Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v V.P. Eusebio Construction Inc.

Facts:
1. The State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Housing and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical Rehabilitation Center in Iraq to Ayjal Trading and Contracting Company for a total contract price of about $18M.

2. Spouses Santos, in behalf of 3-Plex International, Inc., a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ayjal wherein the former undertook the execution of the entire a project, while the latter would be entitled to a commission of 4%.

3. 3-Plex not accredited by the Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB) assigned and transferred all its rights and interests to VPECI.

4. The SOB required the contractors to submit a performance bond representing 5% of the total contract price, an advance payment bond representing 10% of the advance payment to be released upon signing of the contract. To comply with these requirements 3-Plex and VPECI applied for a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors.

5. But what SOB required was a guarantee from the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad so Rafidain Bank issued a performance bond in favor of SOB on the condition that another foreign bank (not Phil Guarantee) would issue the counter-guarantee. Hence, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was chosen to provide the counter guarantee.

6.Afterwards, SOB and the joint venture of VPECI and Ayjal executed the service contract. Under the contract, the joint venture would supply manpower and materials, SOB would refund 25% of the project cost in Iraqi Dinar and 75% in US dollars at an exchange rate of 1 Dinar to $3.37.

7.The project was not completed. Upon seeing the impossibility of meeting the deadline, the joint venture worked for the renewal or extension (12x) of the performance bond up to December 1986.

8. In October 1986, Al Ahli Bank sent a telex call demanding full payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee. Upon receipt, VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development Minister Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex for being in contravention of its mutual agreement that the penalty will be held in abeyance until completion of the project. It also wrote SOB protesting the telex since the Iraqi government lacks foreign exchange to pay VPECI and the non-compliance with the 75% billings in US dollars.

9. Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that it already paid to Rafidain Bank. The Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank representing the full payment of the performance counter-guarantee for VPECI's project in Iraq.

10. Philguarantee sent letters to respondents demanding the full payment of the surety bond. Respondents failed to pay so petitioner filed a civil case for collection of sum of money.

11. Trial Court ruling: Dismissed. Philguarantee had no valid cause of action against the respondents. The joint venture incurred no delay in the execution of the project considering that SOB's violations of the contract rendered impossible the performance of its undertaking.

12. CA: Affirmed.

Issue:
What law should be applied in determining whether or not contractor (joint venture) has defaulted?

Held:
The question of whether there is a breach of the agreement which includes default pertains to the INTRINSIC validity of the contract.

No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal systems is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by lex contractus (proper law of the contract). This may be the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (lex loci intentionis). The law selected may be implied from factors such as substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts adopt this: to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract, SUBJECT to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction.

In the case, the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of law. The laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction and one of the parties is the Iraqi government. The place of performance is also in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether VPECI defaulted may be determined by the laws of Iraq.

BUT! Since foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, processual presumption will apply.

According to Art 1169 of the Civil Code: In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner what is incumbent upon him.

As found by the lower courts: the delay or non-completion of the project was caused by factors not imputable to the Joint Venture, it was rather due to the persistent violations of SOB, particularly it's failure to pay 75% of the accomplished work in US dollars. Hence, the joint venture does not incur in delay if the other party(SOB) fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon him.

Boudard v Tait

Facts:
Emilie Boudard, as widow of Marie Theodore Boudard and as guardian of her children born during their marriage obtained a judgment in their favor from CFI Hanoi, French Indo-China for the sum of 40,000 piastras plus interest. The judgment was against Stewart Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial before court.

Theodore Boudard, who was an employee of Stewart Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees of Tait, although "outside of the fulfillment of a duty", according to the English translation of a certified copy of the French decision. The dismissal of the complaint was based principally on the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI Hanoi to render judgment. It was found that the Tait was not a resident of, nor domiciled in that country. Also, the evidence adduced at the trial proves that neither Tait nor his agent or employees were ever in Hanoi and that Theodore had never, at any time, been his employee.

Issue:
1. Whether or not court erred in admitting evidence for judicial foreign records (in this case, it was the Hanoi decision).

2. Whether or not the court erred in declaring that it was indispensable for Tait to be served with summons in Hanoi.

3. Whether or not the decision of CFI Hanoi was already conclusive.

Held:
1. Yes, Boudard failed to show that the proceedings against Tait in CFI Hanoi were in accordance with the laws of France then in force.

Further, Boudard failed to show that they are certified copies of judicial records. They argue that the papers are the original documents and that the French consul in the Philippines has confirmed this fact. This is not sufficient to authorize a deviation from the rule established by law. The best evidence of a foreign judicial proceeding is a certified copy with all the formalities required.

2. No. French law regarding summons states that: those who have no known residence in France shall be served summons in the place of their present residence; if the place is unknown, writ shall be placed at the main door of the hall of the court where the complaint is filed.

In the case, it was shown that summons were delivered in Manila to J.M. Shotwell, a representative or agent of Churchill and Tait, Inc. which is an entity entirely different from Tait. Also, evidence shows that Tait was not in Hanoi during the time the complaint was filed by Boudard. The rule is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country,regarding payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings.

