De Marcaida v Redfern (G.R. L-26062)

FACTS:

The plaintiffs are Jose V. Ramirez and his wife, Eloisa de Marcaida. The defendant is J. R. Redfern. Jose V. Ramirez and J. R. Redfern are brothers-in-law.

In 1908, J. R. Redfern took his wife and three minor children to England and left them there. He returned to the Philippines the following year. Beginning with 1910 and continuing until 1922, Mr. Redfern provided his wife with funds for her expenses Mr. Redferd is now furnishing his wife P300 per month for the support of herself and one child. The two grown sons are employed and are earning their own living.

In 1920, while still in England, Mrs. Redfern obtained from her sister, Mrs. Ramirez, the sum of £600. Mrs. Redfern later secured an additional £185 from her sister in England. Mrs. Redfern did not make use of this money until 1922. Eight hundred seventy-five pesos were advanced by Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez to Mrs. Redfern after the latter had return to Manila.

The action is brought by the plaintiffs to recover from the defendant the sums of $600, £185, and P875 for alleged advances to the defendant’s wife for her support and maintenance. The judgment of the trial court absolves the defendant from the demands of the plaintiffs with costs against the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:
            Whether or not the plaintiffs can demand support from the defendants relying on Article 216 of the Family Code.

RULING:

No. For one to recover under the provisions of Art 216 of the Family Code, it must be alleged and proved, first, that support has been furnished a dependent of one bound to give support but who fails to do so; second, that the support was supplied without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty. The negative qualification is when the support is given without the expectation of recovering it.

In the case at bar, there is a failure of proof as to the first essential, and possibly the second essential, of the law.

The husband and wife are mutually bound to support each other. Parents are also required to bring up and educate their children. But in this connection, the point of interest is that the wife accepted assistance from another, when it is not shown that she had ever made any complaint to her husband or any of his agents with regard to her allowance. Mr. Redfern's reason for reducing the allowance, he says, was his precarious financial situation in 1921 and 1922. Before one can tender succor to the wife of another with an expectation or recouping himself for the loan, the husband should be given an opportunity to render the needful assistance. Also, it is clear that there is evidence in the record which corroborates the finding of the trial judge that the defendant was amply providing for his wife and children in London.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Sagala v CA (G.R. 116773)

FACTS:

On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband, at 1825, Road 14, Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila. Out of their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao.

Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner’s mother while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondent’s house. Reynaldo Eslao died. Petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. 

Subsequently, petitioner was introduced to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American. Their acquaintance blossomed into a marriage and the petitioner migrated to San Francisco, California, USA, to join her new husband.  The petitioner returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the United States. The petitioner then informed the respondent about her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education;

Respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. 

The lower court rendered its decision ordering respondent to cause the immediate transfer of the custody of the Angelica to her natural mother. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not custody of the daughter should be given to the mother.

RATIO:

Yes. The trial court’s disquisition, in consonance with the provision that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody is enough to convince the Court to decide in favor of private respondent.

When private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.

Of considerable importance also, is the rule long accepted by the courts that “the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy.  The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.

Santos v CA (G.R. 113054)

FACTS:

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.

On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.  After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.

Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals.  In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.

Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.

ISSUE:
            Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
RULING:

The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents.

The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son.

The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.

Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

Vancil v Belmes (G.R 132223)

FACTS:

Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.

Sometime in May 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was 2 years old. Petitioner was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.

On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.

On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the RTC.

ISSUE:

 Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

RULING:

            The respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian.  This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:

“Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.  In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.”

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent.  Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability.  Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent.  Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times.  But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.

Republic v CA (301 SCRA 366)

Republic v CA (301 SCRA 366)

Facts:

St. Jude’s Enterprises is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Caloocan. In March 1966, this land was subdivided into two lots under subdivision plan (LRC) PSD 55643. The first lot was later found to have expanded its area, this was confirmed by the Land Registration Commission (LRC). St Jude’s then sold the lots to Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, and Lucy Madaya.

In January 1985, Sol Gen Estelito Mendoza filed an action to annul the sales on the lots on the ground that the subdivision plan was null and void because it expanded the area of the land.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. It found that the buyers of the land purchased the lots in good faith and since the titles were registered under the Torrens system, such titles became absolute and irrevocable. Also, even if the Sol Gen proved the expansion of the area, there was no proof of fraud when St. Jude submitted the subdivision plan to the LRC.

The CA affirmed the RTC. Thus, the petition for review.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the gov’t is stopped from questioning the approved subdivision plan.

Held:

                Yes.  While the general rule is that the State can’t be put in estoppel by mistakes of its officials, this is subject to limitations. Where innocent 3^rd persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and cancel the certificate.

                In the case, for nearly 20 years (1966-1985),  the State failed to correct and recover the alleged increase of land area of St. Jude. Also, there was no proof given that the land area was intentionally and fraudulently increased or how fraud was allegedly made. The State’s prolonged inaction is tantamount to laches (the negligence/omission of a right w/in a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned or declined to assert it).

                Also, the buyers bought the lots in good faith, relying on the clean certificate of St. Jude. They did not have to go behind the titles to verify the contents or search for hidden defects that could defeat their rights to the lots. The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid  conflicts of title and to facilitate transactions by giving the public to rely on the face of a Torrens Title and to dispense the need of inquiring further. It is only fair and reasonable to apply estoppel to avoid injustice to the innocent purchasers for value. Furthermore, Sol Gen didn’t present proof that they bought the lots in bad faith.

*As regards the expansion of the land, the SC said that the “more or less” term used in the surveyor’s findings indicates that the land was not exact. What defines a piece of titled property is not the numerical data, but the boundaries or “metes and bounds” of the property specified in its technical description and showing its limits.

*SC affirmed CA.

Doctrine:  

Where innocent 3^rd persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and cancel the certificate. All persons dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title issued. The law/courts do not oblige them to go behind the certificate in order to investigate again the true condition of the property.

Manuel Lim v CA

Facts:

Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim are the officers of the Rigi Bilt Industries, Inc. (RIGI). RIGI had been transacting business with Linton Commercial Company, Inc.  The Lims ordered 100 pieces of mild steel plates from Linton and were delivered to the Lim’s place of business which was in Caloocan. To pay Linton, the Lims issued a postdated check for P51,800.00. On a different date, the Lims also ordered another 65 pcs of mild steel plates and were delivered in the place of business. They again issued another postdated check. On that same day, they also ordered purlins worth P241,800 which were delivered to them on various dates. The Lims issued 7 checks for this.

When the 7 checks were presented to the drawee bank (Solidbank), it was dishonored because payment for the checks had been stopped and/or insufficiency of funds. So the Lims were charged with 7 counts of violation of Bouncing Checks Law.

The Malabon trial court held that the Lims were guilty of estafa and violation of BP 22. They went to CA on appeal.

The CA acquitted the Lims of estafa, on the ground that the checks were not made in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of their issuance. However, the CA affirmed the finding that they were guilty 

of violation for BP 22. Motion for Reconsideration to SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the issue was within the jurisdiction of the Malabon Trial Court

Held:

Yes. The venue of jurisdiction lies either in the RTC Caloocan or Malabon Trial Court.

BP 22 is a continuing crime. A person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was partly committed. In determining the proper venue, the ff. must be considered. 1) 7 checks were issued to Linton in its place of business in Navotas. 2) The checks were delivered Linton in the same place. 3) The checks were dishonored in Caloocan 4) The Lims had knowledge 

of their insufficiency of funds.

Under sec 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law:

ISSUE = 1^ST delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder

HOLDER = payee or indorsee of a bill/note who is in possession of it or the bearer

The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. It is the delivery that is important. It is the final act essential to its consummation of an obligation. An undelivered bill is unoperative. The issuance and delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder.

Although Linton sent a collector who received the checks fr. The Lims at their place of business, the checks were actually issued and delivered to Linton in Navotas. The collector is not a holder or an agent, he was just an employee. 

*SC affirms conviction of the Lims for violation of BP 22 and the decision of CA

People v Grospe

Facts:

Manuel Parulan is an authorized dealer of San Mig Corp in Bulacan. He issued 2checks in connection with beer purchases and which he delivered to the Sales supervisor (Mr. Cornelio) of San Mig. The checks were dishonored by Planters Dev’t Bank (drawee) in Bulacan. From the evidence presented, Parulan made false assurances that the checks issued by him were good and backed by sufficient funds. But Judge Grospe of RTC Pampanga dismissed the case for lack of jusrisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Grospe was correct in dismissing the case.

