tacloban upon turning hard to port shortly before the moment of collision, signaled its intention to do so by giving 2 short blasts with its horn. Don Juan gave no answering horn blast to signal it's own intention and proceeded to turn hard to starboard.
2. Yes. The behavior of the captain -playing mahjong "before and up to the time of collision" constituted gross negligence. This behavior is unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the lives of at least 750 passengers were entrusted.
It does not matter that the Captain was off-duty or on-duty. Realistically speaking, there is no such thing as off-duty hours for the master of the vessel at sea that is a common carrier who is required extraordinary diligence. Hence, Negros Navigation in permitting or in failing to discover and correct such behavior is also grossly negligent.
Notes:
Starboard -right
Port -left
Wild Valley v CA
Facts:
Philippine Roxas (owned by Phil. Pres. Lines), vessel, arrived in Venezuela to load iron ore. When vessel was ready to leave the port, Mr. Vasquez (official pilot of Venezuela) was designated to navigate the vessel through the Orinoco River.
The master of the vessel, Captain Colon, was at the bridge with the pilot when the vessel left the port. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was underway.
The vessel experienced some vibrations but the pilot assured that they were just a result of the shallowness of the vessel. The vessel again experienced vibrations which led to the vessel being run aground in the Orinoco River, obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon (vessel owned by Wildvalley Shipping) was unable to sail out that day. For this reason, Wild Valley commenced an action for damages.
Issue:
1. Whether or not fault can be attributed to the master(captain) of Philippine Roxas for the grounding of said vessel.
2. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies.
Held:
1. No. It's the pilot's fault!
There being no contractual obligation, the master was only required to give ordinary diligence in accordance with Article 1173 of the New Civil Code. In the case, the master exercised due diligence when the vessel sailed only after the main engine, machine rise and other auxiliaries were checked and found to be in good running condition and when the master left a competent officer - the pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River.
Philippine rules on pilotage enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a master of a vessel and its pilot. The law is explicit in saying that the master remains the overall commander of the vessel even when there is a pilot on board. He remains in control despite the presence of a pilot who is temporarily in charge of the vessel. It is NOT required of him to be on bridge while the vessel is being navigated by a pilot.
Furthermore, the Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. Admitting his limited knowledge of the River, Captain Colon deemed it best to rely on the knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.
The pilot should have been aware of the portions which are shallow and which are not. His failure to determine the depth of the river and his decision to plod on his set course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, he is negligent and liable for the grounding.
2. NO. The elements of res ipsa loquitor are:
-accident was of such character as to warrant inference that it would not have happened except for defendant's negligence
-accident must have been caused by an agency/instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of
-accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
There was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the master to the pilot on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, requisites 1 and 2 (negligence and control) are not present in the following situation.
Philippine Roxas (owned by Phil. Pres. Lines), vessel, arrived in Venezuela to load iron ore. When vessel was ready to leave the port, Mr. Vasquez (official pilot of Venezuela) was designated to navigate the vessel through the Orinoco River.
The master of the vessel, Captain Colon, was at the bridge with the pilot when the vessel left the port. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was underway.
The vessel experienced some vibrations but the pilot assured that they were just a result of the shallowness of the vessel. The vessel again experienced vibrations which led to the vessel being run aground in the Orinoco River, obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon (vessel owned by Wildvalley Shipping) was unable to sail out that day. For this reason, Wild Valley commenced an action for damages.
Issue:
1. Whether or not fault can be attributed to the master(captain) of Philippine Roxas for the grounding of said vessel.
2. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies.
Held:
1. No. It's the pilot's fault!
There being no contractual obligation, the master was only required to give ordinary diligence in accordance with Article 1173 of the New Civil Code. In the case, the master exercised due diligence when the vessel sailed only after the main engine, machine rise and other auxiliaries were checked and found to be in good running condition and when the master left a competent officer - the pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River.
Philippine rules on pilotage enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a master of a vessel and its pilot. The law is explicit in saying that the master remains the overall commander of the vessel even when there is a pilot on board. He remains in control despite the presence of a pilot who is temporarily in charge of the vessel. It is NOT required of him to be on bridge while the vessel is being navigated by a pilot.
