Facts:
Petitioners ( who are passengers from Cavite and Batangas who ride on buses to and from their province and Manila) and some public service operators of buses and jeeps assail the validity of Ordinance 4986and Administrative Order 1.
Ordinance 4986 states that PUB and PUJs shall be allowed to enter Manila only from 6:30am to 8:30pm every day except Sundays and holidays.
Petitioners contend that since they possess a valid CPC, they have already acquired a vested right to operate.
Administrative Order 1 issued by Commissioner of Public Service states that all jeeps authorized to operate from Manila to any point in Luzon, beyond the perimeter of Greater Manila, shall carry the words "For Provincial Operation".
Issue:
1. Whether or not the said regulations are valid.
2. Whether or not Ordinance 4986 destroys vested rights to operate in Manila.
Held:
1. YES! Using the doctrine in Lagman vs. City of Manila, Petitioner's Certificate of Public Convenience was issued subject to the condition that operators shall observe and comply with all the rules and regulations of the PSC relative to PUB service.
The purpose of the ban is to minimize the problem in Manila and the traffic congestion, delays and accidents resulting from the free entry into the streets of Manila and the operation around said streets.
Both Ordinance 4986 and AO 1 fit into the concept of promotion and regulation of general welfare.
2. NO! A vested right is some right or interest in the property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. As far as the State is concerned, a CPC constitutes neither a franchise nor a contract, confers no property right, and is a mere license or privilege.
The holder does not acquire a property right in the route covered, nor does it confer upon the holder any proprietary right/interest/franchise in the public highways.
Neither do bus passengers have a vested right to be transported directly to Manila. The alleged right is dependent upon the manner public services are allowed to operate within a given area. It is no argument that the passengers enjoyed the privilege of having been continuously transported even before outbreak of war. Times have changed and vehicles have increased. Traffic congestion has moved from worse to critical. Hence, there is a need to regulate the operation of public services.
Martes, Pebrero 26, 2013
Linggo, Pebrero 10, 2013
Mirasol v The Robert Dollar Co. (G.R. No. L-29721)
Doctrine:
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.
Facts:
As a third special defense, defendant quoted clause 13 of the bill of lading, in which it is stated that in no case shall it be held liable “for or in respect to said merchandise or property beyond the sum of S250 for any piece, package or any article not enclosed in a package, unless a higher value is stated herein and ad valorem freight paid or assessed thereon,” and that there was no other agreement.
The plaintiff wrote the defendant a letter as follows: "I wish to file claim of damage." Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to P700 for his Encyclopedia Britannica which was damaged during shipment.
Defendant alleges that the damage, if any, was caused by “sea water,” and that the bill of lading exempts defendant from liability for that cause. That damage by “sea water” is a shipper’s risk, and that defendant is not liable.
Issue: Whether or not damage by sea water is a shipper's risk.
Held:
In the case of The Kengsington decided by the Supreme Court of the U.S.:
The stipulation in a steamship passenger's ticket, which compels him to value his baggage, at a certain sum, far less than it is worth, or, in order to have a higher value put upon it, to subject it to the provisions of the Harter Act, by which the carrier would be exempted from all the liability therefore from
errors in navigation or management of the vessel of other negligence is unreasonable and in conflict with public policy.
In the case, defendant having received the two boxes in good condition, its legal duty was to deliver them to the plaintiff in the same condition in which it received them. From the time of their delivery to the defendant in New York until they are delivered to the plaintiff in Manila, the boxes were under the control and supervision of the defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff. The defendant having admitted that the boxes were damaged while in transit and in its possession, the burden of proof then shifted, and it devolved upon the defendant to both allege and prove that the damage was caused by reason of some fact which exempted it from liability. As to how the boxes were damaged, when or where, was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant and in the very nature of things could not be in the knowledge of the plaintiff. To require the plaintiff to prove as to when and how the damage was caused would force him to call and rely upon the employees of the defendant’s ship, which in legal effect would be to say that he could not recover any damage for any reason. That is not the law.