3. No. The decision cannot be conclusive to such an extent that it cannot be contested. It merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of Boudard's claim and admits proof to the contrary.

The effect of a judgment of any tribunal of a foreign country is:
- In case of judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing.

- In case of judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title, but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of:
-> want of jurisdiction
-> want of notice to the party
-> collusion
-> fraud
-> clear mistake of law or fact

Minucher v CA

Doctrine:
Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.

Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attaché of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an informer belonging to the military intelligence community).

Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding the expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.

Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.

It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a motion to quash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines.

TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with diplomatic immunity.

Issue:
Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement complained in a Diplomatic Note.

Held:
No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or by the service of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.

The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in his official capacity.

People v Dumpo

Facts:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dumpo have been legally married according to the rites and practices of the Mohammedan religion. Without the marriage being dissolved, it has been alleged that Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which they lived together as husband and wife.

Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy in the CFI Zamboanga. Dumpo appealed.

It has been established by the defense, without the prosecution having presented objection or evidence to the contrary, that the alleged second marriage was null and void according to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father (Moro Jalmani) had not given his consent.

Issue: Whether or not Dumpo was guilty of bigamy.

Held: No. Dumpo was acquitted.

The court formulated that there is no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for the validity of a marriage between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact which must be subject to proof in every particular case.

In the case, the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari (Iman or Mohammedans priest authorized to solemnize marriages between Mohammedans) was that the effect of the consent of the father's bride is an indispensable requirement for the validity of such contracts.

It was easy for the prosecution to show that the marriage was void by refuting Tahari's testimony because there were 2 other Imans among the State witnesses in the case, but it failed to do so.

Granting the absolute necessity of the father's consent, tacit compliance may be presumed because it does not appear that Dumpo's father has signified his opposition to the 2nd marriage after he had been informed of its celebration. But this presumption should not be established over the affirmation of Dumpo's father saying that he did not give his consent to the 2nd marriage.

It is an essential element in bigamy that the 2nd marriage have all the essential requisites of a valid marriage. It appearing that the 2nd marriage cannot be considered as such, there is no justification to hold her guilty of bigamy.

Dissent:
There is no quotation from the Koran regarding the essentials of a marriage ceremony. Justice Hull agrees that the evidence relied upon is not worthy of serious consideration. If consent were in fact necessary, it can well be presumed from the subsequent actions of the girl.

Navida v Dizon

Facts:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

In a Memorandum Order, the Federal District Court conditionally granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss provided the defendants:

(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States

(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional defense in any action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which his injury occurred.

(3) waived any limitations-based defense that has matured since the commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas;

(4) stipulated that any discovery conducted during the pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to the same extent as if it had been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and

(5) submitted an agreement binding them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.

In the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for.

Case 1 (125078) and 2 (125598):

336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant companies.)

NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970’s up to the early 1980’s when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the former’s health and well-being.

Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the complaint included the manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce. The subject matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to the present case, consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the present Regional Trial Court.

Second, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that NAVIDA, et al., were coerced into submitting their case to the Philippine courts, merely to comply with the U.S. District Court’s Order and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.

Third, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant companies. Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept service of summons/processes in the Philippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over persons of the defendants through their voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance of the defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the “Defendants’ Amended Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens” filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that “(t)he authority of each designated representative to accept service of process will become effective upon final dismissal of these actions by the Court”. The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case is not yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom. Consequently, since the authority of the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, the acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is also conditional.

Fourth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision of the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same cases in another forum, violates the rule on ‘forum shopping’ so abhorred in this jurisdiction. Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own jurisdiction. This court takes note that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action. The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, which is really a matter of venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction with this court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction.

Case 3 (126654), 4 (127856), 5(128398)

Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. They alleged that as workers in the banana plantation and/or as residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in “serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.”

The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Cases. The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the above but because it shares the opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in its Special report “Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility,” Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage suit against foreign companies since the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine laws. There has been no decided case in Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP. This means there is no available evidence which will prove and disprove the relation between sterility and DBCP.

Eventually, the cases reached the SC!

Present case:

The main contention of the petitioners states that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case.

DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. DOLE also argues that if indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case, applying the customs of the place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.

CHIQUITA (another petitioner) argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed before them. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of the proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTCs have jurisdiction over the subject matter in these cases.

Held: Yes.

1. The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.

At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:

In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City.

2. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.

3. It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., “the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce,” and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.

Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines.

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Re: Jurisdiction over the person

The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings below.

In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.

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Jurisdiction v Exercise of Jurisdiction

It may also be pertinently stressed that “jurisdiction” is different from the “exercise of jurisdiction.” Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.

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Re: Bad faith in filing cases to procure a dismissal and to allow petitioners to return to the forum of their choice.

This Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any merit.

It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported by evidence on record. This Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances.

* We REMAND the records of this case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints.