US v Guevarra

FACTS:

- GUEVARRA SLASHED HIS WIFE WITH A BOLO SEVERAL TIMES CAUSING 3 WOUNDS WHILE STARCHING CLOTHES

- COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE TRIED TO PROVE THAT GUEVARRA WAS SUFFERING FROM A FIT OF INSANITY

- COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE SAID GUEVARRA WAS GUILTY FOR CRIME OF PARRICIDE

ISSUE:

-W/N CFI ERRED IN CLASSIFYING ACT AS PARRICIDE

- W/N CFI ERRED IN NOT REGARDING THE PLEA OF INSANITY FOR DEFENDANT

- W/N CFI ERRED IN IMPOSING PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT

HELD:

- NO GROUND TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATION OF DEFENSE THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE CLASSIFIED AS PARRICIDE

- NOTHING IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT GUEVARRA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND NOR WAS HE UNDER A SUDDEN ATTACK OF INSANITY. THE ACTS OF “INSANITY” MAY HAVE BEEN FEIGNED BY GUEVARRA AFTER HE HAD LEARNED THAT HE COMMITTED A GRAVE CRIME. (DEFENDANT ACTED AS IF HE WAS TERRIFIED WHEN THE PRES. OF THE BOARD OF HEALTH TOOK HIS BLOOD SAMPLE, THAT HE WAS NAKED AND LYING FACE DOWNWARDS W/O KNOWING WHAT HE WAS DOING AND SWIMMING IN HIS OWN URINE IN JAIL) PRES. OF BOARD OF HEALTH OBSERVED THAT HE DEFENDANT NEVER BEHAVED IN AN IRRATIONAL CONDITION. DEFENDANT DID NOT SHOW ANY SIGNS OF PERTURBED REASON DURING HIS STAY IN THE COMPANY OF HIS WIFE

- NOT ERRED IN IMPOSING LIFE IMPRISONMENT, AS PENALIZED IN ART 402 OF THE PENAL CODE

US v Tanedo

FACTS:

- PETENIA, CASTANEDA AND LUGON CONSPIRED TO KILL AND ROB MRS.GUANLAO OF HER VALUABLES. PETENIA COVERED THE MOUTH OF GUANLAO, LUGON HIT HER WITH ADOBE STONE. PETENIA DELIVERED FISTIC BLOWS. AS GUANLAO FELL TO THE GROUND, LUGON AND PETENIA HIT HER AGAIN TWICE AND CAUSED HER DEATH.

- PETENIA AND CASTANEDA WERE ARRESTED FOR ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

ISSUE:
- W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THEIR EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS

-W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN CONSPIRACY

- W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM CAUSE OF EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE (UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR)

HELD:

- NO. BURDEN IS ON DEFENSE TO PROVE THAT A CONFESSION WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION, THREAT OR PROMISE OF REWARD OR LENIENCY. NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS WERE BY FORCE.

- NO. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THE COMMITTED CRIME SHOW A SINGLE PURPOSE AND IN UNISON WITH EACH ACT OF THE ACCUSED TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THE PURPOSE

- NO. REQUISITES MUST BE PRESENT. (EXISTENCE OF UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR, FEAR MUST BE REAL AND IMMINENT, FEAR OF INJURY IS GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO THE COMMITTED ACT) PETENIA CONTENDED THAT HE DELIVERED FISTIC BLOWS BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID THAT LUGON AND CASTANEDA WILL HIT HIM WITH HOLLOW BLOCKS. CASTANEDA CLAIMED THAT HE RANSACKED BEDROOM OF GUANLAO BECAUSE LUGON AND PETENIA POKED A KNIFE AT HIM. COURT SAID CASTANEDA COULD HAVE EASILY ESCAPED WHEN HE WAS ALREADY AT THE HOUSE OF VICTIM. GUILT OF ACCUSED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

People v Petenia

FACTS:

PETENIA, CASTANEDA AND LUGON CONSPIRED TO KILL AND ROB MRS.GUANLAO OF HER VALUABLES. PETENIA COVERED THE MOUTH OF GUANLAO, LUGON HIT HER WITH ADOBE STONE. PETENIA DELIVERED FISTIC BLOWS. AS GUANLAO FELL TO THE GROUND, LUGON AND PETENIA HIT HER AGAIN TWICE AND CAUSED HER DEATH.

