Tan v Del Rosario, Jr.

Facts:

This is a consolidated case involving the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation (SNIT) scheme.

Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of the SNIT. In the 1^st case, they contend that the House Bill which eventually became RA 7496 is a misnomer or deficient because it was named as “Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession” while the actual title contains the said words with the additional phrase, “…Amending Section 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code”.

In the 2^nd case, they argue that respondents have exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships by issuing Revenue Regulation 2-93 to carry out the RA.

Issue:

Whether or not general professional partnerships may be taxed under SNIT

Held:

No. A general professional partnership is not itself an income taxpayer. Income tax is imposed not on the partnership (which is tax exempt), but on the partners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their distributive shares of partnership profits. There is no distinction in income tax liability between a person who practices his profession alone and one who does it through partnership with others in the exercise of a common profession.

In the case, SNIT is not envisioned by the Congress to cover corporations or partnerships which are independently subject to the payment of income tax.

***

Notes:

*2 KINDS OF PARTNERSHIPS UNDER TAX CODE

1. Taxable Partnerships – no matter how it was created or organized, they are subject to income tax by law.

2. Exempt Partnerships – the partners, not the partnership (although obligated to file an income tax return for administration and data) are liable for income tax in their individual capacity.

Mapa v CA

Facts:

High Peak Mining Exploration Corporation borrowed money from Land Bank, the latter acting as trustee. Loans are evidence by a Promissory Note (PN) but there was no further security attached for it. High peak failed to pay loans so LBP sent demand letters.  The PNs became the subject matter of a complaint for the recovery of sum of money where Deputy Sheriff Romulo Flores filed a return of service of summons stating that since Mapa (Chairman of High Peak) could not be found in the given business address( 2^nd flr, First Midland Condominium, Makati), he gave a substituted service to Susan dela Torre, an employee of the High Peak. Mapa filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the service of summons was highly defective because the sheriff’s return did not show that the sheriff exerted efforts to personally serve the summons, thus substituted summons was not warranted.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid substituted service of summons.

Held:

Yes. The absence in the sheriff’s return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. It must be emphasized that the absence in the sheriff’s return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. While the sheriff’s return carries with it the presumption of regularity of duties, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in relation to duty was not done simply because it was not disclosed.

In the case, Mapa did not deny the statements made by the sheriff – that Susan is authorized to receive processes of this nature. Until rebutted by competent evidence, returns would enjoy the presumption of regularity. Thus, Susan may be deemed as an agent of High Peak to whom a substituted service of summons can be made. 

Wonder Mechanical Engineering Corp. v CTA

Facts:

Wonder Corp. was engaged in the business of manufacturing auto spare parts, lamp shades, rice threshers and other articles. It was also engaged in the business of electroplating and repair of machines. However, it did not pay sales tax on the sale of articles and the percentage tax on its electroplating and repair business.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue caused the investigation of Wonder Corp. for the purpose of ascertaining its tax liability. Revenue Examiner Pedro Cabigao reported that Corp. manufactured and sold other articles subject to 7% sales tax but not covered by the Corp’s tax exemption privilege. The Corp. was assessed with a deficiency percentage tax of P25, 080. and a 25% surcharge.

Wonder Corp. contends that it was a given a Certificate of Tax  Exemption with respect to the manufacture of machines for making cigarette paper, pails, lead washer, nails… (those which are determined as new and necessary by RA 901).

Issue:

Whether or not the manufacture and sale of steel chairs, jeep parts… which are not machines for making other products are tax exempt under RA 901.

Held:

No. Wonder Corp. was granted the tax exemption in the manufacture and sale of machines but not manufacture and sale of the articles produced by the machines. Such was the intention of the State for new and necessary industries as an incentive to greater and adequate production of products made scarce by World War II. Tax exemptions are highly disfavored in law and those who claim them must be able to justify his claim and must be clearly expressed in the law. Tax exemptions cannot be established by implication.

In the case, Wonder Corp. was granted tax exemption in the manufacture of cigarette paper, pails, lead washers, nails…  as explicitly stated in the Certificate of Tax Exemption. The manufacture of steel chairs, jeep parts and other articles not constituting machines for making certain products does not fall under RA 901.

Carpio v Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas (Batangas), Inc.

Facts:

Rodolfo Carpio and Remedios Orendain filed with the RTC Batangas a complaint against Rural Bank and Jaime Ozaeta, clerk of court and sheriff of the same court. Petitioner alleges that they are absolute owners of a parcel of land in Sto. Tomas, Batangas. They obtained a loan of P515,000 from the Bank and executed a real estate mortgage over the same property. Without prior demand or notice to petitioners, Bank filed for extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Ozaeta then conducted a public auction where the Bank was the only bidder.

Petitioners allege that the sale was conducted without proper publication because the sheriff’s notice of sale was not published in a newspaper of general circulation, and that they were not given the opportunity to redeem the property. Bank filed an Answer with Counterclaim alleging that oral and written demands were made to petitioners, that there was proper publication, and that petitioners were given 2 years to redeem the property but they failed.

Petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that the Bank’s counterclaim was not accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. Bank filed an opposition, contending that its counterclaim is compulsory, thereby needing no more certificate of forum shopping since it is not an initiatory pleading or complaint. RTC dismissed the motion to dismiss. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not counterclaim needs to be accompanied by a certificate of forum shopping.

Held:

No. Section 5,Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure distinctly provides that the required certification is intended to cover an initiatory pleading – meaning an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. Rationale of this provision is to curb the malpractice of forum shopping.

In the case, the Bank’s Answer with Counterclaim is a responsive pleading, filed to counter petitioner’s complaint that initiates the civil action. The provision does not contemplate a defendant’s claim for relief that is derived from the main action or complaint.

*Petition denied

** Forum Shopping – an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum.

Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation v CTA

Facts:

National Irrigation Administration (NIA) entered into an agreement with Hydro Resources for the construction of the Magat River Multipurpose Project in Isabela. Under their contract, Hydro was allowed to procure new construction equipment, the payment for which will be advanced by NIA. Hydro shall repay NIA the costs incurred and the manner of repayment shall be through deductions from each monthly payment due to Hydro. Hydro shall repay NIA the full value of the construction before the eventual transfer of ownership.

Upon transfer, Hydro was assessed an additional 3% ad valorem duty which it paid under protest. The Collector of Customs then ordered for the refund of the ad valorem duty in the form of tax credit. This was then reversed by the Deputy Minister of Finance.

Issue:

Whether or not the imposition of the 3% ad valorem tax on importations is valid.

Held:

No. EO 860 which was the basis for the imposition of the ad valorem duty took effect December 1982. The importations were effected in 1978 and 1979 by NIA. It is a cardinal rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless contrary is provided. EO 860 does not provide for its retroactivity. The Deputy Minister of Finance even clarified that letters of credit opened prior to the effectivity of EO 860 are not subject to its provisions.

In the case, the procurement of the equipment was not on a tax exempt basis as the import liabilities have been secured to paid under a financial scheme. It is a matter of implementing a pre-existing agreement, hence, the imported articles can only be subject to the rates of import duties prevailing at the time of entry or withdrawal from the customs’ custody.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Ayala Securities Corporation

Facts:

Ayala Securities Corp. (Ayala) failed to file returns of their accumulated surplus so Ayala was charged with 25% surtax by the Commissioner of internal Revenue. The CTA (Court of Tax Appeals) reversed the Commissioner’s decision and held that the assessment made against Ayala was beyond the 5-yr prescriptive period as provided in section 331 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Commissioner now files a motion for reconsideration of this decision. Ayala invokes the defense of prescription against the right of the Commissioner to assess the surtax.

Issue:

Whether or not the right to assess and collect the 25% surtax has prescribed after five years.

Held:

No. There is no such time limit on the right of the Commissioner to assess the 25% surtax since there is no express statutory provision limiting such right or providing for its prescription. Hence, the collection of surtax is imprescriptible. The underlying purpose of the surtax is to avoid a situation where the corporation unduly retains its surplus earnings instead of declaring and paying dividends to its shareholders. SC reverses the ruling of the CTA.

Maceda v Macaraig

Facts:

The petition seeks to nullify certain decisions, orders, ruling, and resolutions of the respondents (Macaraig et. al) for exempting the National Power Corporation (NPC) from indirect tax and duties. Commonwealth Act 120 created NPC as a public corporation. RA 6395 revised the charter of NPC and provided in detail the exemption of NPC from all taxes, duties and other charges by the government. There were many resolutions and decisions that followed after RA 6395 which talked about the exemption and non-exemption from taxes of NPC.

Issue:

Whether or not NPC is really exempt from indirect taxes

Held:

Yes. NPC is a non-profit public corporation created for the general good and welfare of the people. From the very beginning of its corporate existence, NPC enjoyed preferential tax treatment to enable it to pay its debts and obligations. From the changes made in the NPC charter, the intention to strengthen its preferential tax treatment is obvious. The tax exemption is intended not only to insure that the NPC shall continue to generate electricity for the country but more importantly, to assure cheaper rates to be paid by consumers.

------------------

Some Notes on Direct and Indirect Taxes:
Direct Taxes – those which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business it engages in. Examples are: custom duties, ad valorem taxes paid by oil companies for importation of crude oil

Indirect Taxes – paid by persons who can shift the burden upon someone else.

Examples are: ad valorem taxes that oil companies pay to BIR upon removal of petroleum products from its refinery can be shifted to its buyer, like the NPC

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sarmiento: The fact that NPC has been tasked with the enormous undertaking to improve the quality of life, is no reason, to include indirect taxes, within the coverage of its preferential tax treatment. The deletion of “indirect taxes” as stated in one of the assailed orders (PD 938), is significant, because if said law truly intends to exempt NPC from indirect taxes, it would have said so specifically.

Junio v Grupo

Facts:

Rosario Junio entrusted to Atty. Salvador Grupo, P25,000 to be used in the redemption of a property in Bohol. For no reason at all, Atty. Grupo did not redeem the property so the property was forfeited. Because of this, Junio wanted the money back but Grupo refused to refund. Instead, Grupo requested that he use the money to help defray his children’s educational expenses. It was a personal request to which Grupo executed a PN. He maintains that the family of the Junio and Grupo were very close since Junio’s sisters served as Grupo’s household helpers for many years. Grupo also stated that the basis of his rendering legal services was purely gratuitous or “an act of a friend for a friend” with “consideration involved.” He concluded that there was no atty-client relationship existing between them.

The case was referred to the IBP and found Grupo liable for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Profesisonal Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients. The IBP Board of Governors recommended that he be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. Grupo filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an atty-client relationship.

Held:

Yes. If a person, in respect to his business affairs, consults with an attorney in his professional capacity and the attorney voluntarily permits in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.

Having gained dominance over Junio by virtue of such long relation of master and servant, Grupo took advantage of his influence by not returning the money. Grupo has committed an act which falls short of the standard conduct of an attorney. If an ordinary borrower of money is required by law to repay his loan, it is more so in the case of a lawyer whose conduct serves as an example.

*SC orders Grupo suspended from the practice of law for a month and to pay Junio within 30 days with interest at the legal rate.
* Note: 5 yrs. has already passed since the loan.

Cena v CSC

Facts:

Gaudencio Cena worked for 7 years as a Legal Officer of the Law Dep’t of Caloocan City. He was then transferred to the Office of the Congressman where he worked as a Supervising Staff Officer for 3 months.  He was then appointed as Registrar of the RD (Register of Deeds) in Malabon. In total, he has rendered gov’t service for 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65^th bday, he requested the LRA Administrator that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old age pension.

The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the CSC. The CSC denied the extension but Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. This time around, CSC granted a 1-yr extension to him. Cena still filed a case against CSC for grave abuse of discretion when it granted an extension of only 1 yr. He contends that the law(Sec 11, PD 1146 also known as Revised Gov’t Insurance Act) does not limit or specify the maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15-year service. Thus, the CSC has no authority to limit through a memorandum the number of years.

In defense, CSC said that since it is the central personnel agency of the gov’t, it is vested with power to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement age.

Issue:

Whether or not Cena is allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement?

Held:

Yes. An administrative circular, such as a memorandum of the CSC cannot limit PD 1146, on extension of service of employees who reach 65. While it is true that CSC is given the authority to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service, it cannot extend to matters not covered. The CSC’s authority is limited only to carrying into effect what PD 1146 says. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

The CSC Memorandum, being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that a regulation must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. CSC has no power to supply or add perceived omissions in PD 1146.

Tolentino v Sec. of Finance

Facts:

-          House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these Purposes…)

-          Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different from that of the House Bill

-          Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2^nd and 3^rd reading of the Bill on the same day

-          Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become enrolled bill which eventually became the EVAT law.

Procedural Issue:

(1)    WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House of Rep. in accordance with sec 24, art 6 of Consti

(2)    WoN the Senate bill violated the “three readings on separate days” requirement of the Consti

(3)    WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject, one title rule.

NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law, they were exempt from taxes. After the passage of EVAT, they were already included. PAL contended that neither the House or Senate bill provided for the removal of the exemption from taxes of PAL  and that it was inly made after the meeting of the Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of RA 7166

Held:

(1)    YES! Court said that it is not the law which should originate from the House of Rep, but the revenue bill which was required to originate from the House of Rep. The inititiative must ocme from the Lower House because they are elected in the district level – meaning they are expected to be more sensitive to the needs of the locality.

Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo extensive changes while in the Senate. Senate can introduce a separate and distinct bill other than the one the Lower House proposed.  The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the House bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the House bill.

(2)    NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent. Presidential certification dispensed the requirement not only of printing but also reading the bill in 3 separate days.  In fact, the Senate accepted the Pres. certification

(3)    No.  Court said that the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. It is also in the power of Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public utility when the common good so requires.

One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress members and inform people of pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not know of their situation not because of any defect in title but because they might have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its existence.

Aquino v COMELEC

Facts:

Agapito Aquino filed a Cert. of Candidacy to run for Rep in the 2^nd district of Makati. However, Mateo Bedon ( Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the grounds that he lacked the residence qualification under Sec 6, Art 7 of the 1987 Consti. Hearings were conducted by the COMELEC and dismissed Bedon’s petition to disqualify.

During the counting of votes, Aquino garnered more votes against Agusto Syjuco. Bedon then filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Aquino to which COMELEC agreed by issuing an Order. COMELEC then again issued another Order declaring Aquino to be disqualified due to the lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue:

W/N COMELEC erred in deciding that petitioner lacked the constitutional req’ts for residence.

Held:

No! Aquino failed to prove that he was a resident of the 2^nd Legislative District of Makati for a period of one year at the time of election. His domicile of origin was in Concepcion, Tarlac. COMELEC said that the intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati is evident in his leasing a condo unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may give an indication that he intends to reside in Makati, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s domicile. Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for a year because he has other “residences” in Manila or Quezon City.

Residence is synonymous with domicile -> place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home where he, no matter where he may be found eventually intends to return and remain (ruling in Co V Electoral Tribunal of House of Rep)

Elpidio Uy v CA

Facts of the Case:

Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), Pool Formation Trust Agreement (PFTA), PNB  and Public Estates Authority (PEA) entered into an agreement to implement the Heritage Memorial Park.  BCDA was the Project Owner and tasked to sell Heritage Park Investment Certificates to buyers. As trustee, PNB is given the legal and beneficial title to hold the certificates. The certificate holders organized themselves into a non-stock, non-profit corporation, Heritage Park Management Corp. (HPMC).

            Now, PEA and Uy’s business (Edison Dev’t and Construction) executed a Landscaping and Construction Agreement whereby the business will do all the landscaping and the construction of a terrasoleum. Since there was delay in the construction, the Heritage Park Executive Committee terminated the construction contracts so HPMC assumed all the duties and responsibilities of PEA.

Uy filed a complaint against PEA before the Construction Industry Arbitrary Commission (CIAC) where it sought to recover payments for the construction already done in the project.  The CIAC awarded monetary claims to Uy and a Notice of Garnishment was served on HPMC.

HPMC then filed a petition for Injunction/Prohibition before the CA on the ground that the CIAC had no jurisdiction since HPMC was not impleaded as a party in the case before CIAC. HPMC contended it is an indispensable party since it holds the certificates, any claim against PEA is a claim against all parties who contributed funds to the project.  Uy’s contention is that HPMC is not a party-in-interest since it was only a mere trustee of the funds and would not be directly benefited or injured by the outcome of the case.

Issue:

            Whether or not HPMC is a real party-in-interest or an indispensable party.

Held:

            Indispensable party.  An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by court’s action in litigation and without whom there can be no final determination of the case. A party’s interest in the subject matter and in the relief sought are so intertwined that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity.

            According to the provisions of PFTA, PEA would turn over to HPMC all the contracts relating to Heritage Park. At the time of the filing of the CIAC case, PEA already assigned its interests to HPMC and therefore, no longer a party-in-interest. HPMC now stands to be benefited/injured in the suit. Since HPMC was not impleaded, there cannot be an effective, complete and equitable resolution of the dispute.

Notes on indispensable parties:

*Does CIAC have jurisdiction? YES. Both parties agree to submit the dispute for arbitration. However, CIAC should’ve dismissed the case on the grounds that HPMC was not impleaded. Indispensable parties must be joined as either plaintiffs or defendants. When they are not joined, it is the duty of the court to stop trial and order its inclusion.

*The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties lies on the plaintiff. Defendant has no tight to compel.

Bondoc v Pineda

FACTS:

-    Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc, member of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative for 4^TH district of Pampanga.  Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the House of Rep Electoral Tribunal (HRET)

-         After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.

-         Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he voted for Bondoc because he was ‘consistent with truth, justice and self-respect’ and that they would abide by the results of the recounted votes where Bondoc was leading.

-         Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because it was a complete betrayal to his party when he decided for Bondoc.

-         HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his nomination from the tribunal.

-         Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET from its resolution.

      ISSUE:  

W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH THE DISPOSITION OF AN ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET BY REORGANIZING THE REPRESENTATION IN THE TRIBUNAL OF THE MAJORITY PARTY?

W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO WITHDRAW AND RESCIND HIS NOMINATION IS VALID

HELD: 

NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL PARTY TO CONTROL VOTING IN THE TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS JUDGE TO CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF REP.

HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID.  ACTION OF HRET IS VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE BECAUSE:

1.     IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST BET. PINEDA AND BONDOC. TO SANCTION INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD REDUCE TRIBUNAL AS TOOL FOR THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY IN POWER (LDP)

2.     MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN. CAMASURA WAS DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE DETACHMENT, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT VALID GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL

3.     IT VIOLATES CAMASURA’S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERS OF HRET ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE TERMINATED W/O UNDUE CAUSE SUCH AS: EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE, DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, RESIGNATION FROM POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID CAUSE!

People v Dacuycuy

Facts:

Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (…be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power.

Issue:

W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.

Held:

NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if the judicial department was a legislative dep’t. The exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative powers

Araneta v Gatmaitan

Facts:

The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion because of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.

Issue:

W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the Pres.

Held:

VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern w/c were in consonance and strict conformity with law.

Distinction bet:

Delegation of Power to Legislate  - involves discretion of what law shall be

Execution of Law – authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of law.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III

Facts:

Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986.  One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with int’l agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.

Held:

Sub-issue:

Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, int’l law can become domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary int’l law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an int’l rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of int’l law.

Main issue:

Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f) ->advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,

Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children uo to 24 months

And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .

These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from implementing said provisions.

Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)

FACTS: 

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG Commissioners.

The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking permission from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Resthouse was sequestered; and that she intended to delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash.



Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it was signed not by the 2 commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.


ISSUE:
 Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.


HELD:
No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG.



In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what makes it “ill-gotten wealth”,and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its acquisition.



As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.

*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the claim of the Republic in another civil case.

Philippine Veterans Bank v BCDA (G.R. No. 173085)

FACTS: 
BCDA filed several expropriation actions before the branches of the RTC of Angeles City for the acquisition of lands needed to construct the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX). The defendants in this case are the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Ten of these cases were raffled off to Branch 58 of the RTC of Angeles City.

Upon learning of the expropriation cases filed, PVB filed a motion to intervene and alleged that the properties actually belonged to Belmonte Agro-Industrial Development Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in 1976. PVB bought the land upon foreclosure but was not able to consolidate ownership in its name. PVB's motion was denied on the ground that the intervetion amounted to a third-party complaint that is not allowed in expropriation cases and that it will only serve to delay the proceedings. PVB's motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PVB is entitled to intervene in expropriation cases.

HELD:
No. Sec 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of  Civil Procedure empowers the court to order payment to itself of the proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to be settled. At the time PVB tried to intervene, its conflict with the farmer beneficiaries were already pending before another branch of RTC Angeles City. Branch 58 had no authority to pre-empt the other branch of its power to hear and adjudicate claims before it.



PVB's withdrawal of its actions in the other branch because it was found that jurisdiction lies with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) will still leave Branch 58 with no power to adjudicate the issues of ownership presented by PVB's intervention. PVB's remedy is to secure an order from Branch 58 to have the proceeds of the expropriation deposited with that branch, pending the adjudication of ownership by the DARAB.

Republic v Leonor (609 SCRA 75)

In a reversion proceeding, premised on the claim that the property is a foreshore land or that the patents were obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, the burden is on the one who claims it to be so.

Mere omission of nformation from the patent application, though essential, does not, per se, cause ipso facto cancellation of the patent.

FACTS:

DENR-Region IV (through the Solicitor General) filed complaints for Cancellation of Free Paten and OCT and Reversion against Ignacio Leonor and Catalino Razon. The complaints averred that Lot No. 10108-8617 and 10109 were part of the non-disposable foreshore land and did not appear in the cadastral map or records of the DENR. These defects allegedly constituted fraud w/c ,ipso facto cancelled the free patents and the corresponding OCTs.  An investigation of Lots 9368 and 9675 resulted in the discovery that although the lots appeared in the cadastral map, they were not cadastrally surveyed and that serious discrepancies existed among the technical descriptions in the certificates of title.

Respondents filed an answer stating that the free patents were issued in accordance with law, that the lots were surveyed by Alexander Jacob (Geodetic Eng’g) of the Bureau of Lands, and that the subject lots were not investigated by DENR.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents due to insufficiency of evidence. CA declared that 2 of the lands were foreshore lands.and sustained the RTC’s finding that there was no sufficient evidence on the rest of the subject lots.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed error when it sustained the validity of the 3 subject free patents.

HELD:

No. For Lot 8617, records show that the only piece of evidence alluding to this lot being foreshore land is the testimony of Atty. Apuhin from DENR.  His only finding was that the lots had already been developed as a beach resort (owned by Leonor) but the court examined the cadastral map and that there was nothing to indicate that it is a foreshore land. What is obvious is that the lot is close to the waters of Balayan Bay.  However, proximity alone does not necessarily make it a foreshore land. Also petitioner was not able to establish that there was clear and convincing evidence of fraud.

Petitioner also points out that in the free patent application, Leonor did not indicate the name of his predecessors – that this was in violation of the Public Land Act and will ipso facto cancel the free patent. SC said that mere omission of information , though essential, will not ipso facto cancel the patent. It must be shown that the info withheld  would have resulted in the disapproval of the free patent application had it been disclosed.

For Lot 9398, petitioner cited discrepancies in its description. SC stated that such discrepancies would not necessarily imply that respondents employed fraud. Again, there was no proof. Petitioner also argues that the predecessors of Leonor are fictitious persons. The SC does not agree by stating that the predecessors were respondents in a case for accion reivindicatoria and quieting of title.

Conclusion: DENR did not conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged irregularities imputed to respondents in obtaining the free patents. 

Heirs of Crispulo Ferrer and Engracia Puhawan v CA

Doctrine: A survey made in a cadastral proceeding is not a proof of ownership. It merely identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title, its purpose is to identify and delineate the extent of the land.

On prescription: Art 1137 of the Civil Code only applies to private lands, not to public lands even if they have been declared alienable and disposable. Open, continuous, exclusive, notorious (OCEN) must be conclusively established. CA141 is applicable in this case.

Facts of the Case:

Petitioners sought to enjoin NAPOCOR (Nat’l Power Corporation) from selling the Caliraya Hydroelectric Power Plant. They claim ownership over portions of the land where the power plant stood, specifically Lot 1873 and Lot 72.

NAPOCOR claimed that they acquired Lot 1873 through purchase from Oliva Ferrer. As for Lot 72, it claimed that its right to occupy and use of the lot stemmed from the Right of Way Agreement executed by the petitioners.

Petitioners opposed this claim by alleging that Ferrer was a co-heir who owned Lot 1873. As a heir, Ferrer only inherited some part of the lot and the sale to NAPOCOR in excess of this amount was w/o authority from the co-owners and therefore, void.

RTC dismissed the action for injunction and claim for damages. It ruled that the petitioners failed to present convincing proof of ownership of Lot 1873, other than the Bureau of Lands certificate claimed and surveyed for Crispulo Ferrer. As for Lot 72, the RTC ruled that it had already been acquired by Hilaria and Victoria Puhawan through extrajudicial partition. Hence, petitioners have no legal claim over Lot 72. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have a claim to ownership of Lots 1873 and Lot 72.

