Republic v CA and Quintos (G.R. No. 159594)

Facts:

Eduardo and Catalina were married in civil rites. However, the couple were not blessed with a child because Catalina had a hysterectomy following her second marriage.

Eduardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing psychological incapacity as a ground. He alleged that Catalina always left the house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of caring for their adopted daughter; that she gambled away all his remittances as an overseas worker; and that she abandoned the conjugal home with her paramour.

As support to his claim of psychological incapacity, he also presented the results of a neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes stating that Catalina exhibited traits of a borderline personality disorder that was no longer treatable.

Catalina did not appear during trial but admitted her psychological incapacity. She denied flirting with different men and abandoning the conjugal home.

Issue:

Whether or not Catalina was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital duties.

Held:

No. Marriage remains valid.

Psychological incapacity is an incapacity/inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.

In Republic v CA(Molina), the Supreme Court has established guidelines involving the nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity. These were not met in the instant case since the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina's purported psychological incapacity were not sufficiently established.

Catalina's behavior of frequent gossiping, leaving the house without Eduardo's consent, refusal to do household chores, and take care of their adopted daughter were not established. Eduardo presented no other witness to corroborate these allegations.

Also, the RTC and CA heavily relied on Dr. Reyes' evaluation despite any factual foundation to support this claim. The report was vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of the incapacity.Even the testimony of Dr. Reyes stated a general description of borderline personality disorder which did not explain the root cause as to why Catalina  was diagnosed as such. They did not specify the acts or omissions or the gravity which constituted the disorder. What was established was that Catalina was childish and immature.

Furthermore, Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina. This lacks the depth and objectivity of an expert assessment.

From the scant evidence presented, it can be adduced that Catalina's immaturity and apparent refusal to perform her marital obligations do not constitute psychological incapacity alone. It must be shown that such immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

PEREZ V CA (G.R.No. 118870, March 29, 1996)

Facts:

Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered nurse.  After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant.  Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.

On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu.  After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S.  She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets.  However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby.  According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working.  She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.

When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms.  They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession.  He maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile.

Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her.

The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and held that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best interest and welfare.

Issue:

Who should have rightful custody of a child?

Held:

Nerissa. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides:

“SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.” (Italics supplied)

The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.  The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.

It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissa’s present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her son.  Quite a number of working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother. 

Although Ray’s is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care that a mother gives to his child.

De Marcaida v Redfern (G.R. L-26062)

FACTS:

The plaintiffs are Jose V. Ramirez and his wife, Eloisa de Marcaida. The defendant is J. R. Redfern. Jose V. Ramirez and J. R. Redfern are brothers-in-law.

In 1908, J. R. Redfern took his wife and three minor children to England and left them there. He returned to the Philippines the following year. Beginning with 1910 and continuing until 1922, Mr. Redfern provided his wife with funds for her expenses Mr. Redferd is now furnishing his wife P300 per month for the support of herself and one child. The two grown sons are employed and are earning their own living.

In 1920, while still in England, Mrs. Redfern obtained from her sister, Mrs. Ramirez, the sum of £600. Mrs. Redfern later secured an additional £185 from her sister in England. Mrs. Redfern did not make use of this money until 1922. Eight hundred seventy-five pesos were advanced by Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez to Mrs. Redfern after the latter had return to Manila.

The action is brought by the plaintiffs to recover from the defendant the sums of $600, £185, and P875 for alleged advances to the defendant’s wife for her support and maintenance. The judgment of the trial court absolves the defendant from the demands of the plaintiffs with costs against the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:
            Whether or not the plaintiffs can demand support from the defendants relying on Article 216 of the Family Code.

RULING:

No. For one to recover under the provisions of Art 216 of the Family Code, it must be alleged and proved, first, that support has been furnished a dependent of one bound to give support but who fails to do so; second, that the support was supplied without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty. The negative qualification is when the support is given without the expectation of recovering it.

In the case at bar, there is a failure of proof as to the first essential, and possibly the second essential, of the law.

The husband and wife are mutually bound to support each other. Parents are also required to bring up and educate their children. But in this connection, the point of interest is that the wife accepted assistance from another, when it is not shown that she had ever made any complaint to her husband or any of his agents with regard to her allowance. Mr. Redfern's reason for reducing the allowance, he says, was his precarious financial situation in 1921 and 1922. Before one can tender succor to the wife of another with an expectation or recouping himself for the loan, the husband should be given an opportunity to render the needful assistance. Also, it is clear that there is evidence in the record which corroborates the finding of the trial judge that the defendant was amply providing for his wife and children in London.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Sagala v CA (G.R. 116773)

FACTS:

On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband, at 1825, Road 14, Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila. Out of their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao.

Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner’s mother while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondent’s house. Reynaldo Eslao died. Petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. 

Subsequently, petitioner was introduced to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American. Their acquaintance blossomed into a marriage and the petitioner migrated to San Francisco, California, USA, to join her new husband.  The petitioner returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the United States. The petitioner then informed the respondent about her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education;

Respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. 

The lower court rendered its decision ordering respondent to cause the immediate transfer of the custody of the Angelica to her natural mother. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not custody of the daughter should be given to the mother.

RATIO:

Yes. The trial court’s disquisition, in consonance with the provision that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody is enough to convince the Court to decide in favor of private respondent.

When private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.

Of considerable importance also, is the rule long accepted by the courts that “the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy.  The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.

Santos v CA (G.R. 113054)

FACTS:

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.

On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.  After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.

Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals.  In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.

Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.

ISSUE:
            Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
RULING:

The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents.

The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son.

The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.

Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

Vancil v Belmes (G.R 132223)

FACTS:

Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.

Sometime in May 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was 2 years old. Petitioner was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.

On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.

On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the RTC.

ISSUE:

 Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

RULING:

            The respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian.  This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:

“Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.  In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.”

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent.  Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability.  Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent.  Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times.  But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.