Republic v Leonor (609 SCRA 75)

In a reversion proceeding, premised on the claim that the property is a foreshore land or that the patents were obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, the burden is on the one who claims it to be so.

Mere omission of nformation from the patent application, though essential, does not, per se, cause ipso facto cancellation of the patent.

FACTS:

DENR-Region IV (through the Solicitor General) filed complaints for Cancellation of Free Paten and OCT and Reversion against Ignacio Leonor and Catalino Razon. The complaints averred that Lot No. 10108-8617 and 10109 were part of the non-disposable foreshore land and did not appear in the cadastral map or records of the DENR. These defects allegedly constituted fraud w/c ,ipso facto cancelled the free patents and the corresponding OCTs.  An investigation of Lots 9368 and 9675 resulted in the discovery that although the lots appeared in the cadastral map, they were not cadastrally surveyed and that serious discrepancies existed among the technical descriptions in the certificates of title.

Respondents filed an answer stating that the free patents were issued in accordance with law, that the lots were surveyed by Alexander Jacob (Geodetic Eng’g) of the Bureau of Lands, and that the subject lots were not investigated by DENR.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents due to insufficiency of evidence. CA declared that 2 of the lands were foreshore lands.and sustained the RTC’s finding that there was no sufficient evidence on the rest of the subject lots.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed error when it sustained the validity of the 3 subject free patents.

HELD:

No. For Lot 8617, records show that the only piece of evidence alluding to this lot being foreshore land is the testimony of Atty. Apuhin from DENR.  His only finding was that the lots had already been developed as a beach resort (owned by Leonor) but the court examined the cadastral map and that there was nothing to indicate that it is a foreshore land. What is obvious is that the lot is close to the waters of Balayan Bay.  However, proximity alone does not necessarily make it a foreshore land. Also petitioner was not able to establish that there was clear and convincing evidence of fraud.

Petitioner also points out that in the free patent application, Leonor did not indicate the name of his predecessors – that this was in violation of the Public Land Act and will ipso facto cancel the free patent. SC said that mere omission of information , though essential, will not ipso facto cancel the patent. It must be shown that the info withheld  would have resulted in the disapproval of the free patent application had it been disclosed.

For Lot 9398, petitioner cited discrepancies in its description. SC stated that such discrepancies would not necessarily imply that respondents employed fraud. Again, there was no proof. Petitioner also argues that the predecessors of Leonor are fictitious persons. The SC does not agree by stating that the predecessors were respondents in a case for accion reivindicatoria and quieting of title.

Conclusion: DENR did not conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged irregularities imputed to respondents in obtaining the free patents. 

Heirs of Crispulo Ferrer and Engracia Puhawan v CA

Doctrine: A survey made in a cadastral proceeding is not a proof of ownership. It merely identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title, its purpose is to identify and delineate the extent of the land.

On prescription: Art 1137 of the Civil Code only applies to private lands, not to public lands even if they have been declared alienable and disposable. Open, continuous, exclusive, notorious (OCEN) must be conclusively established. CA141 is applicable in this case.

Facts of the Case:

Petitioners sought to enjoin NAPOCOR (Nat’l Power Corporation) from selling the Caliraya Hydroelectric Power Plant. They claim ownership over portions of the land where the power plant stood, specifically Lot 1873 and Lot 72.

NAPOCOR claimed that they acquired Lot 1873 through purchase from Oliva Ferrer. As for Lot 72, it claimed that its right to occupy and use of the lot stemmed from the Right of Way Agreement executed by the petitioners.

Petitioners opposed this claim by alleging that Ferrer was a co-heir who owned Lot 1873. As a heir, Ferrer only inherited some part of the lot and the sale to NAPOCOR in excess of this amount was w/o authority from the co-owners and therefore, void.

RTC dismissed the action for injunction and claim for damages. It ruled that the petitioners failed to present convincing proof of ownership of Lot 1873, other than the Bureau of Lands certificate claimed and surveyed for Crispulo Ferrer. As for Lot 72, the RTC ruled that it had already been acquired by Hilaria and Victoria Puhawan through extrajudicial partition. Hence, petitioners have no legal claim over Lot 72. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have a claim to ownership of Lots 1873 and Lot 72.

Held:

No. The reliance of the petitioners on the Bureau of Lands certificate to prove ownership to Lot 1873 is not sufficient. All that the certification proved was that Crispulo Ferrer was a survey claimant. Purpose of a survey plan is simply to identify and delineate the extent of the land. It is not a proof of ownership. In the case, the petitioners were not even able to present the actual survey plan. Also, the CA found that the portions of land covered by his Ferrer’s title were not those where NAPOCOR’s power plant stood.