Held:

No. The reliance of the petitioners on the Bureau of Lands certificate to prove ownership to Lot 1873 is not sufficient. All that the certification proved was that Crispulo Ferrer was a survey claimant. Purpose of a survey plan is simply to identify and delineate the extent of the land. It is not a proof of ownership. In the case, the petitioners were not even able to present the actual survey plan. Also, the CA found that the portions of land covered by his Ferrer’s title were not those where NAPOCOR’s power plant stood.

Also, they could NOT have acquired it by prescription. Acquisition of ownership of public lands is governed by Commonwealth Act 141, not Art. 1137 of Civil Code. There was no conclusive proof that Lot 1873 was decreed to be alienable and disposable. There was also nothing to support the allegation that their predecessors occupied Lot 1873 since 1916 or June 12, 1945.  Assuming that they have held possession since the date, (when NAPOCOR occupied portions of the land and began construction of the power plant) their inaction for 61 years establishes the fact that they were never in OCEN. Their claim is barred by laches.

As for Lot 72, their claim is also barred by laches. The lot was occupied by NAPOCOR since 1937 and again their inaction was to the petitioner’s disadvantage.

Motion for reconsideration denied. 

Bachrach v La Protectora

Facts:

Nicolas Segundo, Antonio Adiarte, Ignacio Flores and Modesto Serrano (defendants) formed a civil partnership called “La Protectora” for the purpose of engaging in the business of transporting passengers and freight at Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Marcelo Barba, acting as manager, negotiated for the purchase of 2 automobile trucks from E. M. Bachrach for P16,500. Barba paid P3,000 in cash and for the balance executed promissory notes.

One of these promissory notes was signed in the following manner:

“P.P La Protectora, By Marcelo Barba Marcelo Barba”

The other 2 notes were signed in the same way but the word “by” was omitted. It was obvious that in signing the notes, Barba intended to bind both the partnership and himself.

The defendants executed a document in which they declared that they were members of La Protectora and that they had granted to its president full authority to contract for the purchase of the 2 automobiles.  The document was delivered by Barba to Bachrach at the time the vehicles were purchased.

Barba incurred a debt amounting to P2,617.57 and Bachrach foreclosed a chattel mortgage on the trucks but there was still balance. To recover the balance, action was instituted against the defendants. Judgment was rendered against the defendants.

Issue:

a.Whether or not the defendants are liable for the firm debts.

b.Whether or not Barba had authority to incur expenses for the partnership (relevant issue)

Held:

a.Yes. Promissory notes constitute the obligation exclusively of La Protectora and Barba. They do not constitute an obligation directly binding the defendants.  Their liability is based on the principles of partnership liability. A member is not liable in solidum with his fellows for the entire indebtedness but is liable with them or his aliquot part.

SC obiter:  the document was intended merely as an authority to enable Barba to bind the partnership and that the parties to the instrument did not intend to confer upon Barba an authority to bind them personally.

b. Yes. Under Art 1804, every partner may associate another person with him in his share. All partners  are considered agents of the partnership. Barba must be held  to have authority to incur these expenses. He is shown to have been in fact the president/manager, and there can be no doubt that he had actual authority to incur obligation.

US v Guevarra

FACTS:

- GUEVARRA SLASHED HIS WIFE WITH A BOLO SEVERAL TIMES CAUSING 3 WOUNDS WHILE STARCHING CLOTHES

- COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE TRIED TO PROVE THAT GUEVARRA WAS SUFFERING FROM A FIT OF INSANITY

- COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE SAID GUEVARRA WAS GUILTY FOR CRIME OF PARRICIDE

ISSUE:

-W/N CFI ERRED IN CLASSIFYING ACT AS PARRICIDE

- W/N CFI ERRED IN NOT REGARDING THE PLEA OF INSANITY FOR DEFENDANT

- W/N CFI ERRED IN IMPOSING PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT

HELD:

- NO GROUND TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATION OF DEFENSE THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE CLASSIFIED AS PARRICIDE

- NOTHING IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT GUEVARRA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND NOR WAS HE UNDER A SUDDEN ATTACK OF INSANITY. THE ACTS OF “INSANITY” MAY HAVE BEEN FEIGNED BY GUEVARRA AFTER HE HAD LEARNED THAT HE COMMITTED A GRAVE CRIME. (DEFENDANT ACTED AS IF HE WAS TERRIFIED WHEN THE PRES. OF THE BOARD OF HEALTH TOOK HIS BLOOD SAMPLE, THAT HE WAS NAKED AND LYING FACE DOWNWARDS W/O KNOWING WHAT HE WAS DOING AND SWIMMING IN HIS OWN URINE IN JAIL) PRES. OF BOARD OF HEALTH OBSERVED THAT HE DEFENDANT NEVER BEHAVED IN AN IRRATIONAL CONDITION. DEFENDANT DID NOT SHOW ANY SIGNS OF PERTURBED REASON DURING HIS STAY IN THE COMPANY OF HIS WIFE

- NOT ERRED IN IMPOSING LIFE IMPRISONMENT, AS PENALIZED IN ART 402 OF THE PENAL CODE

US v Tanedo

FACTS:

- PETENIA, CASTANEDA AND LUGON CONSPIRED TO KILL AND ROB MRS.GUANLAO OF HER VALUABLES. PETENIA COVERED THE MOUTH OF GUANLAO, LUGON HIT HER WITH ADOBE STONE. PETENIA DELIVERED FISTIC BLOWS. AS GUANLAO FELL TO THE GROUND, LUGON AND PETENIA HIT HER AGAIN TWICE AND CAUSED HER DEATH.

- PETENIA AND CASTANEDA WERE ARRESTED FOR ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

ISSUE:
- W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THEIR EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS

-W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN CONSPIRACY

- W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM CAUSE OF EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE (UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR)

HELD:

- NO. BURDEN IS ON DEFENSE TO PROVE THAT A CONFESSION WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION, THREAT OR PROMISE OF REWARD OR LENIENCY. NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS WERE BY FORCE.

