Boudard v Tait

Facts:
Emilie Boudard, as widow of Marie Theodore Boudard and as guardian of her children born during their marriage obtained a judgment in their favor from CFI Hanoi, French Indo-China for the sum of 40,000 piastras plus interest. The judgment was against Stewart Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial before court.

Theodore Boudard, who was an employee of Stewart Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees of Tait, although "outside of the fulfillment of a duty", according to the English translation of a certified copy of the French decision. The dismissal of the complaint was based principally on the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI Hanoi to render judgment. It was found that the Tait was not a resident of, nor domiciled in that country. Also, the evidence adduced at the trial proves that neither Tait nor his agent or employees were ever in Hanoi and that Theodore had never, at any time, been his employee.

Issue:
1. Whether or not court erred in admitting evidence for judicial foreign records (in this case, it was the Hanoi decision).

2. Whether or not the court erred in declaring that it was indispensable for Tait to be served with summons in Hanoi.

3. Whether or not the decision of CFI Hanoi was already conclusive.

Held:
1. Yes, Boudard failed to show that the proceedings against Tait in CFI Hanoi were in accordance with the laws of France then in force.

Further, Boudard failed to show that they are certified copies of judicial records. They argue that the papers are the original documents and that the French consul in the Philippines has confirmed this fact. This is not sufficient to authorize a deviation from the rule established by law. The best evidence of a foreign judicial proceeding is a certified copy with all the formalities required.

2. No. French law regarding summons states that: those who have no known residence in France shall be served summons in the place of their present residence; if the place is unknown, writ shall be placed at the main door of the hall of the court where the complaint is filed.

In the case, it was shown that summons were delivered in Manila to J.M. Shotwell, a representative or agent of Churchill and Tait, Inc. which is an entity entirely different from Tait. Also, evidence shows that Tait was not in Hanoi during the time the complaint was filed by Boudard. The rule is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country,regarding payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings.

3. No. The decision cannot be conclusive to such an extent that it cannot be contested. It merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of Boudard's claim and admits proof to the contrary.

The effect of a judgment of any tribunal of a foreign country is:
- In case of judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing.

- In case of judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title, but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of:
-> want of jurisdiction
-> want of notice to the party
-> collusion
-> fraud
-> clear mistake of law or fact

People v Castaneda

Facts:
Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document. The complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a deed of sale the house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, making it appear that his spouse gave her marital consent to said sale.

At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution stated that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria.

Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.

Held:
No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.

In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband. It is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint.

With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

Elayda v CA

Facts: The proceedings originated from a complaint of Amelia C. Elayda against the Spouses Pedro Roxas and Leonora T. Roxas. Elayda basically sought recovery of loans extended to the defendants in the aggregate sum of P90,000.00, with interest.

The loans were secured by post-dated checks issued by the spouses and receipts signed by them purporting to show that they had received jewelry to be sold on commission. The Roxases admitted having received said loans but claimed that the loans had been paid in full and that total payments exceeded the total obligation justly and actually due from them, and they had been required to pay usurious interests.

During trial, Elayda presented her testimonial and documentary proofs in due course, 

The Roxases adduced evidence which tended to show that they had received the loans aggregating P90,000.00 on two separate occasions. They alleged that they were required to give, and did give, a "kickback" of P10,000.00 and to pay interest at the rate of 4% a month. They also claim that the total payment made by them to Elayda amounted to P112,674.00.

To counteract this evidence, Elayda tried to submit a statement prepared by her accountant to the effect that the total loan given by her to the spouses amounted to P186,000.00, not P90,000.00. She also averred that the payments made by the spouses on account thereof came up to only P110,474.00 –– of which the sum of P14,223.81 was charged to interest at 14% per annum and P96,250.19, to principal –– thus leaving a balance due from them of P89,749.81. 

The trial court ruled for the Roxases. The preponderance of evidence being clearly in favor of defendants, the complaint is dismissed and the plaintiff is condemned to reimburse and return to defendants the sum of P22,674.00, with costs against plaintiff.

The Appellate Tribunal affirmed the Trial Court's judgment in its entirety, as "being in accordance with law and the evidence."

Issue:

 Whose version of the material occurrences has been established by a preponderance of the evidence?

Held: The Roxases contention.

Elayda wants the SC to go over the proofs presented by the parties, and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the Trial Court and the Appellate Court were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence and eventually, to the totality of the evidence of one party or the other. This, the Court cannot and will not do.

Of course, the matter of whether a particular item of proof was properly admitted or rejected in light of the rules of evidence, is an issue of law. Of this character is the issue raised by Elayda in respect of the Trial Court's rejection of her accountant's statement. This issue this Court can and does now pass upon.

The Court declares the rejection to be correct. Such rejection is entirely in accord with the "familiar doctrine" that "an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not . . ." 

That doctrine has been embodied in the revised Rules of Court, effective on January 1, 1964, Section 2, Rule 129. Nothing in the record shows that Elayda's admissions in her complaint were indeed "made through palpable mistake."

Besides, if it be true that the total loan liability of the Roxases was not P90,000.00 only, but P186,000.00 (or P187,600.00), it is quite surprising that Elayda's evidence-in-chief, as plaintiff, was directed to proving an obligation of only P90,000.00. Even more surprising is the fact that in her complaint Elayda only alleged the sum of P90,000.00 as the indebtedness of the Roxases to her. The evidence of an indebtedness in excess of P90,000.00 would therefore appear to be a mere afterthought, difficult to accept at face value.

Also correct was the Trial Court's ruling, sustained by the Appellate Court, that Elayda's failure to deny specifically and under oath the accusation of usury set out in the Roxases' Amended Answer constituted an admission of that accusation. The ruling is entirely in accord with Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which pertinently provides that "allegations of usury are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath." The admission is a judicial admission, albeit implied, and cannot be negated "unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake," a showing which Elayda has not made.

CA affirmed.