Also, they could NOT have acquired it by prescription. Acquisition of ownership of public lands is governed by Commonwealth Act 141, not Art. 1137 of Civil Code. There was no conclusive proof that Lot 1873 was decreed to be alienable and disposable. There was also nothing to support the allegation that their predecessors occupied Lot 1873 since 1916 or June 12, 1945.  Assuming that they have held possession since the date, (when NAPOCOR occupied portions of the land and began construction of the power plant) their inaction for 61 years establishes the fact that they were never in OCEN. Their claim is barred by laches.

As for Lot 72, their claim is also barred by laches. The lot was occupied by NAPOCOR since 1937 and again their inaction was to the petitioner’s disadvantage.

Motion for reconsideration denied. 

Javier v Concepcion

Facts:

Lim Chua, Tan Tian On and Tan Sick Tan filed for the reconveyance of a parcel of land (Lot 12) against Urbano Javier and Leonila Albiela. Lot 12 is allegedly a portion of a big parcel of land (Lot 6) located in Quezon. It was alleged that Lot 12 was ordered excluded from Lot 6 by Chua et. al. They said that Lot 12 can never be a part of Lot 6 because the Guhit River serves as a natural boundary between the Lot 12 (which was located in Dolores, Quezon) and Lot 6 (located in Candelaria, Quezon).

As a defense, Javier alleged that they acquired Lot 12 by part-purchase and part-inheritance; that they have a Spanish title to the lot; that the lot was adjudicated to their predecessors-in-interest in Land Registration Cases, that they have declared the land for tax purposes; that they planted the land with numerous fruits w/o interference from Chua et. al; and that Chua et. al, were never owners of Lot 12 as they have acquired their title through fraud and deceit.

The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Chua et. al. It held that Lot 12 was part of Lot 6 as evidenced by the records of the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Office. Javier knew of this fact. His contention that the Commissioner’s report and the plotted area should not be admitted has no merit because of the manifestation of the Chief Surveyor.

The CA affirmed the decision thus the certiorari.

Issue:

1.      Whether or not there was fraud in the registration of Lot 12.

2.      Whether or not Chua et. al’s. cause of action has not been barred by prescription/laches.

Held:

1.      No. Fraud as a legal basis for review of a decree means actual/positive fraud as distinguished from constructive/legal fraud.  Actual fraud is a question of fact. Lot 12 was found to be part of Lot 6 under TCT 16817 issued in the name of    Chua. Furthermore, the decree of registration has long become final. Under sec 38 of Land Registration Act:  the person allegedly deprived of the land by a decree of registration under fraud should file in the CFI a petition for review w/in 1 yr. after the entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Granting that there was no actual/ positive fraud in securing the title, Javier is barred from questioning it.

2.      Without merit. The rule is one cannot acquire title to a registered land by prescription or adverse possession. There are no intervening rights of 3^rd persons w/c may be affected by a decision directing the return of Lot 12 to Chua et. al. The defense of laches will not apply in this case.

*SC affirms CA.

Bornales v IAC

Facts:

Sixto Dumolong, married to Isabel Marquez, was originally awarded a parcel of land in Capiz in 1927. But Sixto and Isabel had lived separately since 1920. They had no child. Subsequently, Sixto cohabited with Placida Dumolong, with whom he had a son (Renito Dumolong).

In November 1977,  Placida filed for reconstitution of title over the lot. This was granted by the CFI, Capiz. In March 1978, a Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property was sold to spouses Carlito Patanao and Minda Dumolong; and spouses Bernardo Decrepito and Loreta Dumolong. This was executed by Renito and by Isabel whose supposed thumbmark appeared in the document. The deed was registered in November 1978. 3 months later, they sold the lot to the Bornales spouses through a Deed of Absolute sale.

Isabel filed an Action for Reconveyance against all the spouses. Only the Bornales spouses answered and the other spouses were declared in default. The RTC held in favor of Isabel on the grounds that all the defendants were purchasers in bad faith, that the land was conjugal property of Isabel and Sixto, and that the Deed was a forgery through the machinations of the defendants.

CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the spouses Bornales are purchasers in good faith?

Held:

No.  The Bornales spouses have been tenants/lessees of the land during Sixto’s lifetime. Having been cultivators of the land, it is unimaginable that they were unaware of the transactions affecting the land.  It appears that they were aware that Isabel was the legal wife of Sixto and was a rightful heir to the properties of the latter.