- NO. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THE COMMITTED CRIME SHOW A SINGLE PURPOSE AND IN UNISON WITH EACH ACT OF THE ACCUSED TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THE PURPOSE

- NO. REQUISITES MUST BE PRESENT. (EXISTENCE OF UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR, FEAR MUST BE REAL AND IMMINENT, FEAR OF INJURY IS GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO THE COMMITTED ACT) PETENIA CONTENDED THAT HE DELIVERED FISTIC BLOWS BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID THAT LUGON AND CASTANEDA WILL HIT HIM WITH HOLLOW BLOCKS. CASTANEDA CLAIMED THAT HE RANSACKED BEDROOM OF GUANLAO BECAUSE LUGON AND PETENIA POKED A KNIFE AT HIM. COURT SAID CASTANEDA COULD HAVE EASILY ESCAPED WHEN HE WAS ALREADY AT THE HOUSE OF VICTIM. GUILT OF ACCUSED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

People v Petenia

FACTS:

PETENIA, CASTANEDA AND LUGON CONSPIRED TO KILL AND ROB MRS.GUANLAO OF HER VALUABLES. PETENIA COVERED THE MOUTH OF GUANLAO, LUGON HIT HER WITH ADOBE STONE. PETENIA DELIVERED FISTIC BLOWS. AS GUANLAO FELL TO THE GROUND, LUGON AND PETENIA HIT HER AGAIN TWICE AND CAUSED HER DEATH.

PETENIA AND CASTANEDA WERE ARRESTED FOR ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

ISSUE:

- W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THEIR EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS

-W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN CONSPIRACY

- W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM CAUSE OF EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE (UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR)

HELD:

- NO. BURDEN IS ON DEFENSE TO PROVE THAT A CONFESSION WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION, THREAT OR PROMISE OF REWARD OR LENIENCY. NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS WERE BY FORCE.

- NO. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THE COMMITTED CRIME SHOW A SINGLE PURPOSE AND IN UNISON WITH EACH ACT OF THE ACCUSED TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THE PURPOSE

- NO. REQUISITES MUST BE PRESENT. (EXISTENCE OF UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR, FEAR MUST BE REAL AND IMMINENT, FEAR OF INJURY IS GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO THE COMMITTED ACT) PETENIA CONTENDED THAT HE DELIVERED FISTIC BLOWS BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID THAT LUGON AND CASTANEDA WILL HIT HIM WITH HOLLOW BLOCKS. CASTANEDA CLAIMED THAT HE RANSACKED BEDROOM OF GUANLAO BECAUSE LUGON AND PETENIA POKED A KNIFE AT HIM. COURT SAID CASTANEDA COULD HAVE EASILY ESCAPED WHEN HE WAS ALREADY AT THE HOUSE OF VICTIM. GUILT OF ACCUSED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Salas v Jarencio

Facts:

Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requiring the Pres. to consider the feasibility of declaring an area to be a patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants. RA 4118 was passed declaring the area as an alienable/disposable land of the State, to be placed under the Land Tenure Administration(Land Authority). Gov. Yap of Land Authority wrote letter to Mayor of Manila for the proposed subdivision plan of w/c Manila accepted.  But due to unknown reasons, Manila decided to go against their “agreement” and prayed that RA 4118 be not implemented and that it is unconstitutional.

Respondent Judge Jarencio declared that RA 4118 is unconstitutional and invalid, thus the petition for review.

 Issue:

Is RA 4118 valid?

Held:

VALID! Manila has not shown any evidence that it acquired said land as private or patrimonial property. Further, RA 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the “Land for the Landless” program. The RA was never intended to expropriate the property involved but confirmed its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the Nat’l Gov’t through the Land Authority.

(STATCON PRINCIPLE: PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES)

Presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of the law. To declare a law as unconstitutional, the repugnancy must be clear and unequivocal. To strike down a law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.

Sotto v COMELEC

Facts:

V. Sotto filed for a review for the decision of COMELEC declaring E. Javier as the true and legitimate Pres. of the Popular Front(Sumulong) Party. Sotto contends that he is the President.

Issue:

W/N the Supreme Court(S.C) can review Sotto’s petition under sec.9 of the Commonwealth Act 657 w/c states that any decision, order or ruling of COMELEC may be reviewed by the SC by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or w/ such rules as may be promulgated by the SC

Held:

No. The words “may be reviewed by writ of certiorari” does not refer to the special civil action of certiorari. Sotto filed a special civil action of review of decision w/c means that the SC can only review the acts of the inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions when it acted in excess of his/its jurisdiction (not the review of the actual decision of the lower court w/c should be filed as an appeal)

(STATCON PRINCIPLE: NECESSITY OF DECIDING CONSTITUTIONALITY)

A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide on it unless it is raised by the parties. If a constitutional question is raised, it should present some other ground upon w/c the court may rest its judgment. The constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in w/c the decision for it is inevitable.

Melendres v COMELEC

Facts:

Melendres (who lost the Brgy. Chairman position to Concepcion in the May 1997 elections) filed an election protest at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig contesting results of the elections. After preliminary hearing, it was found that no filing of docket fee was paid by Melendres (which was required in Sec.6, Rule 37 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure) so Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on grounds of failure to comply with it. Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss and said that the case should be continued on the ground that the filing of docket fee is merely an admin. procedural matter and not jurisdictional. Concepcion elevated the case for COMELEC to decide on and ruling was that the Trial Court should cease and desist form further acting on the Election case.

Main issue:

W/N COMELEC acted with a grave abuse of discretion in its ruling

Sub-issue:

W/N payment of filing fee in an election protest is a jurisdictional req’t

Held:

Sub-issue: No. The payment of filing fee is an admin. procedural matter, proceeding as it does from an admin. body. Sec 6, Rule 37 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure is explicit and does not speak of conferment of jurisdiction upon the Trial Court or acquisition by the Court of jurisdiction upon payment of filing fee. Contemporaneous construction is resorted for certainty and predictability in laws esp. those involving specific terms having tech. agencies.

Main Issue: No. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its ruling. The interpretation of an admin. gov’t agency is accorded with great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. When it renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Courts give weight to gov’t agency or officials charged with the implementation of law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment.

Caguioa v Lavina

Facts:

In a letter-complaint by Attys. Caguioa and Ongkiko, Judge Lavina (of RTC, Pasig) was accused of grave misconduct for maliciously issuing void orders on a civil case between Tokyu Construction Co. and BF Corporation. The said corporations were prospective contractors for the construction of NAIA Terminal 2, of which the Manila Int’l Airport Authority (MIAA) invited to bid. However, these corp. were not able to agree on the specific portions of work done by each and the amount of fees to be paid for the work done for the construction, thus the civil case. Lavina issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) for the said case in Jan. 1997. Tokyu filed an Urgent Verified Opposition, bringing into attention of Lavina the existence of PD 1818 which prohibits the issuance of injunctive writs not only against gov’t entities but against any person or entity involved in the execution, implementation and op’n of gov’t infrastructure projects. However, Lavina issued another writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injuction in July 1997.