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.
The defendant has not even attempted to prove that the two cases were wet with sea water by fictitious event, force majeure or nature and defect of the things themselves. Consequently, it must be presumed that it was by causes entirely distinct and in no manner imputable to the plaintiff, and of which the steamer President Garfield or any of its crew could not have been entirely unaware.
The fact that the cases were damaged by “sea water,” standing alone and within itself, is not evidence that they were damaged by force majeure or for a cause beyond the defendant’s control. The words “perils of the sea,” as stated in defendant’s brief apply to “all kinds of marine casualties, such as shipwreck, foundering, stranding,” and among other things, it is said: “Tempest, rocks, shoals, icebergs and other obstacles are within the expression,” and “where the peril is the proximate cause of the loss, the shipowner is excused.” “Something fortuitous and out of the ordinary course is involved in both words ‘peril’ or ‘accident’.”
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.
Facts:
As a third special defense, defendant quoted clause 13 of the bill of lading, in which it is stated that in no case shall it be held liable “for or in respect to said merchandise or property beyond the sum of S250 for any piece, package or any article not enclosed in a package, unless a higher value is stated herein and ad valorem freight paid or assessed thereon,” and that there was no other agreement.
The plaintiff wrote the defendant a letter as follows: "I wish to file claim of damage." Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to P700 for his Encyclopedia Britannica which was damaged during shipment.
Defendant alleges that the damage, if any, was caused by “sea water,” and that the bill of lading exempts defendant from liability for that cause. That damage by “sea water” is a shipper’s risk, and that defendant is not liable.
Issue: Whether or not damage by sea water is a shipper's risk.
Held:
In the case of The Kengsington decided by the Supreme Court of the U.S.:
The stipulation in a steamship passenger's ticket, which compels him to value his baggage, at a certain sum, far less than it is worth, or, in order to have a higher value put upon it, to subject it to the provisions of the Harter Act, by which the carrier would be exempted from all the liability therefore from
errors in navigation or management of the vessel of other negligence is unreasonable and in conflict with public policy.
In the case, defendant having received the two boxes in good condition, its legal duty was to deliver them to the plaintiff in the same condition in which it received them. From the time of their delivery to the defendant in New York until they are delivered to the plaintiff in Manila, the boxes were under the control and supervision of the defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff. The defendant having admitted that the boxes were damaged while in transit and in its possession, the burden of proof then shifted, and it devolved upon the defendant to both allege and prove that the damage was caused by reason of some fact which exempted it from liability. As to how the boxes were damaged, when or where, was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant and in the very nature of things could not be in the knowledge of the plaintiff. To require the plaintiff to prove as to when and how the damage was caused would force him to call and rely upon the employees of the defendant’s ship, which in legal effect would be to say that he could not recover any damage for any reason. That is not the law.
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.
The defendant has not even attempted to prove that the two cases were wet with sea water by fictitious event, force majeure or nature and defect of the things themselves. Consequently, it must be presumed that it was by causes entirely distinct and in no manner imputable to the plaintiff, and of which the steamer President Garfield or any of its crew could not have been entirely unaware.
The fact that the cases were damaged by “sea water,” standing alone and within itself, is not evidence that they were damaged by force majeure or for a cause beyond the defendant’s control. The words “perils of the sea,” as stated in defendant’s brief apply to “all kinds of marine casualties, such as shipwreck, foundering, stranding,” and among other things, it is said: “Tempest, rocks, shoals, icebergs and other obstacles are within the expression,” and “where the peril is the proximate cause of the loss, the shipowner is excused.” “Something fortuitous and out of the ordinary course is involved in both words ‘peril’ or ‘accident’.”
Universal Shipping Lines, Inc. v IAC (G.R. No. 74125)
Facts:
SEVALCO Limited, owned and operated by the petitioner, shipped from Rotterdam Netherlands, to Bangkok, Thailand, aboard its M/V "TAIWAN", 2 cargoes of 50 palletized cartons. They were respectively consigned to S. Lersen Company, Ltd. and Muang Ngarm Retreads,Ltd. Both shipments were insured with the private respondent, Alliance Assurance Company, Ltd., a foreign insurance company domiciled in London, England.
Despite the arrival of the vessel at Bangkok, the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. RB-15 was not unloaded nor delivered to the consignee, S. Lersen Company, Ltd. The shipment under Bill of Lading No. RB-16 was delivered to Muang Ngarm Retreads, Ltd. with a shortage in weight because the cargoes had been either totally or partially dissolved in saltwater which flooded the vessel where they had been stored.
Upon arrival in Manila, Arturo C. Saavedra, master of M/V "TAIWAN" filed a marine protest stating that the source of the water could not be definitely ascertained where it comes from. He was suspecting of some leakage of suction pipes and that hold No. 2 cannot be inspected on account of the full cargoes inside the hold, rendering it to be inaccessible.
The consignees filed their respective formal claims for loss and damage to their cargoes. The insurer paid both claims in the amounts of £I2,180 and £2,547.18 for the loss and damage to their cargoes.
Private respondent, as insurer-subrogee, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from the petitioner and its Manila agent, Carlos Go Thong & Company, what it paid the consignees of the cargo.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner liable for the damage/loss suffered by the subject shipments
2. Whether or not private respondent has capacity to sue in this jurisdiction
3. Whether or not in private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed
Held:
1. No. It was incumbent upon the defendants to prove that the losses and damages were due to causes other than the negligence or fault of their employees. Said defendants have not adduced proof on this point. It having been shown that the losses and damages were incurred while the shipments were in the custody of the M/V' Taiwan' the liability of its owner/operator and shipping agent is clear-they must pay for the losses and damages sustained by the consignees as a consequence of the breach of contract of water transportation.
2. Yes, The private respondent may sue in Philippine courts upon the marine insurance policies issued by it abroad to cover international-bound cargoes shipped by a Philippine carrier, even if it has no license to do business in this country, for it is not the lack of the prescribed license (to do business in the Philippines) but doing business without such license, which bars a foreign corporation from access to our courts.
3. No. Section 3(6), Title I, of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Commonwealth Act No. 65) which provides that:
... the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. ...
This provision of the law admits of an xception: if the one-year period is suspended by express agreement of the parties for in such a case, their agreement becomes the law for them.
The exchange of correspondence between the parties and/or their associates/representatives shows that the parties had mutually agreed to extend the time within which the plaintiff or its predecessors-in-interest may file suit until December 27,1976. When the complaint was filed on June 25, 1976, that deadline had not yet expired.
SEVALCO Limited, owned and operated by the petitioner, shipped from Rotterdam Netherlands, to Bangkok, Thailand, aboard its M/V "TAIWAN", 2 cargoes of 50 palletized cartons. They were respectively consigned to S. Lersen Company, Ltd. and Muang Ngarm Retreads,Ltd. Both shipments were insured with the private respondent, Alliance Assurance Company, Ltd., a foreign insurance company domiciled in London, England.
Despite the arrival of the vessel at Bangkok, the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. RB-15 was not unloaded nor delivered to the consignee, S. Lersen Company, Ltd. The shipment under Bill of Lading No. RB-16 was delivered to Muang Ngarm Retreads, Ltd. with a shortage in weight because the cargoes had been either totally or partially dissolved in saltwater which flooded the vessel where they had been stored.
Upon arrival in Manila, Arturo C. Saavedra, master of M/V "TAIWAN" filed a marine protest stating that the source of the water could not be definitely ascertained where it comes from. He was suspecting of some leakage of suction pipes and that hold No. 2 cannot be inspected on account of the full cargoes inside the hold, rendering it to be inaccessible.
The consignees filed their respective formal claims for loss and damage to their cargoes. The insurer paid both claims in the amounts of £I2,180 and £2,547.18 for the loss and damage to their cargoes.
Private respondent, as insurer-subrogee, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from the petitioner and its Manila agent, Carlos Go Thong & Company, what it paid the consignees of the cargo.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner liable for the damage/loss suffered by the subject shipments
2. Whether or not private respondent has capacity to sue in this jurisdiction
3. Whether or not in private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed
Held:
1. No. It was incumbent upon the defendants to prove that the losses and damages were due to causes other than the negligence or fault of their employees. Said defendants have not adduced proof on this point. It having been shown that the losses and damages were incurred while the shipments were in the custody of the M/V' Taiwan' the liability of its owner/operator and shipping agent is clear-they must pay for the losses and damages sustained by the consignees as a consequence of the breach of contract of water transportation.
2. Yes, The private respondent may sue in Philippine courts upon the marine insurance policies issued by it abroad to cover international-bound cargoes shipped by a Philippine carrier, even if it has no license to do business in this country, for it is not the lack of the prescribed license (to do business in the Philippines) but doing business without such license, which bars a foreign corporation from access to our courts.
3. No. Section 3(6), Title I, of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Commonwealth Act No. 65) which provides that:
... the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. ...
This provision of the law admits of an xception: if the one-year period is suspended by express agreement of the parties for in such a case, their agreement becomes the law for them.
The exchange of correspondence between the parties and/or their associates/representatives shows that the parties had mutually agreed to extend the time within which the plaintiff or its predecessors-in-interest may file suit until December 27,1976. When the complaint was filed on June 25, 1976, that deadline had not yet expired.
Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v Jarque et. al.
Doctrine:
It is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity
Facts:
Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. These documents were recorded in the record of transfers and incumbrances of vessels for the port of Cebu and each was therein denominated a "chattel mortgage".
Neither of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage contained such an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered in the customs house until the period of thirty days prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Francisco Jarque;
A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on within the thirty-day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings.
Francisco was declared an insolvent with the result that an assignment of all the properties of the insolvent was executed in favor of Jose Corominas.
Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortgages were defective.
Yes. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal property. They are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry of the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity.
In the case, the absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. As a consequence a chattel mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is unenforceable against third persons.
It is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity
Facts:
Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. These documents were recorded in the record of transfers and incumbrances of vessels for the port of Cebu and each was therein denominated a "chattel mortgage".
Neither of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage contained such an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered in the customs house until the period of thirty days prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Francisco Jarque;
A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on within the thirty-day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings.
Francisco was declared an insolvent with the result that an assignment of all the properties of the insolvent was executed in favor of Jose Corominas.
Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortgages were defective.
Yes. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal property. They are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry of the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity.
In the case, the absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. As a consequence a chattel mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is unenforceable against third persons.
Savellano v Northwest Airlines
Facts:
Savellano, ex-Mayor and former Chairman of COMELEC and wife were expected to arrive at NAIA after 12 hours of travel coming from Seattle. The plane made an emergency landing because a fire started in one of the engines.
They passengers were brought to a hotel. At around midnight, they were awakened by a phone call from Northwest's personnel saying that they would be take a Seattle-Tokyo-Manila route on the flight back to Manila the next day. Upon arrival at the airport they were again advised that they would take an alternative and longer route (Seattle - Los Angeles - Seoul- Manila) back to Manila.
Meanwhile, the other passengers took the first route. Upon arrival of Savellano at Manila, they were teased for taking the longer and tiresome route. They also discovered that their luggage had been ransacked and the contents stolen.
Savellano demanded damages on the ground that they suffered inconvenience, embarrassment and humiliation for taking the longer route.
Issue:
1.Whether or not the bump-off was a breach of the air carriage contract
2. Whether or not Savellano is entitled to actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Held:
1. Yes. In the condition of the airline ticket, there is nothing authorizing Northwest to decide unilaterally what other stopping places Savellano should take and when they should fly. Substituting aircraft without notice is entirely different from changing stopping places or connecting cities without notice. Also, Northwest failed to show a case of necessity for changing the stopping place.
2. On moral damages: Northwest is not guilty of bad faith. It appears that the passengers of the distressed flight were randomly divided into 2 groups. One group taking the first route and the other taking the longer route of flight. The selection of who was to take the flight was handled via computer reservation system. Savellano failed to present convincing evidence to back the allegation that Northwest was guilty of bad faith.
On exemplary damages, it is not proper. The unexpected and sudden requirement of having to arrange connecting flights in just a few hours, in addition to the Northwest employees' normal workload was difficult to satisfy perfectly. Northwest is not liable for its imperfection of neglecting to consult with passengers beforehand.
Nominal damages are awarded in this case. The court considered that Savellano suffered the inconvenience of having to wake up early to catch the flight and that they were business class passengers who paid more for better service. It also considered Savellano's social and official status. The court awarded P150,000 as nominal damages in order to vindicate and recognize their right to be notified and consulted.
Notes:
*The rulings of Lopez, Zulueta and Ortigas are not applicable in this case there is no showing that the breach was done with the same entrepreneurial motive as in Lopez or with ill-will as in Zulueta and Ortigas.
*Good faith is presumed while bad faith is a matter of fact that needs to be proved by the party alleging it.
Savellano, ex-Mayor and former Chairman of COMELEC and wife were expected to arrive at NAIA after 12 hours of travel coming from Seattle. The plane made an emergency landing because a fire started in one of the engines.
They passengers were brought to a hotel. At around midnight, they were awakened by a phone call from Northwest's personnel saying that they would be take a Seattle-Tokyo-Manila route on the flight back to Manila the next day. Upon arrival at the airport they were again advised that they would take an alternative and longer route (Seattle - Los Angeles - Seoul- Manila) back to Manila.
Meanwhile, the other passengers took the first route. Upon arrival of Savellano at Manila, they were teased for taking the longer and tiresome route. They also discovered that their luggage had been ransacked and the contents stolen.
Savellano demanded damages on the ground that they suffered inconvenience, embarrassment and humiliation for taking the longer route.
Issue:
1.Whether or not the bump-off was a breach of the air carriage contract
2. Whether or not Savellano is entitled to actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Held:
1. Yes. In the condition of the airline ticket, there is nothing authorizing Northwest to decide unilaterally what other stopping places Savellano should take and when they should fly. Substituting aircraft without notice is entirely different from changing stopping places or connecting cities without notice. Also, Northwest failed to show a case of necessity for changing the stopping place.
2. On moral damages: Northwest is not guilty of bad faith. It appears that the passengers of the distressed flight were randomly divided into 2 groups. One group taking the first route and the other taking the longer route of flight. The selection of who was to take the flight was handled via computer reservation system. Savellano failed to present convincing evidence to back the allegation that Northwest was guilty of bad faith.
On exemplary damages, it is not proper. The unexpected and sudden requirement of having to arrange connecting flights in just a few hours, in addition to the Northwest employees' normal workload was difficult to satisfy perfectly. Northwest is not liable for its imperfection of neglecting to consult with passengers beforehand.
Nominal damages are awarded in this case. The court considered that Savellano suffered the inconvenience of having to wake up early to catch the flight and that they were business class passengers who paid more for better service. It also considered Savellano's social and official status. The court awarded P150,000 as nominal damages in order to vindicate and recognize their right to be notified and consulted.
Notes:
*The rulings of Lopez, Zulueta and Ortigas are not applicable in this case there is no showing that the breach was done with the same entrepreneurial motive as in Lopez or with ill-will as in Zulueta and Ortigas.
*Good faith is presumed while bad faith is a matter of fact that needs to be proved by the party alleging it.
Air France v Carrascoso
Facts:
Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila - Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat because there was a "white man" who had better right to the seat.
As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the damages awarded.
Held:
Yes to both.
To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not."
Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France to present its manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man.
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist class just to give way to another passenger whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
*Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose
Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila - Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat because there was a "white man" who had better right to the seat.
As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the damages awarded.
Held:
Yes to both.
To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not."
Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France to present its manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man.