Held:

No. He had jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

Estafa is a transitory crime. There are the elements of deceit and damage. Deceit took place in Pampanga and damage was done in Bulacan where the check was dishonored. While the check was issued in Bulan, it was not completely drawn. It was in Pampanga where the check was uttered and delivered.

The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to the consummation of the obligation. Although the check was received by San Mig in Bulacan, it was not the delivery contemplated by the law to the payee (San Mig). Mr. Cornelio is not the person who could take the check as a holder. Thus, he had to forward the check to the regional office of San Mig in Pampanga. Deceit took place in Pampanga where the check was legally issued and delivered.

Roman Catholic of Malolos v IAC

Facts:

The property subject matter of the contract consists of a parcel of land in the Province of Bulacan, issued and registered in the name of the petitioner which it sold to the private respondent.

On July 7, 1971, the subject contract over the land in question was executed between the petitioner as vendor and the private respondent through its then president, Mr. Carlos F. Robes, as vendee, stipulating for a downpayment of P23,930.00 and the balance of P100,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum to be paid within four (4) years from execution of the contract. The contract likewise provides for cancellation, forfeiture of previous payments, and reconveyance of the land in question in case the private respondent would fail to complete payment within the said period.

After the expiration of the stipulated period for payment, Atty. Adalia Francisco (president of the company who bought land) wrote the petitioner a formal request that her company be allowed to pay the principal amount of P100,000.00 in three (3) equal installments of six (6) months each with the first installment and the accrued interest of P24,000.00 to be paid immediately upon approval of the said request.

The petitioner formally denied the said request of the private respondent, but granted the latter a grace period of five (5) days from the receipt of the denial to pay the total balance of P124,000.00. The private respondent wrote the petitioner requesting an extension of 30 days from said date to fully settle its account but this was still denied.

 Consequently, Atty. Francisco wrote a letter directly addressed to the petitioner, protesting the alleged refusal of the latter to accept tender of payment made by the former on the last day of the grace period. But the private respondent demanded the execution of a deed of absolute sale over the land in question

Atty. Fernandez, wrote a reply to the private respondent stating the refusal of his client to execute the deed of absolute sale so the petitioner cancelled the contract and considered all previous payments forfeited and the land as ipso facto reconveyed.

From a perusal of the foregoing facts, we find that both the contending parties have conflicting versions on the main question of tender of payment.
According to the trial court:
. . . What made Atty. Francisco suddenly decide to pay plaintiff’s obligation on tender her payment, when her request to extend the grace period has not yet been acted upon? Atty. Francisco’s claim that she made a tender of payment is not worthy of credence.

The trial court considered as fatal the failure of Atty. Francisco to present in court the certified personal check allegedly tendered as payment or, at least, its xerox copy, or even bank records thereof.

Not satisfied with the said decision, the private respondent appealed to the IAC. The  IAC reversed the decision of the trial court.  The IAC, in finding that the private respondent had sufficient available funds, ipso facto concluded that the latter had tendered payment.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the finding of the IAC that Atty. Francisco had sufficient available funds did tender payment for the said obligation.
2. Whether or not an offer of a check is a valid tender of payment of an obligation under a contract which stipulates that the consideration of the sale is in Philippine Currency.

HELD:
1. No. Tender of payment involves a positive and unconditional act by the obligor of offering legal tender currency as payment to the obligee for the former’s obligation and demanding that the latter accept the same. Thus, tender of payment cannot be presumed by a mere inference from surrounding circumstances. At most, sufficiency of available funds is only affirmative of the capacity or ability of the obligor to fulfill his part of the bargain. The respondent court was therefore in error.

2. No.  In the case of Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals:
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. A check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. The tender of payment by the private respondent was not valid for failure to comply with the requisite payment in legal tender or currency stipulated within the grace period


the DECISION of the IAC is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED and the DECISION of the trial court is REINSTATED.

Intestate of San Pedro v CA (265 SCRA 733)

FACTS:

The case involves two petitions which were consolidated by the court in its decision.