Issue:

W/N Judge Lavina committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing said orders.

Held:

Yes. The January 1997 Order completely ignored the prohibition of injunctive writs contained in PD 1818 and other Supreme Court Circulars. The Court held that Lavina may be either feigning misunderstanding of the law or manifesting his indifference to it. The Order also extended the initial 72-hr TRO to a full 20-day period which in effect, delays the construction of NAIA 2. By enjoining (1) Tokyu from receiving amount from MIAA as compensation for working for the project and (2) MIAA from directly paying Tokyu compensation for the execution of the project, the TRO issued interfered with, impeded and obstructed an entity directly and primarily responsible for the execution of a gov’t infrastructure project.

Ratio Decidendi:

The admin. liability of judge proceeds from failure to observe a simple, comprehensible, unequivocal mandate of PD 1818 .When a statute is clear and explicit, there is no need for any interpretation if it, there is only room for application. Judges should endeavor to ascertain facts and its applicable laws. 

Campos Rueda & Co v Pacific Commercial (44 Phil 916)

Facts:

Campos, Rueda & Co., a limited partnership, is indebted to the appellants: Pacific Commercial Co. , Asiatic Petroleum Co, and International Banking Corporation amounting to not less than P1,000.00 (which were not paid more than 30 days prior to the date of the filing by petitioners of the application for voluntary insolvency).

The trial court denied their petition on the ground that it was not proven, nor alleged, that the members of the firm were insolvent at the time the application was filed. It also held that the partners are personally and solidarily liable for the consequences of the transactions of the partnership.

Issue:

Whether or not a limited partnership may be held to have committed an act of insolvency.

Held:

Yes.  A limited partnership’s juridical personality is different from the personality of its members.  On general principle, the limited partnership must answer for and suffer the consequence of its acts. Under our Insolvency Law, one of the acts of bankruptcy upon w/c an adjudication of involuntary insolvency can be predicated is the failure to pay obligations.

The failure of Campos, Rueda & Co., to pay its obligations constitutes an act w/c is specifically provided for in the Insolvency Law for declaration of involuntary insolvency. The petitioners have a right to a judicial decree declaring the involuntary insolvency of said partnership.

Javier v Concepcion

Facts:

Lim Chua, Tan Tian On and Tan Sick Tan filed for the reconveyance of a parcel of land (Lot 12) against Urbano Javier and Leonila Albiela. Lot 12 is allegedly a portion of a big parcel of land (Lot 6) located in Quezon. It was alleged that Lot 12 was ordered excluded from Lot 6 by Chua et. al. They said that Lot 12 can never be a part of Lot 6 because the Guhit River serves as a natural boundary between the Lot 12 (which was located in Dolores, Quezon) and Lot 6 (located in Candelaria, Quezon).

As a defense, Javier alleged that they acquired Lot 12 by part-purchase and part-inheritance; that they have a Spanish title to the lot; that the lot was adjudicated to their predecessors-in-interest in Land Registration Cases, that they have declared the land for tax purposes; that they planted the land with numerous fruits w/o interference from Chua et. al; and that Chua et. al, were never owners of Lot 12 as they have acquired their title through fraud and deceit.

The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Chua et. al. It held that Lot 12 was part of Lot 6 as evidenced by the records of the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Office. Javier knew of this fact. His contention that the Commissioner’s report and the plotted area should not be admitted has no merit because of the manifestation of the Chief Surveyor.

The CA affirmed the decision thus the certiorari.

Issue:

1.      Whether or not there was fraud in the registration of Lot 12.

2.      Whether or not Chua et. al’s. cause of action has not been barred by prescription/laches.

Held:

1.      No. Fraud as a legal basis for review of a decree means actual/positive fraud as distinguished from constructive/legal fraud.  Actual fraud is a question of fact. Lot 12 was found to be part of Lot 6 under TCT 16817 issued in the name of    Chua. Furthermore, the decree of registration has long become final. Under sec 38 of Land Registration Act:  the person allegedly deprived of the land by a decree of registration under fraud should file in the CFI a petition for review w/in 1 yr. after the entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Granting that there was no actual/ positive fraud in securing the title, Javier is barred from questioning it.

2.      Without merit. The rule is one cannot acquire title to a registered land by prescription or adverse possession. There are no intervening rights of 3^rd persons w/c may be affected by a decision directing the return of Lot 12 to Chua et. al. The defense of laches will not apply in this case.

*SC affirms CA.

Bornales v IAC

Facts:

Sixto Dumolong, married to Isabel Marquez, was originally awarded a parcel of land in Capiz in 1927. But Sixto and Isabel had lived separately since 1920. They had no child. Subsequently, Sixto cohabited with Placida Dumolong, with whom he had a son (Renito Dumolong).

In November 1977,  Placida filed for reconstitution of title over the lot. This was granted by the CFI, Capiz. In March 1978, a Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property was sold to spouses Carlito Patanao and Minda Dumolong; and spouses Bernardo Decrepito and Loreta Dumolong. This was executed by Renito and by Isabel whose supposed thumbmark appeared in the document. The deed was registered in November 1978. 3 months later, they sold the lot to the Bornales spouses through a Deed of Absolute sale.

Isabel filed an Action for Reconveyance against all the spouses. Only the Bornales spouses answered and the other spouses were declared in default. The RTC held in favor of Isabel on the grounds that all the defendants were purchasers in bad faith, that the land was conjugal property of Isabel and Sixto, and that the Deed was a forgery through the machinations of the defendants.

CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the spouses Bornales are purchasers in good faith?

Held:

No.  The Bornales spouses have been tenants/lessees of the land during Sixto’s lifetime. Having been cultivators of the land, it is unimaginable that they were unaware of the transactions affecting the land.  It appears that they were aware that Isabel was the legal wife of Sixto and was a rightful heir to the properties of the latter.

The fact alone that the petitioners knew that they purchased the property with full knowledge of the flaws and defect in the title of the vendors is proof of their bad faith.  Having bought the land registered under the Torrens system from their vendors who procured title by means of fraud, petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against Isabel to the extent of her interest. The Torrens system should not be used as a means to perpetuate fraud against the rightful owner. Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith.