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist class just to give way to another passenger whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
*Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose
Sabado, Pebrero 9, 2013
Minucher v CA
Doctrine:
Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.
Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attaché of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an informer belonging to the military intelligence community).
Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding the expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.
Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.
It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a motion to quash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines.
TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement complained in a Diplomatic Note.
Held:
No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or by the service of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.
The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in his official capacity.
Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.
Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attaché of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an informer belonging to the military intelligence community).
Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding the expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.
Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.
It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a motion to quash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines.
TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement complained in a Diplomatic Note.
Held:
No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or by the service of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.
The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in his official capacity.
People v Castaneda
Facts:
Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document. The complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a deed of sale the house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, making it appear that his spouse gave her marital consent to said sale.
At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution stated that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Held:
No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband. It is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document. The complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a deed of sale the house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, making it appear that his spouse gave her marital consent to said sale.
At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution stated that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Held:
No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband. It is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. v MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
The cargo subject of the instant case was discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody of the consignee, Dole Philippines. The corresponding claim for the damages sustained by the cargo was filed by the plaintiff with the defendant, Maritime Company on May 4, 1972.
On June 11, 1973 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the CFI Manila embodying 3 causes of action involving 3 separate and different shipments. The third cause of action therein involved the cargo now subject of this present litigation.
On December 11, 1974, Judge Serafin Cuevas issued an Order dismissing the first two causes of action. The third cause of action which covered the cargo subject of this case now was likewise dismissed but without prejudice as it was not covered by the settlement. Because of the dismissal of the complaint with respect to the third cause of action, DOLE instituted this present complaint on January 6, 1975.
Maritime filed an answer pleading inter alia the affirmative defense of prescription under the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The Trial Court granted the motion, scheduling the preliminary hearing on April 27, 1977. The record before the Court does not show whether or not that hearing was held, but under date of May 6, 1977, Maritime filed a formal motion to dismiss invoking once more the ground of prescription.
The Trial Court, after due consideration, resolved the matter in favor of Maritime and dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 1155 of the Civil Code applies in lieu of the COGSA.
Held:
No. Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of actions is interrupted by the making of an extrajudicial written demand by the creditor
Section 3, paragraph 6 of the COGSA provides that:
the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered; Provided, That, if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent or conceded, is not given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when.the goods should have been delivered.
1. Dole argues that since the provisions of the Civil Code are, by express mandate of said Code, suppletory of deficiencies in the Code of Commerce and special laws in matters governed by the latter and there being a patent deficiency with respect to the tolling of the prescriptive period provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, prescription under said Act is subject to the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code on tolling. Since Dole's claim for loss or damage was filed on May 4, 1972 amounted to a written extrajudicial demand which would toll or interrupt prescription under Article 1155, it operated to toll prescription also in actions under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
These arguments might merit weightier consideration were it not for the fact that the question has already received a definitive answer, adverse to the position taken by Dole, in The Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. American President Lines, Inc.
2. Dole argues that it was error for the court not to have considered the action of plaintiff-appellant suspended by the extrajudicial demand which took place, according to defendant's own motion to dismiss on August 22, 1952.
Court noticed that while plaintiff avoids stating any date when the goods arrived in Manila, it relies upon the allegation made in the motion to dismiss that a protest was filed on August 22, 1952 — which goes to show that plaintiff-appellant's counsel has not been laying the facts squarely before the court for the consideration of the merits of the case. We have already decided that in a case governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on prescription should not be made to apply. (Chua Kuy vs. Everett Steamship Corp., G.R. No. L-5554, May 27, 1953.) We hold that in such a case the general provisions of the new Civil Code (Art. 1155) cannot be made to apply, as such application would have the effect of extending the one-year period of prescription fixed in the law. It is desirable that matters affecting transportation of goods by sea be decided in as short a time as possible; the application of the provisions of Article 1155 of the new Civil Code would unnecessarily extend the period and permit delays in the settlement of questions affecting transportation, contrary to the clear intent and purpose of the law.