Furthermore, the Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. Admitting his limited knowledge of the River, Captain Colon deemed it best to rely on the knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.
The pilot should have been aware of the portions which are shallow and which are not. His failure to determine the depth of the river and his decision to plod on his set course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, he is negligent and liable for the grounding.
2. NO. The elements of res ipsa loquitor are:
-accident was of such character as to warrant inference that it would not have happened except for defendant's negligence
-accident must have been caused by an agency/instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of
-accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
There was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the master to the pilot on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, requisites 1 and 2 (negligence and control) are not present in the following situation.
Go, Sr. v Ramos
Facts:
Three cases arose from the same factual milieu. These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien.
Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.”
Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten.
He also averred that in September 1989, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. He alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625 (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950.
Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.
With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is “FChinese,” he maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrar’s Office who might have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his father’s citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed when the employees of that office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino.
As regards the entry in his siblings’ certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his father.
In a Resolution dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. She affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmy’s father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.
On March 8, 2001, the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos’ election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his father’s questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating provisions of The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and set aside the March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings. In essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.
In the interim, the Board issued a Decision ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy.
In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a supplemental petition for certiorari and prohibition before the trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision. Later, however, the trial court dissolved the writ in a Decision dated January 6, 2004 as a consequence of the dismissal of the petition.
Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied.
Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.
Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143. They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge sheet.
The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition. It did not find merit in their argument that the issue of citizenship should proceed only before the proper court in an independent action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.
Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been denied, Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation which resulted in the apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China.
On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance.
In an Order, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed?
Held:
Yes.
Bureau of Immigration maintains that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial court was proper. A petition for habeas corpus has for its purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a lawful ground for Jimmy’s apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of the Board dated April 17, 2002 that ordered Jimmy’s deportation has already attained finality by reason of the belated appeal taken by Jimmy from the said decision on April 2, 2004 before the Office of the President, or after almost two years from the time the decision was rendered. Said decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmy’s apprehension and detention.
They also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on recognizance he was previously granted to question his subsequent apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under investigation, and not when the order of deportation had already been issued by the Board. Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis. Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be dismissed because the same is no longer proper once the applicant thereof has been charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy. Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is no longer being detained.
On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is involved in this case is his cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the petitioners in ordering his arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the avails of the extraordinary writ.
Jimmy argues that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not attained finality owing to the availability of various remedies, one of which is an appeal, and in fact is actually void because it was rendered without due process. He also insists that the bail issued to him is valid and effective until the final determination of his citizenship before the proper courts. Moreover, he maintains that the petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee.
Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void for failure to implead therein his father, and that he should have been given a full blown trial before a regular court where he can prove his citizenship.
Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition meritorious.
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error.
The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4[98] of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.
Three cases arose from the same factual milieu. These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien.
Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.”
Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten.
He also averred that in September 1989, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. He alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625 (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950.
Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.
With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is “FChinese,” he maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrar’s Office who might have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his father’s citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed when the employees of that office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino.
As regards the entry in his siblings’ certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his father.
In a Resolution dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. She affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmy’s father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.
On March 8, 2001, the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos’ election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his father’s questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating provisions of The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and set aside the March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings. In essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.
In the interim, the Board issued a Decision ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy.
In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a supplemental petition for certiorari and prohibition before the trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision. Later, however, the trial court dissolved the writ in a Decision dated January 6, 2004 as a consequence of the dismissal of the petition.
Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied.
Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.
Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143. They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge sheet.
The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition. It did not find merit in their argument that the issue of citizenship should proceed only before the proper court in an independent action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.
Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been denied, Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation which resulted in the apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China.
On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance.
In an Order, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed?
Held:
Yes.
Bureau of Immigration maintains that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial court was proper. A petition for habeas corpus has for its purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a lawful ground for Jimmy’s apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of the Board dated April 17, 2002 that ordered Jimmy’s deportation has already attained finality by reason of the belated appeal taken by Jimmy from the said decision on April 2, 2004 before the Office of the President, or after almost two years from the time the decision was rendered. Said decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmy’s apprehension and detention.
They also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on recognizance he was previously granted to question his subsequent apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under investigation, and not when the order of deportation had already been issued by the Board. Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis. Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be dismissed because the same is no longer proper once the applicant thereof has been charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy. Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is no longer being detained.
On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is involved in this case is his cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the petitioners in ordering his arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the avails of the extraordinary writ.
Jimmy argues that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not attained finality owing to the availability of various remedies, one of which is an appeal, and in fact is actually void because it was rendered without due process. He also insists that the bail issued to him is valid and effective until the final determination of his citizenship before the proper courts. Moreover, he maintains that the petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee.
Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void for failure to implead therein his father, and that he should have been given a full blown trial before a regular court where he can prove his citizenship.
Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition meritorious.
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error.
The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4[98] of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v V.P. Eusebio Construction Inc.
Facts:
1. The State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Housing and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical Rehabilitation Center in Iraq to Ayjal Trading and Contracting Company for a total contract price of about $18M.
2. Spouses Santos, in behalf of 3-Plex International, Inc., a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ayjal wherein the former undertook the execution of the entire a project, while the latter would be entitled to a commission of 4%.
3. 3-Plex not accredited by the Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB) assigned and transferred all its rights and interests to VPECI.
4. The SOB required the contractors to submit a performance bond representing 5% of the total contract price, an advance payment bond representing 10% of the advance payment to be released upon signing of the contract. To comply with these requirements 3-Plex and VPECI applied for a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors.
5. But what SOB required was a guarantee from the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad so Rafidain Bank issued a performance bond in favor of SOB on the condition that another foreign bank (not Phil Guarantee) would issue the counter-guarantee. Hence, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was chosen to provide the counter guarantee.
6.Afterwards, SOB and the joint venture of VPECI and Ayjal executed the service contract. Under the contract, the joint venture would supply manpower and materials, SOB would refund 25% of the project cost in Iraqi Dinar and 75% in US dollars at an exchange rate of 1 Dinar to $3.37.
7.The project was not completed. Upon seeing the impossibility of meeting the deadline, the joint venture worked for the renewal or extension (12x) of the performance bond up to December 1986.
8. In October 1986, Al Ahli Bank sent a telex call demanding full payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee. Upon receipt, VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development Minister Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex for being in contravention of its mutual agreement that the penalty will be held in abeyance until completion of the project. It also wrote SOB protesting the telex since the Iraqi government lacks foreign exchange to pay VPECI and the non-compliance with the 75% billings in US dollars.
9. Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that it already paid to Rafidain Bank. The Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank representing the full payment of the performance counter-guarantee for VPECI's project in Iraq.
10. Philguarantee sent letters to respondents demanding the full payment of the surety bond. Respondents failed to pay so petitioner filed a civil case for collection of sum of money.
11. Trial Court ruling: Dismissed. Philguarantee had no valid cause of action against the respondents. The joint venture incurred no delay in the execution of the project considering that SOB's violations of the contract rendered impossible the performance of its undertaking.
12. CA: Affirmed.
Issue:
What law should be applied in determining whether or not contractor (joint venture) has defaulted?
Held:
The question of whether there is a breach of the agreement which includes default pertains to the INTRINSIC validity of the contract.
No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal systems is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by lex contractus (proper law of the contract). This may be the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (lex loci intentionis). The law selected may be implied from factors such as substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts adopt this: to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract, SUBJECT to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction.
In the case, the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of law. The laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction and one of the parties is the Iraqi government. The place of performance is also in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether VPECI defaulted may be determined by the laws of Iraq.
BUT! Since foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, processual presumption will apply.
According to Art 1169 of the Civil Code: In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner what is incumbent upon him.
As found by the lower courts: the delay or non-completion of the project was caused by factors not imputable to the Joint Venture, it was rather due to the persistent violations of SOB, particularly it's failure to pay 75% of the accomplished work in US dollars. Hence, the joint venture does not incur in delay if the other party(SOB) fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon him.
1. The State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Housing and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical Rehabilitation Center in Iraq to Ayjal Trading and Contracting Company for a total contract price of about $18M.
2. Spouses Santos, in behalf of 3-Plex International, Inc., a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ayjal wherein the former undertook the execution of the entire a project, while the latter would be entitled to a commission of 4%.
3. 3-Plex not accredited by the Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB) assigned and transferred all its rights and interests to VPECI.
4. The SOB required the contractors to submit a performance bond representing 5% of the total contract price, an advance payment bond representing 10% of the advance payment to be released upon signing of the contract. To comply with these requirements 3-Plex and VPECI applied for a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors.
5. But what SOB required was a guarantee from the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad so Rafidain Bank issued a performance bond in favor of SOB on the condition that another foreign bank (not Phil Guarantee) would issue the counter-guarantee. Hence, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was chosen to provide the counter guarantee.
6.Afterwards, SOB and the joint venture of VPECI and Ayjal executed the service contract. Under the contract, the joint venture would supply manpower and materials, SOB would refund 25% of the project cost in Iraqi Dinar and 75% in US dollars at an exchange rate of 1 Dinar to $3.37.
7.The project was not completed. Upon seeing the impossibility of meeting the deadline, the joint venture worked for the renewal or extension (12x) of the performance bond up to December 1986.
8. In October 1986, Al Ahli Bank sent a telex call demanding full payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee. Upon receipt, VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development Minister Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex for being in contravention of its mutual agreement that the penalty will be held in abeyance until completion of the project. It also wrote SOB protesting the telex since the Iraqi government lacks foreign exchange to pay VPECI and the non-compliance with the 75% billings in US dollars.
9. Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that it already paid to Rafidain Bank. The Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank representing the full payment of the performance counter-guarantee for VPECI's project in Iraq.
10. Philguarantee sent letters to respondents demanding the full payment of the surety bond. Respondents failed to pay so petitioner filed a civil case for collection of sum of money.
11. Trial Court ruling: Dismissed. Philguarantee had no valid cause of action against the respondents. The joint venture incurred no delay in the execution of the project considering that SOB's violations of the contract rendered impossible the performance of its undertaking.
12. CA: Affirmed.
Issue:
What law should be applied in determining whether or not contractor (joint venture) has defaulted?
Held:
The question of whether there is a breach of the agreement which includes default pertains to the INTRINSIC validity of the contract.
No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal systems is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by lex contractus (proper law of the contract). This may be the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (lex loci intentionis). The law selected may be implied from factors such as substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts adopt this: to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract, SUBJECT to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction.
In the case, the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of law. The laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction and one of the parties is the Iraqi government. The place of performance is also in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether VPECI defaulted may be determined by the laws of Iraq.
BUT! Since foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, processual presumption will apply.
According to Art 1169 of the Civil Code: In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner what is incumbent upon him.
As found by the lower courts: the delay or non-completion of the project was caused by factors not imputable to the Joint Venture, it was rather due to the persistent violations of SOB, particularly it's failure to pay 75% of the accomplished work in US dollars. Hence, the joint venture does not incur in delay if the other party(SOB) fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon him.
China Airlines v CA (G.R. No. 129988)
Facts:
Respondents, Antonio Salvador and Rolando Lao planned to travel to Los Angeles, California to pursue a cable business deal involving the distribution of Filipino films. Initially, Morelia Travel Agency booked their flight with China Airlines (CAL).
Upon discovering that Morelia charged higher rates than American Express Travel (Amexco), they dropped the services of Morelia. Lao called Amexco claiming that he and Salvador had a confirmed booking with CAL. Lao then gave to Amexco the record locator number that CAL issued previously to Morelia. CAL confirmed the booking.
When the respondents were at the airport, CAL prevented them from boarding because their names were not in the passenger's manifest. CAL cancelled the reservations when Morelia revoked the booking. But the respondents were able to get a flight with Northwest Airlines.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not there was a breach in the contract of carriage.