PETENIA AND CASTANEDA WERE ARRESTED FOR ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

ISSUE:

- W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THEIR EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS

-W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN CONSPIRACY

- W/N LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM CAUSE OF EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE (UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR)

HELD:

- NO. BURDEN IS ON DEFENSE TO PROVE THAT A CONFESSION WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION, THREAT OR PROMISE OF REWARD OR LENIENCY. NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS WERE BY FORCE.

- NO. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THE COMMITTED CRIME SHOW A SINGLE PURPOSE AND IN UNISON WITH EACH ACT OF THE ACCUSED TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THE PURPOSE

- NO. REQUISITES MUST BE PRESENT. (EXISTENCE OF UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR, FEAR MUST BE REAL AND IMMINENT, FEAR OF INJURY IS GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO THE COMMITTED ACT) PETENIA CONTENDED THAT HE DELIVERED FISTIC BLOWS BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID THAT LUGON AND CASTANEDA WILL HIT HIM WITH HOLLOW BLOCKS. CASTANEDA CLAIMED THAT HE RANSACKED BEDROOM OF GUANLAO BECAUSE LUGON AND PETENIA POKED A KNIFE AT HIM. COURT SAID CASTANEDA COULD HAVE EASILY ESCAPED WHEN HE WAS ALREADY AT THE HOUSE OF VICTIM. GUILT OF ACCUSED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Salas v Jarencio

Facts:

Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requiring the Pres. to consider the feasibility of declaring an area to be a patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants. RA 4118 was passed declaring the area as an alienable/disposable land of the State, to be placed under the Land Tenure Administration(Land Authority). Gov. Yap of Land Authority wrote letter to Mayor of Manila for the proposed subdivision plan of w/c Manila accepted.  But due to unknown reasons, Manila decided to go against their “agreement” and prayed that RA 4118 be not implemented and that it is unconstitutional.

Respondent Judge Jarencio declared that RA 4118 is unconstitutional and invalid, thus the petition for review.

 Issue:

Is RA 4118 valid?

Held:

VALID! Manila has not shown any evidence that it acquired said land as private or patrimonial property. Further, RA 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the “Land for the Landless” program. The RA was never intended to expropriate the property involved but confirmed its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the Nat’l Gov’t through the Land Authority.

(STATCON PRINCIPLE: PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES)

Presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of the law. To declare a law as unconstitutional, the repugnancy must be clear and unequivocal. To strike down a law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.

Sotto v COMELEC

Facts:

V. Sotto filed for a review for the decision of COMELEC declaring E. Javier as the true and legitimate Pres. of the Popular Front(Sumulong) Party. Sotto contends that he is the President.

Issue:

W/N the Supreme Court(S.C) can review Sotto’s petition under sec.9 of the Commonwealth Act 657 w/c states that any decision, order or ruling of COMELEC may be reviewed by the SC by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or w/ such rules as may be promulgated by the SC

Held:

No. The words “may be reviewed by writ of certiorari” does not refer to the special civil action of certiorari. Sotto filed a special civil action of review of decision w/c means that the SC can only review the acts of the inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions when it acted in excess of his/its jurisdiction (not the review of the actual decision of the lower court w/c should be filed as an appeal)

(STATCON PRINCIPLE: NECESSITY OF DECIDING CONSTITUTIONALITY)

A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide on it unless it is raised by the parties. If a constitutional question is raised, it should present some other ground upon w/c the court may rest its judgment. The constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in w/c the decision for it is inevitable.

Melendres v COMELEC

Facts:

Melendres (who lost the Brgy. Chairman position to Concepcion in the May 1997 elections) filed an election protest at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig contesting results of the elections. After preliminary hearing, it was found that no filing of docket fee was paid by Melendres (which was required in Sec.6, Rule 37 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure) so Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on grounds of failure to comply with it. Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss and said that the case should be continued on the ground that the filing of docket fee is merely an admin. procedural matter and not jurisdictional. Concepcion elevated the case for COMELEC to decide on and ruling was that the Trial Court should cease and desist form further acting on the Election case.