The fact alone that the petitioners knew that they purchased the property with full knowledge of the flaws and defect in the title of the vendors is proof of their bad faith.  Having bought the land registered under the Torrens system from their vendors who procured title by means of fraud, petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against Isabel to the extent of her interest. The Torrens system should not be used as a means to perpetuate fraud against the rightful owner. Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith.

*CA affirmed

Doctrine: The Torrens system should not be used as a means to perpetuate fraud against the rightful owner. Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith.

Llanto v Alzona

To be considered as mortgagees in good faith, jurisprudence require that they should take the necessary precaution expected of a prudent man to ascertain the status and condition of properties offered as collateral and to verify the persons they transact businesses with.

Facts:

Maria Sales was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Laguna which she acquired under a free patent. Until they died, she and her husband (Bernardo) lived on the said land in the house w/c they constructed. Maria died in August 1986.

In January 1990, a real estate mortgage contract (REM) was purportedly executed by Maria in favor of Dominador Alzona. Estela Pelongco (one of the daughters of Maria and Bernardo) signed as witness. Ernesta Alzona (brother of Dominador) admitted that his name does not appear in the REM although he was a co-mortgagee. The mortgage was foreclosed and was sold in a mortgage sale to Ernesto.  In January 1992, he executed a Consolidation of Ownership over the property and a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in his name.

Mila Llanto (another daughter of Maria and Bernardo) and the rest of her brothers and sisters caused the inscription of an adverse claim on the title to the property. They filed for a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage and Auction Sale with Reconveyance of Title. However, the RTC and CA both ruled in favor of Alzona.

Issue:

Whether or not the Alzonas were mortgagees in good faith.

Held:

One of the essential requisites of mortgage is that the mortgagor should be the absolute owner of property to be mortgaged, otherwise the mortgage is null and void.  An exception to this is the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith - to be considered as mortgagees in good faith, jurisprudence require that they should take the necessary precaution expected of a prudent man to ascertain the status and condition of properties offered as collateral and to verify the persons they transact businesses with. This is based in the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title.

In the case, the RTC gave credence to Ernesto’s testimony that he conducted a credit investigation before he approved the loan sought and the property mortgaged. A perusal testimony proved that he exercised the necessary precautions to ascertain the status of the property to be mortgaged. Llanto never disputed Ernesto’s claim that he met the petitioners at the house built on the parcel of land. It was Estela and the persons who represented themselves as Bernardo and Maria who perpetrated the fraud. Ernesto cannot be faulted if he was led into believing that the old man and woman he met in November 1989 and January 1990 are 2 different persons.

Duran v IAC

Doctrine: The fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name indicated by the forger.

Facts:

Circe Duran owned 2 parcels of land in Caloocan City which she had purchased form the Moja Estate. She left the Philippines in June 1854.  A Deed of Sale of the 2 lots was made in favor of Circe’s mother, Fe. In December 1965, Fe mortgaged the same property to Erlinda Marcelo-Tiangco. When Circe came to know about the mortgage, she wrote to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Caloocan informing that she had not given her mother any authority to sell or mortgage any of her properties. She failed to get an answer from the RD. So she returned to the Philippines in May 1966.

Meanwhile, Fe failed to redeem the mortgaged properties and foreclosure proceedings were initiated by Marcelo- Tiangco. 

Circe claims that the sale in favor of her mother is a forgery saying that at the time of its execution in 1963, she was in the US. Fe alleges that the signatures of Circe in the Deed are genuine and the mortgage made by Fe is valid.

Issue:

1.       Whether or not the mortgage is valid

2.       Whether or not Marcelo-Tiangco was a buyer in good faith and for value

Held:

1.       Yes, the mortgage is valid with respect to the mortgagees. There is a presumption of regularity in the case of a public document. The fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name indicated by the forger. Insofar as innocent 3^rd persons are concerned, the owner was already Fe inasmuch as she had become the registered owner (caused by the sale of Circe to Fe). The mortgagee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the cert. of title and did not have to inquire further.

2.       Good faith consists of the possessor’s belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same and could convey his title. In the case, Marcelo-Tiangco in good faith relied on the cert. of title in the name of Fe.

*Circe was also guilty of estoppels by laches. Antero (husband of Circe) was in the Philippines in 1964 to construct an apartment on the disputed lots. He could have discovered the deed of sale sought to be set aside. They could also have intervened in the foreclosure suit but they did not.

Republic v CA (301 SCRA 366)

Republic v CA (301 SCRA 366)

Facts:

St. Jude’s Enterprises is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Caloocan. In March 1966, this land was subdivided into two lots under subdivision plan (LRC) PSD 55643. The first lot was later found to have expanded its area, this was confirmed by the Land Registration Commission (LRC). St Jude’s then sold the lots to Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, and Lucy Madaya.

In January 1985, Sol Gen Estelito Mendoza filed an action to annul the sales on the lots on the ground that the subdivision plan was null and void because it expanded the area of the land.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. It found that the buyers of the land purchased the lots in good faith and since the titles were registered under the Torrens system, such titles became absolute and irrevocable. Also, even if the Sol Gen proved the expansion of the area, there was no proof of fraud when St. Jude submitted the subdivision plan to the LRC.

The CA affirmed the RTC. Thus, the petition for review.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the gov’t is stopped from questioning the approved subdivision plan.

Held:

                Yes.  While the general rule is that the State can’t be put in estoppel by mistakes of its officials, this is subject to limitations. Where innocent 3^rd persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and cancel the certificate.

                In the case, for nearly 20 years (1966-1985),  the State failed to correct and recover the alleged increase of land area of St. Jude. Also, there was no proof given that the land area was intentionally and fraudulently increased or how fraud was allegedly made. The State’s prolonged inaction is tantamount to laches (the negligence/omission of a right w/in a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned or declined to assert it).

                Also, the buyers bought the lots in good faith, relying on the clean certificate of St. Jude. They did not have to go behind the titles to verify the contents or search for hidden defects that could defeat their rights to the lots. The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid  conflicts of title and to facilitate transactions by giving the public to rely on the face of a Torrens Title and to dispense the need of inquiring further. It is only fair and reasonable to apply estoppel to avoid injustice to the innocent purchasers for value. Furthermore, Sol Gen didn’t present proof that they bought the lots in bad faith.

*As regards the expansion of the land, the SC said that the “more or less” term used in the surveyor’s findings indicates that the land was not exact. What defines a piece of titled property is not the numerical data, but the boundaries or “metes and bounds” of the property specified in its technical description and showing its limits.

*SC affirmed CA.

Doctrine:  

Where innocent 3^rd persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and cancel the certificate. All persons dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title issued. The law/courts do not oblige them to go behind the certificate in order to investigate again the true condition of the property.

Intestate of San Pedro v CA (265 SCRA 733)

FACTS:

The case involves two petitions which were consolidated by the court in its decision.

1. GR 103727

Engracio San Pedro, as heir-judicial administrator of Plaintiff Intestate, filed a complaint for recovery of real property/ reconveyance with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction against private defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz.

San Pedro alleged that defendants acquired portion of the subject estate by employing fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation.

RTC of QC dismissed the complaint saying that the defendants are already the registered owners covered by the Torrens Title - which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish Title of San Pedro. The Spanish Title also stated that the estate shall be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. The court ordered Plaintiff Intestate to pay each defendant the amount of 5,000 and atty fees.

Motion for Recon was denied.  Petitioner filed an appeal,  CA dismissed.  

2. GR 106496

Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito filed a petition for letter of administration over the intestate to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator. Judge Echeverri appointed San Pedro as administrator and the court issued letter of administration in his favor upon posting a bond of 10,000.

Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for intervention and opposition to the petition, claiming that the Titulo de Propriedad is inadmissible and ineffective proof of ownership in court and it is invalid.

Republic filed a motion to suspend the proceedings but the Republic‘s opposition to the petition for letter of administration was dismissed. Republic filed Motion for Recon.

The Judge declared Titulo de Propriedad as null and void and excluded all lands covered from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.

bPetitioner-heirs appealed to CA. CA dismissed.

ISSUES:

1.Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136?

2. Whether or not the lower court committed error in excluding from the inventory of the estate all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 on the ground that it is null and void?

RATIO:

1.NO. It is within the jurisdiction of the lower court functioning as probate court. The jurisdiction of the Probate Court is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them. Their main function is to settle and liquidate the estate of the deceased so as to rule on whether the inventory of the estate properly included them for distribution of the net assets estate to lawful heirs.

2.NO. The lower court did not commit any error when it declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate.

Under PD 892, the system of registration under Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish Titles should cause their lands to be registered under Land Registration Act within 6 months from date of effectivity or until August 16, 1976.

In both cases, petitioner-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 was brought under the operation of PD 892. There was no certificate of title shown.

Also, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under PD 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in special proceedings case. Since the Titulo was not registered under Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered title of defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz. Torrens title of the latter enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity.

Petitioner-heirs failed to present neither the original Titulo nor a genuine copy thereof (only an alleged illegible copy was presented). Even the secondary evidence presented was also not admissible.

RULING:

The Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and no rights can be derived therefrom. All lands covered by said Titulo are excluded from inventory of the estate. The petition for letter of administration closed and terminated. The heirs are disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership and ordered to vacate.