Facts:
Petitioners ( who are passengers from Cavite and Batangas who ride on buses to and from their province and Manila) and some public service operators of buses and jeeps assail the validity of Ordinance 4986and Administrative Order 1.
Ordinance 4986 states that PUB and PUJs shall be allowed to enter Manila only from 6:30am to 8:30pm every day except Sundays and holidays.
Petitioners contend that since they possess a valid CPC, they have already acquired a vested right to operate.
Administrative Order 1 issued by Commissioner of Public Service states that all jeeps authorized to operate from Manila to any point in Luzon, beyond the perimeter of Greater Manila, shall carry the words "For Provincial Operation".
Issue:
1. Whether or not the said regulations are valid.
2. Whether or not Ordinance 4986 destroys vested rights to operate in Manila.
Held:
1. YES! Using the doctrine in Lagman vs. City of Manila, Petitioner's Certificate of Public Convenience was issued subject to the condition that operators shall observe and comply with all the rules and regulations of the PSC relative to PUB service.
The purpose of the ban is to minimize the problem in Manila and the traffic congestion, delays and accidents resulting from the free entry into the streets of Manila and the operation around said streets.
Both Ordinance 4986 and AO 1 fit into the concept of promotion and regulation of general welfare.
2. NO! A vested right is some right or interest in the property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. As far as the State is concerned, a CPC constitutes neither a franchise nor a contract, confers no property right, and is a mere license or privilege.
The holder does not acquire a property right in the route covered, nor does it confer upon the holder any proprietary right/interest/franchise in the public highways.
Neither do bus passengers have a vested right to be transported directly to Manila. The alleged right is dependent upon the manner public services are allowed to operate within a given area. It is no argument that the passengers enjoyed the privilege of having been continuously transported even before outbreak of war. Times have changed and vehicles have increased. Traffic congestion has moved from worse to critical. Hence, there is a need to regulate the operation of public services.
Martes, Pebrero 26, 2013
Linggo, Pebrero 10, 2013
Mirasol v The Robert Dollar Co. (G.R. No. L-29721)
Doctrine:
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.
Facts:
As a third special defense, defendant quoted clause 13 of the bill of lading, in which it is stated that in no case shall it be held liable “for or in respect to said merchandise or property beyond the sum of S250 for any piece, package or any article not enclosed in a package, unless a higher value is stated herein and ad valorem freight paid or assessed thereon,” and that there was no other agreement.
The plaintiff wrote the defendant a letter as follows: "I wish to file claim of damage." Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to P700 for his Encyclopedia Britannica which was damaged during shipment.
Defendant alleges that the damage, if any, was caused by “sea water,” and that the bill of lading exempts defendant from liability for that cause. That damage by “sea water” is a shipper’s risk, and that defendant is not liable.
Issue: Whether or not damage by sea water is a shipper's risk.
Held:
In the case of The Kengsington decided by the Supreme Court of the U.S.:
The stipulation in a steamship passenger's ticket, which compels him to value his baggage, at a certain sum, far less than it is worth, or, in order to have a higher value put upon it, to subject it to the provisions of the Harter Act, by which the carrier would be exempted from all the liability therefore from
errors in navigation or management of the vessel of other negligence is unreasonable and in conflict with public policy.
In the case, defendant having received the two boxes in good condition, its legal duty was to deliver them to the plaintiff in the same condition in which it received them. From the time of their delivery to the defendant in New York until they are delivered to the plaintiff in Manila, the boxes were under the control and supervision of the defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff. The defendant having admitted that the boxes were damaged while in transit and in its possession, the burden of proof then shifted, and it devolved upon the defendant to both allege and prove that the damage was caused by reason of some fact which exempted it from liability. As to how the boxes were damaged, when or where, was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant and in the very nature of things could not be in the knowledge of the plaintiff. To require the plaintiff to prove as to when and how the damage was caused would force him to call and rely upon the employees of the defendant’s ship, which in legal effect would be to say that he could not recover any damage for any reason. That is not the law.
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.