Main issue:

W/N COMELEC acted with a grave abuse of discretion in its ruling

Sub-issue:

W/N payment of filing fee in an election protest is a jurisdictional req’t

Held:

Sub-issue: No. The payment of filing fee is an admin. procedural matter, proceeding as it does from an admin. body. Sec 6, Rule 37 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure is explicit and does not speak of conferment of jurisdiction upon the Trial Court or acquisition by the Court of jurisdiction upon payment of filing fee. Contemporaneous construction is resorted for certainty and predictability in laws esp. those involving specific terms having tech. agencies.

Main Issue: No. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its ruling. The interpretation of an admin. gov’t agency is accorded with great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. When it renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Courts give weight to gov’t agency or officials charged with the implementation of law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment.

Caguioa v Lavina

Facts:

In a letter-complaint by Attys. Caguioa and Ongkiko, Judge Lavina (of RTC, Pasig) was accused of grave misconduct for maliciously issuing void orders on a civil case between Tokyu Construction Co. and BF Corporation. The said corporations were prospective contractors for the construction of NAIA Terminal 2, of which the Manila Int’l Airport Authority (MIAA) invited to bid. However, these corp. were not able to agree on the specific portions of work done by each and the amount of fees to be paid for the work done for the construction, thus the civil case. Lavina issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) for the said case in Jan. 1997. Tokyu filed an Urgent Verified Opposition, bringing into attention of Lavina the existence of PD 1818 which prohibits the issuance of injunctive writs not only against gov’t entities but against any person or entity involved in the execution, implementation and op’n of gov’t infrastructure projects. However, Lavina issued another writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injuction in July 1997.

Issue:

W/N Judge Lavina committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing said orders.

Held:

Yes. The January 1997 Order completely ignored the prohibition of injunctive writs contained in PD 1818 and other Supreme Court Circulars. The Court held that Lavina may be either feigning misunderstanding of the law or manifesting his indifference to it. The Order also extended the initial 72-hr TRO to a full 20-day period which in effect, delays the construction of NAIA 2. By enjoining (1) Tokyu from receiving amount from MIAA as compensation for working for the project and (2) MIAA from directly paying Tokyu compensation for the execution of the project, the TRO issued interfered with, impeded and obstructed an entity directly and primarily responsible for the execution of a gov’t infrastructure project.

Ratio Decidendi:

The admin. liability of judge proceeds from failure to observe a simple, comprehensible, unequivocal mandate of PD 1818 .When a statute is clear and explicit, there is no need for any interpretation if it, there is only room for application. Judges should endeavor to ascertain facts and its applicable laws. 

Campos Rueda & Co v Pacific Commercial (44 Phil 916)

Facts:

Campos, Rueda & Co., a limited partnership, is indebted to the appellants: Pacific Commercial Co. , Asiatic Petroleum Co, and International Banking Corporation amounting to not less than P1,000.00 (which were not paid more than 30 days prior to the date of the filing by petitioners of the application for voluntary insolvency).

The trial court denied their petition on the ground that it was not proven, nor alleged, that the members of the firm were insolvent at the time the application was filed. It also held that the partners are personally and solidarily liable for the consequences of the transactions of the partnership.

Issue:

Whether or not a limited partnership may be held to have committed an act of insolvency.

Held:

Yes.  A limited partnership’s juridical personality is different from the personality of its members.  On general principle, the limited partnership must answer for and suffer the consequence of its acts. Under our Insolvency Law, one of the acts of bankruptcy upon w/c an adjudication of involuntary insolvency can be predicated is the failure to pay obligations.

The failure of Campos, Rueda & Co., to pay its obligations constitutes an act w/c is specifically provided for in the Insolvency Law for declaration of involuntary insolvency. The petitioners have a right to a judicial decree declaring the involuntary insolvency of said partnership.