Tolentino v Sec. of Finance

Facts:

-          House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these Purposes…)

-          Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different from that of the House Bill

-          Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2^nd and 3^rd reading of the Bill on the same day

-          Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become enrolled bill which eventually became the EVAT law.

Procedural Issue:

(1)    WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House of Rep. in accordance with sec 24, art 6 of Consti

(2)    WoN the Senate bill violated the “three readings on separate days” requirement of the Consti

(3)    WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject, one title rule.

NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law, they were exempt from taxes. After the passage of EVAT, they were already included. PAL contended that neither the House or Senate bill provided for the removal of the exemption from taxes of PAL  and that it was inly made after the meeting of the Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of RA 7166

Held:

(1)    YES! Court said that it is not the law which should originate from the House of Rep, but the revenue bill which was required to originate from the House of Rep. The inititiative must ocme from the Lower House because they are elected in the district level – meaning they are expected to be more sensitive to the needs of the locality.

Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo extensive changes while in the Senate. Senate can introduce a separate and distinct bill other than the one the Lower House proposed.  The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the House bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the House bill.

(2)    NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent. Presidential certification dispensed the requirement not only of printing but also reading the bill in 3 separate days.  In fact, the Senate accepted the Pres. certification

(3)    No.  Court said that the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. It is also in the power of Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public utility when the common good so requires.

One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress members and inform people of pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not know of their situation not because of any defect in title but because they might have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its existence.

Aquino v COMELEC

Facts:

Agapito Aquino filed a Cert. of Candidacy to run for Rep in the 2^nd district of Makati. However, Mateo Bedon ( Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the grounds that he lacked the residence qualification under Sec 6, Art 7 of the 1987 Consti. Hearings were conducted by the COMELEC and dismissed Bedon’s petition to disqualify.

During the counting of votes, Aquino garnered more votes against Agusto Syjuco. Bedon then filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Aquino to which COMELEC agreed by issuing an Order. COMELEC then again issued another Order declaring Aquino to be disqualified due to the lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue:

W/N COMELEC erred in deciding that petitioner lacked the constitutional req’ts for residence.

Held:

No! Aquino failed to prove that he was a resident of the 2^nd Legislative District of Makati for a period of one year at the time of election. His domicile of origin was in Concepcion, Tarlac. COMELEC said that the intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati is evident in his leasing a condo unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may give an indication that he intends to reside in Makati, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s domicile. Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for a year because he has other “residences” in Manila or Quezon City.

Residence is synonymous with domicile -> place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home where he, no matter where he may be found eventually intends to return and remain (ruling in Co V Electoral Tribunal of House of Rep)

Bondoc v Pineda

FACTS:

-    Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc, member of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative for 4^TH district of Pampanga.  Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the House of Rep Electoral Tribunal (HRET)

-         After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.

-         Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he voted for Bondoc because he was ‘consistent with truth, justice and self-respect’ and that they would abide by the results of the recounted votes where Bondoc was leading.

-         Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because it was a complete betrayal to his party when he decided for Bondoc.

-         HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his nomination from the tribunal.

-         Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET from its resolution.

      ISSUE:  

W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH THE DISPOSITION OF AN ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET BY REORGANIZING THE REPRESENTATION IN THE TRIBUNAL OF THE MAJORITY PARTY?

W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO WITHDRAW AND RESCIND HIS NOMINATION IS VALID

HELD: 

NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL PARTY TO CONTROL VOTING IN THE TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS JUDGE TO CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF REP.

HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID.  ACTION OF HRET IS VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE BECAUSE:

1.     IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST BET. PINEDA AND BONDOC. TO SANCTION INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD REDUCE TRIBUNAL AS TOOL FOR THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY IN POWER (LDP)

2.     MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN. CAMASURA WAS DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE DETACHMENT, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT VALID GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL

3.     IT VIOLATES CAMASURA’S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERS OF HRET ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE TERMINATED W/O UNDUE CAUSE SUCH AS: EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE, DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, RESIGNATION FROM POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID CAUSE!

People v Dacuycuy

Facts:

Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (…be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power.

Issue:

W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.

Held:

NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if the judicial department was a legislative dep’t. The exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative powers

Araneta v Gatmaitan

Facts:

The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion because of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.

Issue:

W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the Pres.

Held:

VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern w/c were in consonance and strict conformity with law.

Distinction bet:

Delegation of Power to Legislate  - involves discretion of what law shall be

Execution of Law – authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of law.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III

Facts:

Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986.  One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with int’l agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.

Held:

Sub-issue:

Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, int’l law can become domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary int’l law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an int’l rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of int’l law.

Main issue:

Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f) ->advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,

Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children uo to 24 months

And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .

These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from implementing said provisions.

Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)

FACTS: 

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG Commissioners.

The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking permission from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Resthouse was sequestered; and that she intended to delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash.



Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it was signed not by the 2 commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.


ISSUE:
 Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.


HELD:
No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG.



In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what makes it “ill-gotten wealth”,and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its acquisition.



As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.

*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the claim of the Republic in another civil case.