The defendant has not even attempted to prove that the two cases were wet with sea water by fictitious event, force majeure or nature and defect of the things themselves. Consequently, it must be presumed that it was by causes entirely distinct and in no manner imputable to the plaintiff, and of which the steamer President Garfield or any of its crew could not have been entirely unaware.
The fact that the cases were damaged by “sea water,” standing alone and within itself, is not evidence that they were damaged by force majeure or for a cause beyond the defendant’s control. The words “perils of the sea,” as stated in defendant’s brief apply to “all kinds of marine casualties, such as shipwreck, foundering, stranding,” and among other things, it is said: “Tempest, rocks, shoals, icebergs and other obstacles are within the expression,” and “where the peril is the proximate cause of the loss, the shipowner is excused.” “Something fortuitous and out of the ordinary course is involved in both words ‘peril’ or ‘accident’.”
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.
Facts:
As a third special defense, defendant quoted clause 13 of the bill of lading, in which it is stated that in no case shall it be held liable “for or in respect to said merchandise or property beyond the sum of S250 for any piece, package or any article not enclosed in a package, unless a higher value is stated herein and ad valorem freight paid or assessed thereon,” and that there was no other agreement.
The plaintiff wrote the defendant a letter as follows: "I wish to file claim of damage." Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to P700 for his Encyclopedia Britannica which was damaged during shipment.
Defendant alleges that the damage, if any, was caused by “sea water,” and that the bill of lading exempts defendant from liability for that cause. That damage by “sea water” is a shipper’s risk, and that defendant is not liable.
Issue: Whether or not damage by sea water is a shipper's risk.
Held:
In the case of The Kengsington decided by the Supreme Court of the U.S.:
The stipulation in a steamship passenger's ticket, which compels him to value his baggage, at a certain sum, far less than it is worth, or, in order to have a higher value put upon it, to subject it to the provisions of the Harter Act, by which the carrier would be exempted from all the liability therefore from
errors in navigation or management of the vessel of other negligence is unreasonable and in conflict with public policy.
In the case, defendant having received the two boxes in good condition, its legal duty was to deliver them to the plaintiff in the same condition in which it received them. From the time of their delivery to the defendant in New York until they are delivered to the plaintiff in Manila, the boxes were under the control and supervision of the defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff. The defendant having admitted that the boxes were damaged while in transit and in its possession, the burden of proof then shifted, and it devolved upon the defendant to both allege and prove that the damage was caused by reason of some fact which exempted it from liability. As to how the boxes were damaged, when or where, was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant and in the very nature of things could not be in the knowledge of the plaintiff. To require the plaintiff to prove as to when and how the damage was caused would force him to call and rely upon the employees of the defendant’s ship, which in legal effect would be to say that he could not recover any damage for any reason. That is not the law.
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.
The defendant has not even attempted to prove that the two cases were wet with sea water by fictitious event, force majeure or nature and defect of the things themselves. Consequently, it must be presumed that it was by causes entirely distinct and in no manner imputable to the plaintiff, and of which the steamer President Garfield or any of its crew could not have been entirely unaware.
The fact that the cases were damaged by “sea water,” standing alone and within itself, is not evidence that they were damaged by force majeure or for a cause beyond the defendant’s control. The words “perils of the sea,” as stated in defendant’s brief apply to “all kinds of marine casualties, such as shipwreck, foundering, stranding,” and among other things, it is said: “Tempest, rocks, shoals, icebergs and other obstacles are within the expression,” and “where the peril is the proximate cause of the loss, the shipowner is excused.” “Something fortuitous and out of the ordinary course is involved in both words ‘peril’ or ‘accident’.”
Universal Shipping Lines, Inc. v IAC (G.R. No. 74125)
Facts:
SEVALCO Limited, owned and operated by the petitioner, shipped from Rotterdam Netherlands, to Bangkok, Thailand, aboard its M/V "TAIWAN", 2 cargoes of 50 palletized cartons. They were respectively consigned to S. Lersen Company, Ltd. and Muang Ngarm Retreads,Ltd. Both shipments were insured with the private respondent, Alliance Assurance Company, Ltd., a foreign insurance company domiciled in London, England.
Despite the arrival of the vessel at Bangkok, the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. RB-15 was not unloaded nor delivered to the consignee, S. Lersen Company, Ltd. The shipment under Bill of Lading No. RB-16 was delivered to Muang Ngarm Retreads, Ltd. with a shortage in weight because the cargoes had been either totally or partially dissolved in saltwater which flooded the vessel where they had been stored.
Upon arrival in Manila, Arturo C. Saavedra, master of M/V "TAIWAN" filed a marine protest stating that the source of the water could not be definitely ascertained where it comes from. He was suspecting of some leakage of suction pipes and that hold No. 2 cannot be inspected on account of the full cargoes inside the hold, rendering it to be inaccessible.
The consignees filed their respective formal claims for loss and damage to their cargoes. The insurer paid both claims in the amounts of £I2,180 and £2,547.18 for the loss and damage to their cargoes.
Private respondent, as insurer-subrogee, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from the petitioner and its Manila agent, Carlos Go Thong & Company, what it paid the consignees of the cargo.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner liable for the damage/loss suffered by the subject shipments
2. Whether or not private respondent has capacity to sue in this jurisdiction
3. Whether or not in private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed
Held:
1. No. It was incumbent upon the defendants to prove that the losses and damages were due to causes other than the negligence or fault of their employees. Said defendants have not adduced proof on this point. It having been shown that the losses and damages were incurred while the shipments were in the custody of the M/V' Taiwan' the liability of its owner/operator and shipping agent is clear-they must pay for the losses and damages sustained by the consignees as a consequence of the breach of contract of water transportation.
2. Yes, The private respondent may sue in Philippine courts upon the marine insurance policies issued by it abroad to cover international-bound cargoes shipped by a Philippine carrier, even if it has no license to do business in this country, for it is not the lack of the prescribed license (to do business in the Philippines) but doing business without such license, which bars a foreign corporation from access to our courts.
3. No. Section 3(6), Title I, of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Commonwealth Act No. 65) which provides that:
... the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. ...
This provision of the law admits of an xception: if the one-year period is suspended by express agreement of the parties for in such a case, their agreement becomes the law for them.
The exchange of correspondence between the parties and/or their associates/representatives shows that the parties had mutually agreed to extend the time within which the plaintiff or its predecessors-in-interest may file suit until December 27,1976. When the complaint was filed on June 25, 1976, that deadline had not yet expired.
SEVALCO Limited, owned and operated by the petitioner, shipped from Rotterdam Netherlands, to Bangkok, Thailand, aboard its M/V "TAIWAN", 2 cargoes of 50 palletized cartons. They were respectively consigned to S. Lersen Company, Ltd. and Muang Ngarm Retreads,Ltd. Both shipments were insured with the private respondent, Alliance Assurance Company, Ltd., a foreign insurance company domiciled in London, England.
Despite the arrival of the vessel at Bangkok, the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. RB-15 was not unloaded nor delivered to the consignee, S. Lersen Company, Ltd. The shipment under Bill of Lading No. RB-16 was delivered to Muang Ngarm Retreads, Ltd. with a shortage in weight because the cargoes had been either totally or partially dissolved in saltwater which flooded the vessel where they had been stored.
Upon arrival in Manila, Arturo C. Saavedra, master of M/V "TAIWAN" filed a marine protest stating that the source of the water could not be definitely ascertained where it comes from. He was suspecting of some leakage of suction pipes and that hold No. 2 cannot be inspected on account of the full cargoes inside the hold, rendering it to be inaccessible.
The consignees filed their respective formal claims for loss and damage to their cargoes. The insurer paid both claims in the amounts of £I2,180 and £2,547.18 for the loss and damage to their cargoes.
Private respondent, as insurer-subrogee, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from the petitioner and its Manila agent, Carlos Go Thong & Company, what it paid the consignees of the cargo.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner liable for the damage/loss suffered by the subject shipments
2. Whether or not private respondent has capacity to sue in this jurisdiction
3. Whether or not in private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed
Held:
1. No. It was incumbent upon the defendants to prove that the losses and damages were due to causes other than the negligence or fault of their employees. Said defendants have not adduced proof on this point. It having been shown that the losses and damages were incurred while the shipments were in the custody of the M/V' Taiwan' the liability of its owner/operator and shipping agent is clear-they must pay for the losses and damages sustained by the consignees as a consequence of the breach of contract of water transportation.