2. Whether or not there there was bad faith.
3. Whether or not there was sufficient claims for damages.
Held:
1. Yes. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date.
When CAL did not allow respondents, who were in possession of the confirmed tickets, from boarding its airplane because their names were not in the manifest, it ocnsituted a breach of contract of carriage.
2. No. Bad faith should always be established by clear and convincing evidence since the law always presumes good faith.
In the case, there were three reasons why CAL cancelled the reservations. First was Amexco's unauthorized use of the record locator number. Second was CAL's negligence in confirming the reservations of Amexco. Third was the absence of the correct contact numbers of private respondents. There was no concerted effort on the part of CAL to cancel respondent's reservations in favor of other passengers.
3. Not entitled to moral damages because not every case of mental anguish, fright or anxiety calls for the award of moral damages.
Not entitled to exemplary damages because CAL was not in bad faith and its employees did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Not entitled to actual damages because respondents did not shell out any money for their CAL tickets. Respondents would have been entitled to the price difference between the tickets of CAL and Northwest had the latter cost more than the former but this was not the case. Evidence shows that Northwest tickets ($625) cost less than CAL tickets ($629). The court cannot order reimbursement of the Northwest tickets because this would have enabled respondents to fly for free. The cost of the tickets were a necessary expense that private respondents could not pass on to CAL.
Entitled to nominal damages of P5,000 when the plaintiff suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an award of actual damages.
Respondents, Antonio Salvador and Rolando Lao planned to travel to Los Angeles, California to pursue a cable business deal involving the distribution of Filipino films. Initially, Morelia Travel Agency booked their flight with China Airlines (CAL).
Upon discovering that Morelia charged higher rates than American Express Travel (Amexco), they dropped the services of Morelia. Lao called Amexco claiming that he and Salvador had a confirmed booking with CAL. Lao then gave to Amexco the record locator number that CAL issued previously to Morelia. CAL confirmed the booking.
When the respondents were at the airport, CAL prevented them from boarding because their names were not in the passenger's manifest. CAL cancelled the reservations when Morelia revoked the booking. But the respondents were able to get a flight with Northwest Airlines.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not there was a breach in the contract of carriage.
2. Whether or not there there was bad faith.
3. Whether or not there was sufficient claims for damages.
Held:
1. Yes. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date.
When CAL did not allow respondents, who were in possession of the confirmed tickets, from boarding its airplane because their names were not in the manifest, it ocnsituted a breach of contract of carriage.
2. No. Bad faith should always be established by clear and convincing evidence since the law always presumes good faith.
In the case, there were three reasons why CAL cancelled the reservations. First was Amexco's unauthorized use of the record locator number. Second was CAL's negligence in confirming the reservations of Amexco. Third was the absence of the correct contact numbers of private respondents. There was no concerted effort on the part of CAL to cancel respondent's reservations in favor of other passengers.
3. Not entitled to moral damages because not every case of mental anguish, fright or anxiety calls for the award of moral damages.
Not entitled to exemplary damages because CAL was not in bad faith and its employees did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Not entitled to actual damages because respondents did not shell out any money for their CAL tickets. Respondents would have been entitled to the price difference between the tickets of CAL and Northwest had the latter cost more than the former but this was not the case. Evidence shows that Northwest tickets ($625) cost less than CAL tickets ($629). The court cannot order reimbursement of the Northwest tickets because this would have enabled respondents to fly for free. The cost of the tickets were a necessary expense that private respondents could not pass on to CAL.
Entitled to nominal damages of P5,000 when the plaintiff suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an award of actual damages.
Boudard v Tait
Facts:
Emilie Boudard, as widow of Marie Theodore Boudard and as guardian of her children born during their marriage obtained a judgment in their favor from CFI Hanoi, French Indo-China for the sum of 40,000 piastras plus interest. The judgment was against Stewart Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial before court.