1. GR 103727

Engracio San Pedro, as heir-judicial administrator of Plaintiff Intestate, filed a complaint for recovery of real property/ reconveyance with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction against private defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz.

San Pedro alleged that defendants acquired portion of the subject estate by employing fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation.

RTC of QC dismissed the complaint saying that the defendants are already the registered owners covered by the Torrens Title - which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish Title of San Pedro. The Spanish Title also stated that the estate shall be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. The court ordered Plaintiff Intestate to pay each defendant the amount of 5,000 and atty fees.

Motion for Recon was denied.  Petitioner filed an appeal,  CA dismissed.  

2. GR 106496

Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito filed a petition for letter of administration over the intestate to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator. Judge Echeverri appointed San Pedro as administrator and the court issued letter of administration in his favor upon posting a bond of 10,000.

Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for intervention and opposition to the petition, claiming that the Titulo de Propriedad is inadmissible and ineffective proof of ownership in court and it is invalid.

Republic filed a motion to suspend the proceedings but the Republic‘s opposition to the petition for letter of administration was dismissed. Republic filed Motion for Recon.

The Judge declared Titulo de Propriedad as null and void and excluded all lands covered from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.

bPetitioner-heirs appealed to CA. CA dismissed.

ISSUES:

1.Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136?

2. Whether or not the lower court committed error in excluding from the inventory of the estate all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 on the ground that it is null and void?

RATIO:

1.NO. It is within the jurisdiction of the lower court functioning as probate court. The jurisdiction of the Probate Court is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them. Their main function is to settle and liquidate the estate of the deceased so as to rule on whether the inventory of the estate properly included them for distribution of the net assets estate to lawful heirs.

2.NO. The lower court did not commit any error when it declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate.

Under PD 892, the system of registration under Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish Titles should cause their lands to be registered under Land Registration Act within 6 months from date of effectivity or until August 16, 1976.

In both cases, petitioner-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 was brought under the operation of PD 892. There was no certificate of title shown.

Also, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under PD 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in special proceedings case. Since the Titulo was not registered under Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered title of defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz. Torrens title of the latter enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity.

Petitioner-heirs failed to present neither the original Titulo nor a genuine copy thereof (only an alleged illegible copy was presented). Even the secondary evidence presented was also not admissible.

RULING:

The Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and no rights can be derived therefrom. All lands covered by said Titulo are excluded from inventory of the estate. The petition for letter of administration closed and terminated. The heirs are disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership and ordered to vacate.

Dela Cruz v CA

Facts:

The land involves a residential lot in San Jose, Bulacan, Bulacan. Eugenio Dela Cruz claims to be the owner and actual possessor of the lot for more than 30 yrs since Sept. 1987.

In Oct 1959, Dela Cruz contracted a loan from the parents of Christina Villanueva (who was claiming that she was a successor-in-interest after she purchased the lot from the Ramos brothers) and Dela Cruz mortgaged the land as security. In 1973, the land became subject of application under the Land Registration Act. This was done by the Ramos brothers. But Dela Cruz opposed the application for registration. The application was denied because the land still remained part of the forest reserve, hence, it is inalienable.

Afterwards, the brothers pursued the reclassification successfully and were granted ownership. Dela Cruz did not know of this instance so he was surprised to learn that the ownership was bestowed to the Ramos brothers. De La Cruz filed for reconveyance but it was dismissed.

Dela Cruz went to the CA, claiming that his uncle gave the land to his mother after having purchased it from Cecilio Espiritu in 1930. But, the CA also affirmed the RTC.

Dela Cruz now goes to SC for review.

Issue:

Is Dela Cruz vested with a better right over the residential lot?

Held:

No. Dela Cruz possessed and occupied the land after it has been declared by Gov’t as part of the forest zone. The land remained part of the forest reserve until such time it was reclassified into alienable/disposable by the Ramos brothers. Even if Dela Cruz cultivated and fenced the land, it was still a forest land.

Forest lands cannot be acquired by prescription. Therefore, possession of the lot could never ripen into ownership.

Estoppel will also not apply in this case because Dela Cruz did not possess the capacity to encumber the land at the time the land was still classified as forest.

SC affirms.