Versoza v CA (299 SCRA 100)

Facts:

Fe Uson is the owner of a parcel of land in Sual, Pangasinan. She mortgaged the land to Wilfredo Versoza.  For failing to pay her obligation, Versoza foreclosed the property. The Provincial Sheriff set the foreclosure sale. 

To prevent from proceeding with the foreclosure sale, Uson filed for annulment of mortgage with a prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint of Uson was dismissed on the ground that it was not personally verified by Uson. The court granted Uson’s Motion for Reconsideration and filed an amended complaint with the required verification.

In the meantime, Versoza asked the Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure. Uson requested that the sale be deferred since there was a pending action (annulment of mortgage) in court. However, the sale continued and the property was sold to Versoza.

After the redemption period, Sheriff issued the Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale. The lot is now under Versoza’s name. Sometime after, Versoza sold the lot to Pilar Martinez.

Uson filed her an application for preliminary injunction in her 2^nd amended complaint impleading Martinez and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan as defendants to the case.

Trial Court granted the injunction and ordered Martinez to cease and desist from performing acts of ownership over the lot.

Versoza and Martinez now claims that the status quo to be preserved refers to the point before the filing of the 2^nd complaint and before Martinez acquired the property. They also contend that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. The judge of the case clarified that the status quo being maintained in this case is the possession of Uson of the land and does not refer to Martinez being the registered owner of the lot.

Issue:

1.       Whether or not Uson is entitled to an injunctive writ.

2.       What is the status quo ante that the writ seeks to preserve?

3.       Wherher or not consummated acts can be restrained by injunction in this case?

Held:

1.       YES. The requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ are:

                The invasion of the right is material and substantial;

The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;

There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

The requisites are all present in the case. Uson had title to and possession of the property. She also claimed to have paid her obligation except for a nominal unpaid balance which she agrees to consign judicially. Hence, she has a clear and unmistakable right to protect her title and possession of the mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale.

2.       Status quo maintained is from Uson’s possession of the land. As defined, status quo is the last peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy. Its preservation is the function of the injunctive suit.  When the amended complaint does not introduce new issues or causes of action, the suit is deemed to commence on the date when the original complaint was filed.

3.       YES. While the general rule is that injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done, there is an exception – where the acts performed after an injunction suit is brought,  a defendant may not as a matter of right proceed to perform the acts sought to restrained and then be heard to assert in a suit that the injunction will not lie because he has already performed the acts before the final hearing. 

The court said that, a court should not (by means of preliminary injunction) transfer the property from the possession of a party to another where legal title is in dispute and the party having possession of the property asserts its ownership. One who does the act sought to be restrained, does so at his own peril.

In the case, when Uson filed the complaint, she had title to and was asserting ownership of the lot. An action was brought to enjoin Versoza from proceeding with the sale but he continued it. In doing so, Versoza was acting at his own peril.

Anderson v Posadas (G.R. No. 44100)

Good will is the reputation of good name of an establishment. If the good will, that is, the good reputation of the business is acquired in the course of its management and operation, it does form part of the capital with which it was established. It is an intangible moral profit which is subject to income tax.
FACTS:

William Anderson purchased the business of Erlanger & Galinger. He incorporated the partnership with an authorized capital of P600,000 (all of which were subscribed by Anderson). Anderson paid P70,000 and the amount left (totaling P530,000) was entered in an underwriting account.

A good will account was opened by Anderson. In 1918, he sold to Simon Feldstein 500 of his shares which amounted to P150,000 but in the course of their transactions incurred losses. In view of the said losses, Anderson deducted P125,000 from his taxable income which was approved by the BIR.

Juan Posadas, Commissioner of Internal Revenue attempted to collect a tax (P300,000) at which Anderson was assessed the goodwill of the business. Anderson agreed to eliminate the goodwill by debiting the sum in his capital account and crediting it to the good will account .