2. Yes, The private respondent may sue in Philippine courts upon the marine insurance policies issued by it abroad to cover international-bound cargoes shipped by a Philippine carrier, even if it has no license to do business in this country, for it is not the lack of the prescribed license (to do business in the Philippines) but doing business without such license, which bars a foreign corporation from access to our courts.
3. No. Section 3(6), Title I, of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Commonwealth Act No. 65) which provides that:
... the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. ...
This provision of the law admits of an xception: if the one-year period is suspended by express agreement of the parties for in such a case, their agreement becomes the law for them.
The exchange of correspondence between the parties and/or their associates/representatives shows that the parties had mutually agreed to extend the time within which the plaintiff or its predecessors-in-interest may file suit until December 27,1976. When the complaint was filed on June 25, 1976, that deadline had not yet expired.
Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v Jarque et. al.
Doctrine:
It is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity
Facts:
Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. These documents were recorded in the record of transfers and incumbrances of vessels for the port of Cebu and each was therein denominated a "chattel mortgage".
Neither of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage contained such an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered in the customs house until the period of thirty days prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Francisco Jarque;
A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on within the thirty-day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings.
Francisco was declared an insolvent with the result that an assignment of all the properties of the insolvent was executed in favor of Jose Corominas.
Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortgages were defective.
Yes. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal property. They are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry of the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity.
In the case, the absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. As a consequence a chattel mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is unenforceable against third persons.
It is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity
Facts:
Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. These documents were recorded in the record of transfers and incumbrances of vessels for the port of Cebu and each was therein denominated a "chattel mortgage".
Neither of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage contained such an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered in the customs house until the period of thirty days prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Francisco Jarque;
A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on within the thirty-day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings.
Francisco was declared an insolvent with the result that an assignment of all the properties of the insolvent was executed in favor of Jose Corominas.
Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortgages were defective.
Yes. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal property. They are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry of the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity.
In the case, the absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. As a consequence a chattel mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is unenforceable against third persons.
Savellano v Northwest Airlines
Facts:
Savellano, ex-Mayor and former Chairman of COMELEC and wife were expected to arrive at NAIA after 12 hours of travel coming from Seattle. The plane made an emergency landing because a fire started in one of the engines.
They passengers were brought to a hotel. At around midnight, they were awakened by a phone call from Northwest's personnel saying that they would be take a Seattle-Tokyo-Manila route on the flight back to Manila the next day. Upon arrival at the airport they were again advised that they would take an alternative and longer route (Seattle - Los Angeles - Seoul- Manila) back to Manila.
Meanwhile, the other passengers took the first route. Upon arrival of Savellano at Manila, they were teased for taking the longer and tiresome route. They also discovered that their luggage had been ransacked and the contents stolen.
Savellano demanded damages on the ground that they suffered inconvenience, embarrassment and humiliation for taking the longer route.
Issue:
1.Whether or not the bump-off was a breach of the air carriage contract
2. Whether or not Savellano is entitled to actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Held:
1. Yes. In the condition of the airline ticket, there is nothing authorizing Northwest to decide unilaterally what other stopping places Savellano should take and when they should fly. Substituting aircraft without notice is entirely different from changing stopping places or connecting cities without notice. Also, Northwest failed to show a case of necessity for changing the stopping place.
2. On moral damages: Northwest is not guilty of bad faith. It appears that the passengers of the distressed flight were randomly divided into 2 groups. One group taking the first route and the other taking the longer route of flight. The selection of who was to take the flight was handled via computer reservation system. Savellano failed to present convincing evidence to back the allegation that Northwest was guilty of bad faith.
On exemplary damages, it is not proper. The unexpected and sudden requirement of having to arrange connecting flights in just a few hours, in addition to the Northwest employees' normal workload was difficult to satisfy perfectly. Northwest is not liable for its imperfection of neglecting to consult with passengers beforehand.
