Go, Sr. v Ramos

Facts:

Three cases arose from the same factual milieu. These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien.

Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.”

Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten.

He also averred that in September 1989, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. He alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625 (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950.

Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.

With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is “FChinese,” he maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrar’s Office who might have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his father’s citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed when the employees of that office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino.

As regards the entry in his siblings’ certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his father.

In a Resolution dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. She affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmy’s father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.

On March 8, 2001, the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos’ election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his father’s questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.

On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating provisions of The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and set aside the March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings. In essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.

In the interim, the Board issued a Decision ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy.

In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a supplemental petition for certiorari and prohibition before the trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision. Later, however, the trial court dissolved the writ in a Decision dated January 6, 2004 as a consequence of the dismissal of the petition.

Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied.
Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.

Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143. They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge sheet.

The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition. It did not find merit in their argument that the issue of citizenship should proceed only before the proper court in an independent action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.

Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been denied, Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation which resulted in the apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China.

On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance.

In an Order, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed?

Held:
Yes.

Bureau of Immigration maintains that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial court was proper. A petition for habeas corpus has for its purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a lawful ground for Jimmy’s apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of the Board dated April 17, 2002 that ordered Jimmy’s deportation has already attained finality by reason of the belated appeal taken by Jimmy from the said decision on April 2, 2004 before the Office of the President, or after almost two years from the time the decision was rendered. Said decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmy’s apprehension and detention.

They also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on recognizance he was previously granted to question his subsequent apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under investigation, and not when the order of deportation had already been issued by the Board. Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis. Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be dismissed because the same is no longer proper once the applicant thereof has been charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy. Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is no longer being detained.

On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is involved in this case is his cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the petitioners in ordering his arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the avails of the extraordinary writ.

Jimmy argues that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not attained finality owing to the availability of various remedies, one of which is an appeal, and in fact is actually void because it was rendered without due process. He also insists that the bail issued to him is valid and effective until the final determination of his citizenship before the proper courts. Moreover, he maintains that the petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee.

Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void for failure to implead therein his father, and that he should have been given a full blown trial before a regular court where he can prove his citizenship.
Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition meritorious.

We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error.

The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4[98] of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.

Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.

Sandejas v Lina

Doctrine: . In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. 

Facts:

On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS. Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro as administrator. 

On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned were the records of the Court where Sandejas filed his petition. 

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A. Lina alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated to sell to Lina 4 parcels of land.

Eliodoro died sometime in November 1984 in Canada His counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the death of the administrator. He also alleged that the matter of the claim of Alex becomes a money claim to be filed in Eliodoro's estate. the lower court issued an order directing the other heirs of Sandejas to move for the appointment of a new administrator within 15 days from receipt of the order. 

On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has not received any motion for the appointment of an administrator in place of Eliodoro; that his appointment would be beneficial to the heirs; that he is willing to give away his being an administrator as long as the heirs has found one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as new administrator. They were reasoning out that it was only at a later date that Sixto accepted the appointment. The lower court substituted Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas as administrator.

On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale executed between Alex A. Lina and Elidioro and to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Alex. The lower court granted Alex's motion. 

Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court. 

Issue

What is the settlement court's jurisdiction?

Held:

Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. One can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only with the court's permission.

Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences have no bearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.

In the present case, the Motion was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to Alex; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.

* Re: Intervenor's Standing

Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and granting respondent's Motion for Approval.

There is no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides:

"SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. -- Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. "

This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically requiring only the executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2);or for authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other interested persons, although such authority is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4).

Section 8 mentions only an application to authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who should file the application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one .who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the avails of the suit.