It appears, that with the P100,000 paid by Feldstein on account of his purchasing 500 shares, the loss (P125,000) has been recovered and it is but just that the P125,000 be restored as taxable income.

CFI Manila decided and held that P155,000 (which represents proceeds of the sale of the Goodwill Account) and that P125,000 (representing the recovered loss) is not subject to income tax.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not goodwill account is subject to income tax

2. Whether or not the amount of P125,000 subject to income tax.

HELD:
1. YES. Good will is the reputation of good name of an establishment. If the good will, that is, the good reputation of the business is acquired in the course of its management and operation, it does form part of the capital with which it was established. It is an intangible moral profit, susceptible of valuation in money, acquired by the business by reason of the confidence reposed in it by the public, due to the efficiency and honesty shown by the manager and personnel thereof in conducting the same on account of the courtesy accorded its customers, which moral profit, once it is valuated and used, becomes a part of the assets.

In the case, the good will of P155,000 created by Anderson has been beneficial not only to him but also to Feldstein. Aside from the benefit, he also realized a gain of P70,838 from the sale of the 500 shares to Feldstein. When you add these two amounts, it totals to P161,250 which is more than what the CIR is trying to collect from Anderson.

2. YES. It is subject to income tax.* (no legal explanation given by the Court)

In the case, the loss of P125,000 suffered by Anderson (by reason of the sale of said 500 shares) has been recovered, and it is but just that the sum of P125,000, deducted from the profits by reason of losses suffered temporarily on the capital, be restored.

CIR v Castaneda (G.R. No. 96016)

FACTS:

Efren Castaneda retired from gov’t service as Revenue Attache in the Philippine Embassy, London, England. Upon retirement, he received benefits such as the terminal leave pay. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue withheld P12,557 allegedly representing that it was tax income.

Castaneda filed for a refund, contending that the cash equivalent of his terminal leave is exempt from income tax.

The Solicitor General contends that the terminal leave is based from an employer-employee relationship and that as part of the services rendered by the employee, the terminal leave pay is part of the gross income of the recipient.

CTA -> ruled in favor of Castaneda and ordered the refund.
CA -> affirmed decision of CTA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not terminal leave pay (on occasion of his compulsory retirement) is subject to income tax.

HELD:

NO. As explained in Borromeo v CSC, the rationale of the court in holding that terminal leave pays are subject to income tax is that:


. . commutation of leave credits, more commonly known as terminal leave, is applied for by an officer or employee who retires, resigns or is separated from the service through no fault of his own. In the exercise of sound personnel policy, the Government encourages unused leaves to be accumulated. The Government recognizes that for most public servants, retirement pay is always less than generous if not meager and scrimpy. A modest nest egg which the senior citizen may look forward to is thus avoided. Terminal leave payments are given not only at the same time but also for the same policy considerations governing retirement benefits.
A terminal leave pay is a retirement benefit which is NOT subject to income tax.

*Petition denied.

Raytheon Productions v CIR (144 F2d 110)

Facts:

Raytheon Prod.  Came into existence as a result of a tax free reorganization. The original Raytheon was a manufacturer of tubes which made possible the operation of radio receiving set. Another company (R.C.A) developed a competitive tube which produced the same type of rectification as those of the Raytheon tube.

R.C.A  began to license the manufacturers of radio sets and incorporated a clause which provided that the licensee was required to buy tubes from R.C.A. As a consequence of this restriction, Raytheon found it impossible to market its tubes so Raytheon also obtained a license from R.C.A. to manufacture tubes on a royalty basis.

The license agreement between R.C.A and Raytheon contained a release of all claims of Raytheon against R.C.A. BUT such claims can be asserted if R.C.A paid similar claims to others. Raytheon was informed that R.C.A violated the agreement so a suit was filed to enforce Raytheon’s claims.

R.C.A also filed a suit against Raytheon for non-payment of royalties. There was a settlement agreement of the anti-trust action where R.C.A agreed to pay($410, 000). The officers of Raytheon testified that they returned to R.C.A $60,000 as income from patent licenses and treated the remaining $350,000 as a realization from a chose in action and not taxable income.

The Commissioner however, determined this $350,000 as income tax.

Issue:

Whether an amount received by a taxpayer in compromise settlement of as suit for damages is a non-taxable return of capital or income.

Held:

Amount is a TAXABLE INCOME. Damages recovered in an anti-trust action are not necessarily nontaxable. According to US jurisprudence, recoveries which represent a reimbursement for lost profits are income.

Accdg. to Commercial Electrical Supply v Commissioner, damages for violation of the anti-trust acts are treated as ordinary income where they represent compensation for lost profits.

The test is not whether the action was one in tort or contract but rather “In lieu of what were the damages awarded?” Where the suit is not to recover lost profits but is for injury to good will, the recovery represents a return of capital and is not taxable.

In the case, the Court held that there was nothing to indicate that the suit was for lost profits. It was not a kind of antitrust suit where the plaintiff’s business still exists and where the injury was merely for loss of profits.  

Since the suit was to recover damages to the destruction of the business and good will, the recovery represents a return of capital. Nor does the fact that the suit ended in a compromise agreement change the nature of the recovery, “ the determining factor is the nature of the basic claim from which the compromise amount was realized”.

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*Realization Test (accdg. to the case)

Although the injured party may not be deriving a profit as a result of the damage suit itself, the conversion thereby of his property into cash is a realization of any gain made over the cost or other basis of the good will prior to the illegal interference.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE:  A buys Blackacre for $5,000. It appreciates in value to $50,000. B tortiously destroys it by fire. A sues and recovers $50,000 tort damages from B. Although no gain was derived by A from the suit, his prior gain due to the appreciation in value of Blackacre is realized when it is turned into cash by the money damages.

Socorro Limos v Spouses Odones (G.R. No. 186979)

A request for admission is not intended merely to reproduce or reiterate the allegations but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request.

FACTS:

Spouses Odones filed a complaint for Annulment of Title against Limos before the RTC in Camiling, Tarlac. The complaint alleged that they were owners of a parcel of land by virtue of an extrajudicial succession.

It took a while before the respondents decided to register the conveyance and when they did, they found out that the land’s OCT was replaced by a TCT in the name of Socorro Limos.

Limos allegedly secured the TCT by virtue of a sale executed by Donata Lardizabal and husband, Francisco Razalan.

Respondents sought the cancellation of the TCT on the grounds that the signatures of Lardizabal and Razalan were forged. The petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses in their Answer to which the respondents gave a Reply maintaining that the sale was valid.

Thereafter, the petitioners served upon respondents a Request for Admission of the following matters:

1. That the husband of the deceased Donata Lardizabal is Francisco Razalan;

2. That the children of the deceased Sps. Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan are Mercedes Razalan, Tomasa Razalan and Tomas Razalan;

3. That this Tomasa Razalan died on April 27, 1997, and her heirs are (a) Melecio Partido surviving husband, and her surviving children are (b) Eduardo Partido, (c) Enrique Razalan Partido, (d) Eduardo Razalan Partido, (e) Sotera Razalan Partido and (f) Raymundo Razalan Partido.

4. That Amadeo Razalan is claiming also to be a grandchild and also claiming to be sole forced heir of Donata Lardizabal

5. That Amadeo Razalan is not among those who signed the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale;

6. That as per Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan which was submitted by the plaintiffs, the children of Tomasa Razalan are Sotera Razalan and 2 brothers/sisters. These children of Tomasa Razalan did not also sign the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale;

7. That there is/are no heirs of Clemente Razalan who appeared to have executed the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale;

Petitioners failed to respond to this Request for Admission, prompting the filing of a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing and arguing that the failure of Respondents to object to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission pursuant to Rule 26, Sec 2 of the RoC. As such a hearing on the affirmative defenses had become imperative because petitioners were no longer required to present evidence on the admitted facts.

Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending that the facts sought to be admitted were not material and relevant to the case.

RTC -> denied the Motion and held that items 1-4 were already earlier pleaded as an affirmative defense, hence, it would be redundant for Respondents to make another denial.

CA -> dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative defenses could be best proven by a hearing

So Petitioner’s seek for a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense is proper.

HELD:

NO. Under Rule 26, Sec 1 and 2: A party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have impliedly admitted all matters contained therein. It must be emphasized that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the discretion of the court. A request for admission is not intended merely to reproduce or reiterate the allegations but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request.

Thus, if the trial court finds that the matters in the Request were already admitted then the requested party cannot be compelled to admit or deny them again. In turn the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response  to request or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Rule 26, Sec 2.

In the case, the redundant and unnecessary nature of the Petitioner’s Request  rendered it irrelevant so as to apply the implied admission rule. Since there is no implied admission attributable to the Respondent’s failure to respond, then the argument that a preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.

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*As to validity of the sale, Court held that it shall be determined in a full-blown trial. A preliminary hearing will not sufficiently address these issues.

Gomez v Montalban (G.R. No. 174414)

When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.

Facts:

Lita Montalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez in the amount of P40,000 with a voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15% interest per month. Montalban failed to comply with her obligation so Gomez filed a complaint in the RTC for sum of money. Summons was served but despite her receipt, she still failed to file an Answer. She was declared in default and upon motion, Gomez was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Montalban to pay Gomez.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that there was no proper service of summons since there was no personal service. She alleged that one Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre was not authorized to receive summons and that her failure to file an Answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence (FAME). The Petition was set for hearing but counsel for respondent failed to appear before the court hence the dismissal of the Petition.

Montalban filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the Petition stating that counsel’s failure to appeal was unintentional to which the RTC granted. To this instance, Gomez filed a Petition for Reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the granting of Petition for Relief from Judgment by the RTC is proper.

Held:

NO. The RTC committed an error in doing so. A Petition for Relief under Rule 38 is only available against a final and executory judgment and the grounds include fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

Discussion on Grounds:

"Mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake," which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. This does not exist in the case at bar, because respondent has in no wise been prevented from interposing an appeal.

"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court,or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy. This is not present in the case at hand as respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to present her case.

Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. Under Section 1 Rule 38, the "negligence" must be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsel's conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court's ruling.

In Tuason v CA, the court explained the nature of a Petition for Relief from Judgment:
“A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.”

In the case, Montalban contended that judgment was entered against her through mistake or fraud because she was not duly served summons. However, under the discussion of the following grounds, the SC sees no merit in her petition.

*Petition for Relief from Judgment is set aside.

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v CA (334 SCRA 305)

Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial/quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and that there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. It seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction. Also certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy.

On the other hand, Rule 45 as a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment which include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings. All errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.

FACTS:

Banco Fil sold to Tala Realty 4 lots in Iloilo. Tala then leased the properties back to Banco Fil for a monthly rental of P21,000 for a period of 20 years. Tala demanded payment for rentals but Banco Fil failed to comply with their obligation so Tala filed numerous ejectment suits against Banco Fil. Incidentally, Banco Fil also filed 16 other complaints for recovery of real property to which Tala filed a Motion to Dismiss (MtD). The trial court granted the MtD and denied Banco Fil’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Banco Fil, instead of filing an appeal, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion because it did not comply with the constitutional mandate on the form for decisions. CA dismissed the certiorari stating that Rule 65 may be granted only when there’s no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.

Banco Fil received the copy of the CA’s decision and filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which the CA again denied. Banco Fil filed another petition for certiorari under Rule 65 this time with the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether appeal to SC under Rule 65 is proper.

HELD:

NO. SC immediately dismissed petition for the violation of the basic rules of Remedial Law. The proper remedy from the CA’s adverse resolutions to the SC is an ordinary appeal via petition for review under Rule 45.

Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial/quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and that there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. It seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction. Also certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy.

On the other hand, Rule 45 as a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment which include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings. All errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.

In the case, Banco Fil’s allegations that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion were only bare allegations since Banco Fil even admitted that the CA labored out a 33-page rationale on the decision of their case, thus, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.

Note that, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Hence, the availability to Banco Fil of the remedy under Rule 45 effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Also note that certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal. In the case, Banco Fil’s recourse under Rule 65 cannot be taken, because when it filed a petition for certiorari to the SC, the reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Rule 45 to the CA had already lapsed. 

Canlas v Tubil

Rule 40, Sec 8 CANNOT apply to a case where the MTC has original jurisdiction and where the case was already decided on its merits.

FACTS:

Iluminada Tubil was the owner of a residential lot in Guagua, Pampanga. Rudy, Victoria and Felicidad Canlas erected a house on the aforementioned lot and occupied it as their residential house upon mere tolerance by the owner. Tubil now wanted to use the land fruitfully so demands were made to vacate the lot. Canlas refused so a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Tubil before the MTC. Canlas filed a motion to dismiss (MtD) on the grounds that the MTC was without jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the parties were not the real parties-in-interest.

MtD was denied. Canlas filed an answer stating that they were in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the land; that Tubil’s title over the land issued by a Free Patent was dubious; that the action was actually accion publiciana which is beyond MTC’s jurisdiction.

MTC dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer on the grounds that Tubil failed to show that there was mere tolerance. RTC affirmed. Respondent files a petition for review with the CA which reversed the MTC’s decision and ordered the RTC to decide on the merits of the case. Canlas now files a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari contending that the RTC does not have original jurisdiction over the subject matter, thus, it cannot validly decide on the merits pursuant to Rule 40, Section 8, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court (RoC).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rule 40, Section 8 is applicable in this case.

HELD:

NO.  Rule 40, Sec 8, par 2 states that “If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction BUT shall decide the case without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence…”

The SC held that the case was of unlawful detainer to which the MTC has original jurisdiction over the subject matter, not accion publiciana where the RTC has original jurisdiction.

Having ruled that the MTC acquired jurisdiction, it properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint for failure of the respondent to prove mere tolerance by sufficient evidence. Rule 40, Section 8 of the RoC has no application in this case.

*Decision of the MTC is reinstated.

** Property Review:

Unlawful Detainer - an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

-summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.

Accion Publiciana - action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper RTC when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.

If at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.

CIR v Wander Philippines Inc.

Facts:

Wander is a domestic corporation which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Glaro S.A. Ltd.,a Swiss corporation not engaged in trade/business in the Philippines. In two instances, Wander filed its withholding tax return and remitted to Glaro (the parent company) dividends (P222,000 in the first instance and P355,200 in the second), on which 35% tax was withheld and paid to the BIR.

Wander now files a claim for refund of the withheld tax contending that it is liable only to 15% withholding tax pursuant to Section 24. B.1 of the Tax Code. The BIR did not act upon the claim filed by Wander so the corporation filed a petition to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA held that the corporation is entitled to 15% withholding tax rate on dividends remitted to Glaro, a non-resident foreign corporation.

Issue:

Whether or not Wander is entitled to the 15% withholding tax rate.

Held:

Yes. According to Sec. 24.B.1 of the Tax Code, the dividends received from a domestic corporation is liable to a 15% withholding tax, provided that the country in which the foreign corporation is domiciled shall allow a tax credit (equivalent to 20% which is the difference between the 35% tax due on regular corporations and the 15% tax due on dividends) against the taxes due to have been paid in the Philippines.

In the case, Switzerland did not impose any tax on the dividends received by Glaro thus it should be considered as a full satisfaction of the given condition. To deny respondent  the privilege to withhold 15% would run counter to the spirit and intent of the law and will adversely affect the foreign corporations’ interest and discourage them from investing capital in our country.

*Petition dismissed for lack of merit.