Under Dole's theory, when its claim was received by Maritime, the one-year prescriptive period was interrupted and began to run anew from May 4, 1972, affording Dole another period of one year counted from that date within which to institute action on its claim for damage. Unfortunately, Dole let the new period lapse without filing action. It instituted Civil Case No. 91043 only on June 11, 1973, more than one month after that period has expired and its right of action had prescribed.
The cargo subject of the instant case was discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody of the consignee, Dole Philippines. The corresponding claim for the damages sustained by the cargo was filed by the plaintiff with the defendant, Maritime Company on May 4, 1972.
On June 11, 1973 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the CFI Manila embodying 3 causes of action involving 3 separate and different shipments. The third cause of action therein involved the cargo now subject of this present litigation.
On December 11, 1974, Judge Serafin Cuevas issued an Order dismissing the first two causes of action. The third cause of action which covered the cargo subject of this case now was likewise dismissed but without prejudice as it was not covered by the settlement. Because of the dismissal of the complaint with respect to the third cause of action, DOLE instituted this present complaint on January 6, 1975.
Maritime filed an answer pleading inter alia the affirmative defense of prescription under the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The Trial Court granted the motion, scheduling the preliminary hearing on April 27, 1977. The record before the Court does not show whether or not that hearing was held, but under date of May 6, 1977, Maritime filed a formal motion to dismiss invoking once more the ground of prescription.
The Trial Court, after due consideration, resolved the matter in favor of Maritime and dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 1155 of the Civil Code applies in lieu of the COGSA.
Held:
No. Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of actions is interrupted by the making of an extrajudicial written demand by the creditor
Section 3, paragraph 6 of the COGSA provides that:
the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered; Provided, That, if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent or conceded, is not given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when.the goods should have been delivered.
1. Dole argues that since the provisions of the Civil Code are, by express mandate of said Code, suppletory of deficiencies in the Code of Commerce and special laws in matters governed by the latter and there being a patent deficiency with respect to the tolling of the prescriptive period provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, prescription under said Act is subject to the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code on tolling. Since Dole's claim for loss or damage was filed on May 4, 1972 amounted to a written extrajudicial demand which would toll or interrupt prescription under Article 1155, it operated to toll prescription also in actions under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
These arguments might merit weightier consideration were it not for the fact that the question has already received a definitive answer, adverse to the position taken by Dole, in The Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. American President Lines, Inc.
2. Dole argues that it was error for the court not to have considered the action of plaintiff-appellant suspended by the extrajudicial demand which took place, according to defendant's own motion to dismiss on August 22, 1952.
Court noticed that while plaintiff avoids stating any date when the goods arrived in Manila, it relies upon the allegation made in the motion to dismiss that a protest was filed on August 22, 1952 — which goes to show that plaintiff-appellant's counsel has not been laying the facts squarely before the court for the consideration of the merits of the case. We have already decided that in a case governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on prescription should not be made to apply. (Chua Kuy vs. Everett Steamship Corp., G.R. No. L-5554, May 27, 1953.) We hold that in such a case the general provisions of the new Civil Code (Art. 1155) cannot be made to apply, as such application would have the effect of extending the one-year period of prescription fixed in the law. It is desirable that matters affecting transportation of goods by sea be decided in as short a time as possible; the application of the provisions of Article 1155 of the new Civil Code would unnecessarily extend the period and permit delays in the settlement of questions affecting transportation, contrary to the clear intent and purpose of the law.
Under Dole's theory, when its claim was received by Maritime, the one-year prescriptive period was interrupted and began to run anew from May 4, 1972, affording Dole another period of one year counted from that date within which to institute action on its claim for damage. Unfortunately, Dole let the new period lapse without filing action. It instituted Civil Case No. 91043 only on June 11, 1973, more than one month after that period has expired and its right of action had prescribed.
People v Dumpo
Facts:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dumpo have been legally married according to the rites and practices of the Mohammedan religion. Without the marriage being dissolved, it has been alleged that Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which they lived together as husband and wife.
Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy in the CFI Zamboanga. Dumpo appealed.
It has been established by the defense, without the prosecution having presented objection or evidence to the contrary, that the alleged second marriage was null and void according to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father (Moro Jalmani) had not given his consent.
Issue: Whether or not Dumpo was guilty of bigamy.
Held: No. Dumpo was acquitted.
The court formulated that there is no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for the validity of a marriage between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact which must be subject to proof in every particular case.
In the case, the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari (Iman or Mohammedans priest authorized to solemnize marriages between Mohammedans) was that the effect of the consent of the father's bride is an indispensable requirement for the validity of such contracts.
It was easy for the prosecution to show that the marriage was void by refuting Tahari's testimony because there were 2 other Imans among the State witnesses in the case, but it failed to do so.
Granting the absolute necessity of the father's consent, tacit compliance may be presumed because it does not appear that Dumpo's father has signified his opposition to the 2nd marriage after he had been informed of its celebration. But this presumption should not be established over the affirmation of Dumpo's father saying that he did not give his consent to the 2nd marriage.
It is an essential element in bigamy that the 2nd marriage have all the essential requisites of a valid marriage. It appearing that the 2nd marriage cannot be considered as such, there is no justification to hold her guilty of bigamy.
Dissent:
There is no quotation from the Koran regarding the essentials of a marriage ceremony. Justice Hull agrees that the evidence relied upon is not worthy of serious consideration. If consent were in fact necessary, it can well be presumed from the subsequent actions of the girl.
Navida v Dizon
Facts:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In a Memorandum Order, the Federal District Court conditionally granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss provided the defendants:
(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States
(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional defense in any action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which his injury occurred.
(3) waived any limitations-based defense that has matured since the commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas;
(4) stipulated that any discovery conducted during the pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to the same extent as if it had been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and
(5) submitted an agreement binding them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.
In the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for.
Case 1 (125078) and 2 (125598):
336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant companies.)
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970’s up to the early 1980’s when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the former’s health and well-being.
Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the complaint included the manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce. The subject matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to the present case, consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the present Regional Trial Court.
Second, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that NAVIDA, et al., were coerced into submitting their case to the Philippine courts, merely to comply with the U.S. District Court’s Order and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.
Third, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant companies. Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept service of summons/processes in the Philippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over persons of the defendants through their voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance of the defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the “Defendants’ Amended Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens” filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that “(t)he authority of each designated representative to accept service of process will become effective upon final dismissal of these actions by the Court”. The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case is not yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom. Consequently, since the authority of the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, the acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is also conditional.
Fourth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision of the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same cases in another forum, violates the rule on ‘forum shopping’ so abhorred in this jurisdiction. Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own jurisdiction. This court takes note that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action. The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, which is really a matter of venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction with this court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction.
Case 3 (126654), 4 (127856), 5(128398)
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. They alleged that as workers in the banana plantation and/or as residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in “serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.”
The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Cases. The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the above but because it shares the opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in its Special report “Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility,” Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage suit against foreign companies since the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine laws. There has been no decided case in Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP. This means there is no available evidence which will prove and disprove the relation between sterility and DBCP.
Eventually, the cases reached the SC!
Present case:
The main contention of the petitioners states that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. DOLE also argues that if indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case, applying the customs of the place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
CHIQUITA (another petitioner) argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed before them. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of the proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTCs have jurisdiction over the subject matter in these cases.
Held: Yes.
1. The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City.
2. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
3. It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., “the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce,” and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines.
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Re: Jurisdiction over the person
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.
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Jurisdiction v Exercise of Jurisdiction
It may also be pertinently stressed that “jurisdiction” is different from the “exercise of jurisdiction.” Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
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Re: Bad faith in filing cases to procure a dismissal and to allow petitioners to return to the forum of their choice.
This Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported by evidence on record. This Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances.
* We REMAND the records of this case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints.
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