Theodore Boudard, who was an employee of Stewart Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees of Tait, although "outside of the fulfillment of a duty", according to the English translation of a certified copy of the French decision. The dismissal of the complaint was based principally on the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI Hanoi to render judgment. It was found that the Tait was not a resident of, nor domiciled in that country. Also, the evidence adduced at the trial proves that neither Tait nor his agent or employees were ever in Hanoi and that Theodore had never, at any time, been his employee.
Issue:
1. Whether or not court erred in admitting evidence for judicial foreign records (in this case, it was the Hanoi decision).
2. Whether or not the court erred in declaring that it was indispensable for Tait to be served with summons in Hanoi.
3. Whether or not the decision of CFI Hanoi was already conclusive.
Held:
1. Yes, Boudard failed to show that the proceedings against Tait in CFI Hanoi were in accordance with the laws of France then in force.
Further, Boudard failed to show that they are certified copies of judicial records. They argue that the papers are the original documents and that the French consul in the Philippines has confirmed this fact. This is not sufficient to authorize a deviation from the rule established by law. The best evidence of a foreign judicial proceeding is a certified copy with all the formalities required.
2. No. French law regarding summons states that: those who have no known residence in France shall be served summons in the place of their present residence; if the place is unknown, writ shall be placed at the main door of the hall of the court where the complaint is filed.
In the case, it was shown that summons were delivered in Manila to J.M. Shotwell, a representative or agent of Churchill and Tait, Inc. which is an entity entirely different from Tait. Also, evidence shows that Tait was not in Hanoi during the time the complaint was filed by Boudard. The rule is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country,regarding payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings.
3. No. The decision cannot be conclusive to such an extent that it cannot be contested. It merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of Boudard's claim and admits proof to the contrary.
The effect of a judgment of any tribunal of a foreign country is:
- In case of judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing.
- In case of judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title, but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of:
-> want of jurisdiction
-> want of notice to the party
-> collusion
-> fraud
-> clear mistake of law or fact
Emilie Boudard, as widow of Marie Theodore Boudard and as guardian of her children born during their marriage obtained a judgment in their favor from CFI Hanoi, French Indo-China for the sum of 40,000 piastras plus interest. The judgment was against Stewart Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial before court.
Theodore Boudard, who was an employee of Stewart Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees of Tait, although "outside of the fulfillment of a duty", according to the English translation of a certified copy of the French decision. The dismissal of the complaint was based principally on the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI Hanoi to render judgment. It was found that the Tait was not a resident of, nor domiciled in that country. Also, the evidence adduced at the trial proves that neither Tait nor his agent or employees were ever in Hanoi and that Theodore had never, at any time, been his employee.
Issue:
1. Whether or not court erred in admitting evidence for judicial foreign records (in this case, it was the Hanoi decision).
2. Whether or not the court erred in declaring that it was indispensable for Tait to be served with summons in Hanoi.
3. Whether or not the decision of CFI Hanoi was already conclusive.
Held:
1. Yes, Boudard failed to show that the proceedings against Tait in CFI Hanoi were in accordance with the laws of France then in force.
Further, Boudard failed to show that they are certified copies of judicial records. They argue that the papers are the original documents and that the French consul in the Philippines has confirmed this fact. This is not sufficient to authorize a deviation from the rule established by law. The best evidence of a foreign judicial proceeding is a certified copy with all the formalities required.
2. No. French law regarding summons states that: those who have no known residence in France shall be served summons in the place of their present residence; if the place is unknown, writ shall be placed at the main door of the hall of the court where the complaint is filed.
In the case, it was shown that summons were delivered in Manila to J.M. Shotwell, a representative or agent of Churchill and Tait, Inc. which is an entity entirely different from Tait. Also, evidence shows that Tait was not in Hanoi during the time the complaint was filed by Boudard. The rule is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country,regarding payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings.
3. No. The decision cannot be conclusive to such an extent that it cannot be contested. It merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of Boudard's claim and admits proof to the contrary.
The effect of a judgment of any tribunal of a foreign country is:
- In case of judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing.
- In case of judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title, but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of:
-> want of jurisdiction
-> want of notice to the party
-> collusion
-> fraud
-> clear mistake of law or fact
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