*CA affirmed

Doctrine: The Torrens system should not be used as a means to perpetuate fraud against the rightful owner. Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith.

Llanto v Alzona

To be considered as mortgagees in good faith, jurisprudence require that they should take the necessary precaution expected of a prudent man to ascertain the status and condition of properties offered as collateral and to verify the persons they transact businesses with.

Facts:

Maria Sales was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Laguna which she acquired under a free patent. Until they died, she and her husband (Bernardo) lived on the said land in the house w/c they constructed. Maria died in August 1986.

In January 1990, a real estate mortgage contract (REM) was purportedly executed by Maria in favor of Dominador Alzona. Estela Pelongco (one of the daughters of Maria and Bernardo) signed as witness. Ernesta Alzona (brother of Dominador) admitted that his name does not appear in the REM although he was a co-mortgagee. The mortgage was foreclosed and was sold in a mortgage sale to Ernesto.  In January 1992, he executed a Consolidation of Ownership over the property and a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in his name.

Mila Llanto (another daughter of Maria and Bernardo) and the rest of her brothers and sisters caused the inscription of an adverse claim on the title to the property. They filed for a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage and Auction Sale with Reconveyance of Title. However, the RTC and CA both ruled in favor of Alzona.

Issue:

Whether or not the Alzonas were mortgagees in good faith.

Held:

One of the essential requisites of mortgage is that the mortgagor should be the absolute owner of property to be mortgaged, otherwise the mortgage is null and void.  An exception to this is the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith - to be considered as mortgagees in good faith, jurisprudence require that they should take the necessary precaution expected of a prudent man to ascertain the status and condition of properties offered as collateral and to verify the persons they transact businesses with. This is based in the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title.

In the case, the RTC gave credence to Ernesto’s testimony that he conducted a credit investigation before he approved the loan sought and the property mortgaged. A perusal testimony proved that he exercised the necessary precautions to ascertain the status of the property to be mortgaged. Llanto never disputed Ernesto’s claim that he met the petitioners at the house built on the parcel of land. It was Estela and the persons who represented themselves as Bernardo and Maria who perpetrated the fraud. Ernesto cannot be faulted if he was led into believing that the old man and woman he met in November 1989 and January 1990 are 2 different persons.

Duran v IAC

Doctrine: The fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name indicated by the forger.

Facts:

Circe Duran owned 2 parcels of land in Caloocan City which she had purchased form the Moja Estate. She left the Philippines in June 1854.  A Deed of Sale of the 2 lots was made in favor of Circe’s mother, Fe. In December 1965, Fe mortgaged the same property to Erlinda Marcelo-Tiangco. When Circe came to know about the mortgage, she wrote to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Caloocan informing that she had not given her mother any authority to sell or mortgage any of her properties. She failed to get an answer from the RD. So she returned to the Philippines in May 1966.

Meanwhile, Fe failed to redeem the mortgaged properties and foreclosure proceedings were initiated by Marcelo- Tiangco. 

Circe claims that the sale in favor of her mother is a forgery saying that at the time of its execution in 1963, she was in the US. Fe alleges that the signatures of Circe in the Deed are genuine and the mortgage made by Fe is valid.

Issue:

1.       Whether or not the mortgage is valid

2.       Whether or not Marcelo-Tiangco was a buyer in good faith and for value

Held:

1.       Yes, the mortgage is valid with respect to the mortgagees. There is a presumption of regularity in the case of a public document. The fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name indicated by the forger. Insofar as innocent 3^rd persons are concerned, the owner was already Fe inasmuch as she had become the registered owner (caused by the sale of Circe to Fe). The mortgagee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the cert. of title and did not have to inquire further.

2.       Good faith consists of the possessor’s belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same and could convey his title. In the case, Marcelo-Tiangco in good faith relied on the cert. of title in the name of Fe.

*Circe was also guilty of estoppels by laches. Antero (husband of Circe) was in the Philippines in 1964 to construct an apartment on the disputed lots. He could have discovered the deed of sale sought to be set aside. They could also have intervened in the foreclosure suit but they did not.

De Marcaida v Redfern (G.R. L-26062)

FACTS:

The plaintiffs are Jose V. Ramirez and his wife, Eloisa de Marcaida. The defendant is J. R. Redfern. Jose V. Ramirez and J. R. Redfern are brothers-in-law.

In 1908, J. R. Redfern took his wife and three minor children to England and left them there. He returned to the Philippines the following year. Beginning with 1910 and continuing until 1922, Mr. Redfern provided his wife with funds for her expenses Mr. Redferd is now furnishing his wife P300 per month for the support of herself and one child. The two grown sons are employed and are earning their own living.

In 1920, while still in England, Mrs. Redfern obtained from her sister, Mrs. Ramirez, the sum of £600. Mrs. Redfern later secured an additional £185 from her sister in England. Mrs. Redfern did not make use of this money until 1922. Eight hundred seventy-five pesos were advanced by Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez to Mrs. Redfern after the latter had return to Manila.

The action is brought by the plaintiffs to recover from the defendant the sums of $600, £185, and P875 for alleged advances to the defendant’s wife for her support and maintenance. The judgment of the trial court absolves the defendant from the demands of the plaintiffs with costs against the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:
            Whether or not the plaintiffs can demand support from the defendants relying on Article 216 of the Family Code.

RULING:

No. For one to recover under the provisions of Art 216 of the Family Code, it must be alleged and proved, first, that support has been furnished a dependent of one bound to give support but who fails to do so; second, that the support was supplied without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty. The negative qualification is when the support is given without the expectation of recovering it.

In the case at bar, there is a failure of proof as to the first essential, and possibly the second essential, of the law.

The husband and wife are mutually bound to support each other. Parents are also required to bring up and educate their children. But in this connection, the point of interest is that the wife accepted assistance from another, when it is not shown that she had ever made any complaint to her husband or any of his agents with regard to her allowance. Mr. Redfern's reason for reducing the allowance, he says, was his precarious financial situation in 1921 and 1922. Before one can tender succor to the wife of another with an expectation or recouping himself for the loan, the husband should be given an opportunity to render the needful assistance. Also, it is clear that there is evidence in the record which corroborates the finding of the trial judge that the defendant was amply providing for his wife and children in London.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.