Nominal damages are awarded in this case. The court considered that Savellano suffered the inconvenience of having to wake up early to catch the flight and that they were business class passengers who paid more for better service. It also considered Savellano's social and official status. The court awarded P150,000 as nominal damages in order to vindicate and recognize their right to be notified and consulted.
Notes:
*The rulings of Lopez, Zulueta and Ortigas are not applicable in this case there is no showing that the breach was done with the same entrepreneurial motive as in Lopez or with ill-will as in Zulueta and Ortigas.
*Good faith is presumed while bad faith is a matter of fact that needs to be proved by the party alleging it.
Savellano, ex-Mayor and former Chairman of COMELEC and wife were expected to arrive at NAIA after 12 hours of travel coming from Seattle. The plane made an emergency landing because a fire started in one of the engines.
They passengers were brought to a hotel. At around midnight, they were awakened by a phone call from Northwest's personnel saying that they would be take a Seattle-Tokyo-Manila route on the flight back to Manila the next day. Upon arrival at the airport they were again advised that they would take an alternative and longer route (Seattle - Los Angeles - Seoul- Manila) back to Manila.
Meanwhile, the other passengers took the first route. Upon arrival of Savellano at Manila, they were teased for taking the longer and tiresome route. They also discovered that their luggage had been ransacked and the contents stolen.
Savellano demanded damages on the ground that they suffered inconvenience, embarrassment and humiliation for taking the longer route.
Issue:
1.Whether or not the bump-off was a breach of the air carriage contract
2. Whether or not Savellano is entitled to actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Held:
1. Yes. In the condition of the airline ticket, there is nothing authorizing Northwest to decide unilaterally what other stopping places Savellano should take and when they should fly. Substituting aircraft without notice is entirely different from changing stopping places or connecting cities without notice. Also, Northwest failed to show a case of necessity for changing the stopping place.
2. On moral damages: Northwest is not guilty of bad faith. It appears that the passengers of the distressed flight were randomly divided into 2 groups. One group taking the first route and the other taking the longer route of flight. The selection of who was to take the flight was handled via computer reservation system. Savellano failed to present convincing evidence to back the allegation that Northwest was guilty of bad faith.
On exemplary damages, it is not proper. The unexpected and sudden requirement of having to arrange connecting flights in just a few hours, in addition to the Northwest employees' normal workload was difficult to satisfy perfectly. Northwest is not liable for its imperfection of neglecting to consult with passengers beforehand.
Nominal damages are awarded in this case. The court considered that Savellano suffered the inconvenience of having to wake up early to catch the flight and that they were business class passengers who paid more for better service. It also considered Savellano's social and official status. The court awarded P150,000 as nominal damages in order to vindicate and recognize their right to be notified and consulted.
Notes:
*The rulings of Lopez, Zulueta and Ortigas are not applicable in this case there is no showing that the breach was done with the same entrepreneurial motive as in Lopez or with ill-will as in Zulueta and Ortigas.
*Good faith is presumed while bad faith is a matter of fact that needs to be proved by the party alleging it.
Air France v Carrascoso
Facts:
Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila - Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat because there was a "white man" who had better right to the seat.
As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the damages awarded.
Held:
Yes to both.
To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not."
Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France to present its manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man.
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist class just to give way to another passenger whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
*Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose
Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila - Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat because there was a "white man" who had better right to the seat.
As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the damages awarded.
Held:
Yes to both.
To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not."
Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France to present its manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man.
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist class just to give way to another passenger whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
*Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose
Sabado, Pebrero 9, 2013
Minucher v CA
Doctrine:
Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.
Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attaché of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an informer belonging to the military intelligence community).
Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding the expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.
Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.
It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a motion to quash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines.
TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement complained in a Diplomatic Note.
Held:
No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or by the service of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.
The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in his official capacity.
Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.
Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attaché of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an informer belonging to the military intelligence community).
Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding the expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.
Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.
It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a motion to quash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines.
TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement complained in a Diplomatic Note.
Held:
No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or by the service of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.
The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in his official capacity.
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